The Blogs: Houthi Threat Bringing Saudi Arabia and UAE Closer, Will Israel and IMEC Benefit?

Photo caption: Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud (right) and Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani attend a consultative ministerial meeting in Riyadh on March 19, 2026. (Fayez Nureldine/AFP). Photo previously published by The Times of Israel in March 2026.

The renewed escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Yemen, alongside growing tensions between the United States and Iran, may be reshaping relations between the Gulf’s two most influential powers—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In recent months, relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have experienced significant strains. Much of the disagreement centered on Yemen’s civil war, where the UAE supported local factions whose interests did not always align with Saudi policy. Additional differences emerged over Sudan, approaches toward Iran, and relations with Turkey and Pakistan.

Over the past week, however, there have been growing signs of a renewed effort to present a united front. According to Reuters, senior Saudi and Emirati officials have publicly emphasized the strength of bilateral ties. Saudi Minister of Media Salman Al-Dosari and Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Hamed, Chairman of the UAE’s National Media Office, published remarkably similar messages on X on the same evening, highlighting the deep bonds of brotherhood, shared heritage, and strategic cooperation between the two countries. Both also called on the media to reflect these values in their coverage.

At the same time, the UAE condemned Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, while Saudi Arabia condemned the Iranian attacks against the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. These coordinated messages may indicate that growing regional security threats are beginning to outweigh the political disagreements that have characterized relations in recent months.

For Israel, these developments could have broader implications. Israel and Saudi Arabia face a common challenge from the Houthis, whose attacks threaten freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Any disruption to these maritime routes affects international trade and regional supply chains, including cargo moving through Aqaba and onward to Eilat.

The struggle over Red Sea shipping lanes is not merely a security issue. It could also influence the future design of trade corridors linking Asia, the Gulf, and Europe, including the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

In recent weeks, I suggested in previous articles that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar could explore alternative trade corridors that bypass Israel. If a broader competition over the strategic trade routes of the post-US-Iran confrontation era is indeed emerging, Israel’s response cannot be limited to diplomacy alone. It must also include substantial investment in infrastructure, logistics, and advanced industry.

The Port of Eilat should become far more than a local port—or merely a “dry port.” It has the potential to serve as Israel’s southern gateway for trade with India, the Gulf states, and Asia. Around it, Israel could develop an advanced industrial, logistics, and technology hub connecting raw materials and components arriving from Asia with Israeli innovation, research, and manufacturing capabilities. Such a strategy would enable Israel to produce higher-value goods, strengthen its position in global supply chains, and maintain a competitive advantage even if alternative regional trade routes emerge.

At the same time, Ramon International Airport should be developed into a regional air cargo hub supporting both imports and exports of advanced products while continuing to serve as a major tourism gateway. The combination of a seaport, an international airport, industrial zones, and modern transportation infrastructure could transform the Eilat region into a new economic center serving both Israel and its regional partners.

Meanwhile, the United States and Saudi Arabia have recently reached understandings regarding cooperation on a civilian nuclear program. However, full implementation still depends on broader political considerations, including the question of normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

It is still too early to conclude that a broader regional realignment is underway. Nevertheless, if security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE continues to deepen in response to the Iranian and Houthi threats, it could create more favorable conditions for renewed discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords and reviving momentum behind IMEC, following recent uncertainty surrounding reports of alternative transportation routes that would bypass Israel.

It is possible that the shared threat posed by Iran and its regional proxies will ultimately become the catalyst for renewed Gulf cooperation. If this trend continues, it could influence not only the regional balance of power but also the future of economic and strategic cooperation throughout the Middle East. In a rapidly changing region, the combination of security, diplomacy, and infrastructure development may prove essential for preserving Israel’s strategic position along the trade corridors of the 21st century.