History Lessons: Real Peace Can Only Be Built by the Willing

As French President Macron pushes forward on a major international conference in June, it is instructive to look back at the last time there was a significant effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian and broader issues in the region through such a get-together.

This occurred forty-eight years ago in Jimmy Carter’s first year of his presidency. The region and the international community had gone through great turmoil in the years preceding his election: the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Arab oil boycott of the West, the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy. Carter’s election in November 1976 seemed to open up new opportunities to address outstanding issues.

The moving force behind America’s role early in the Carter term was his national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had written about his views on where the conflict should be headed next in Foreign Affairs and other publications.

Brzezinski’s thesis was that American interests in the Middle East were at risk because of the ongoing conflict, which primarily benefited the Soviet Union, and unless a comprehensive solution to the problems was found, the Soviets would continue to make hay and America would lose out.

Brzezinski was opposing his predecessor, Kissinger, who had taken leadership on the regional challenges following the Yom Kippur War, in two key ways.

First, Kissinger argued that the only way to succeed in Middle East diplomacy was to look for step-by-step progress. Hence his shuttle diplomacy with Egypt and Syria. Brzezinski, on the other hand, posited that the challenges couldn’t wait for such an incremental approach. Rather, what was necessary was a comprehensive solution to be reached at an international conference sponsored both by the United States and Israel.

Second, Kissinger argued that American interests in limiting Soviet influence in the region were achievable by demonstrating, through support for Israel in its battles with radical Arab countries, that victories could be gained, thereby attracting the moderate Arab states away from the Soviets and toward the Americans. Brzezinski, on the other hand, reasoned that the more we sided with Israel without a solution to the Palestinian issue the more the Soviets would gain. Therefore, he believed, America needed to take a more even-handed approach which included pressure on the Jewish state.

These differences surfaced early in 1977 when Israeli Prime Minister Rabin came to the US to meet the new president. While there were differing reports about what exactly took place in their private meeting, there was plenty to suggest that Rabin was taken aback by Carter’s willingness to criticize Israel and to push for dramatic change.

As the year moved on, the tensions between Washington and Jerusalem increased as steps were taken to make the international conference a reality in the fall. From Israel’s perspective, this was a highly negative development. They saw such a conference as producing no change in the Arab rejection of Israel’s right to exist and as a propaganda and political vehicle to pressure Israel.

Still, despite Israeli opposition, the Carter Administration pressed on and it appeared early in the fall that such a conference would either happen or there could be a major blow-up between Israel and the United States.

And then history intervened. While in public the main activity was about a comprehensive solution at a major international conference, behind the scenes dramatic meetings were taking place between Egyptian and Israeli officials facilitated by Romania.

Ironically. It was all the activity surrounding a potential conference which generated this quiet historical breakthrough.

Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat, seeing the direction of international diplomacy, knowing full well that such a path would lead absolutely nowhere, and eager to break the cycle of violence that had plagued Egypt and Israel for decades, chose to go his own way. And so unbeknownst to the world at large, Sadat was preparing to shock the world by his radical idea to accept Israel and seek an agreement with the Jewish state directly.

And so in November 1977, Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem as Israelis watched in awe and wonder. And Carter and Brzezinski’s vision of a comprehensive solution to the Middle East went the way of the dustbin of history.

In sum, the conference theme that dominated the conversation in 1977 was only saved from potential disaster because of Sadat’s heroic leadership. If not for his going solo, there would have been zero progress, American interests would not have been furthered and Israel would have been under even greater pressure and isolation.

As noted, there are so many things that are different today as Macron and others move forward towards a possible June gathering. The clearest and consistent lesson, however, is that real peace can only come through the willing and not through artificial frameworks and pressure. Sadat was willing. King Hussein was willing. The UAE and Bahrain were willing.

The Palestinians have shown no willingness and until they do, all the talk about international solutions will once again go nowhere.