How do we recover from this?

In the military campaign launched after the failure and massacre of Shabbat Simchat Torah, Israel’s enemies have completely failed in all their plans, and we have undeniably emerged victorious — whether in Gaza, Lebanon, or especially Syria. Even against the Houthis and, most importantly, against Iran, we have proven our resilience. Our defense systems have demonstrated their effectiveness, and our offensives have inflicted significant damage on our enemies.

However, in the psychological battle over the return of the hostages, Hamas is currently winning. It is not only humiliating us, but celebrating at our expense, leveraging the immense psychological pressure reflected in Israeli media.

The Tactical Failures

1. The Legitimization of Hamas

Hamas, which is holding our hostages in clear violation of international law — endangering their lives and denying them medical care required for all prisoners of war — has nonetheless received indirect legitimacy from us as the ruler of Gaza. This is due to the ongoing negotiations, even though these talks are ostensibly conducted through intermediaries who, in truth, support Hamas.

We should have demanded the transfer of all hostages to Egypt (or Turkey) under international legal protections as a precondition for any deal involving Israel and these countries. Instead, we allowed negotiations with a terrorist organization while it continued to commit war crimes, placing our hostages in daily peril. We should have exerted intense international pressure on Egypt and Qatar to halt all support for Hamas unless it transferred the hostages.

Regrettably, neither the government nor the public had the psychological fortitude to insist on this firmly, largely due to the overwhelming anxiety perpetuated by the media. While this cannot be proven definitively, I believe this weakness has worsened the hostages’ situation and significantly prolonged the negotiations — because Hamas remained in full control.

2. Hamas’s Continued Survival

Hamas has demonstrated its ability to survive primarily because we have refrained from conquering and holding Gaza for at least a year. Had we done so, only Israel would have been distributing humanitarian aid. This did not happen due to the firm opposition of the Biden administration. But Israel, too, has always recoiled from the idea of conquering and managing a hostile population. This reluctance led to the disengagement, which in turn triggered a series of military confrontations and ultimately brought us to this devastating war, with a staggering number of casualties — both Israeli and Palestinian — far higher than when Israel controlled Gaza.

3. Hamas Exploits Israel’s Weakness

Hamas has accurately identified Israel’s psychological weakness regarding the hostages and understands precisely how to manipulate Israeli media. Unfortunately, we allow and even encourage this, out of a desire to preserve internal freedom of speech. As a result, all psychological pressure is directed at the Israeli government, while no one in the world is applying pressure on Hamas.

4. The Rising Threat of Future Kidnappings

The danger of future kidnappings is growing because Hamas recognizes that this is its sole strategic success in the war it initiated. Moreover, the mass release of convicted Hamas terrorists from Israeli prisons is Hamas’s greatest victory in this conflict.

A small glimmer of light in this darkness is Hamas’s admission that one Israeli is worth 30 or 40 of its own people. The very equation of Israeli hostages — including the bodies of a woman and her children — with convicted murderers is appalling.

How Do We Rise from This Low Point?

Broadly speaking, there are three possible paths forward:

A. Renewing the Attack on Gaza

One option is to resume striking Gaza immediately after the last hostage is returned. This has been suggested by government officials since the ceasefire. However, I believe the chances of this happening are slim for two reasons: first, it is doubtful that Israel’s government would dare to openly violate an agreement without direct provocation. Second, it is unlikely that we could dismantle Hamas without fully conquering and managing Gaza — at least temporarily — while coordinating with President Trump and his future policies.

Personally, I strongly oppose continued entanglement in the Gaza quagmire.

B. Shifting the Focus to Iran

Another option is to let Gaza remain in ruins and shift our efforts toward a decisive military confrontation with the Iranian regime, coordinating quietly with President Trump. A strategic shift in Iran would have a far greater impact on the Middle East than continuing the war in Gaza.

C. Establishing Sovereignty in Judea and Samaria

The third option is to focus on a historic resolution by applying Israeli sovereignty to Area C in Judea and Samaria, with formal or tacit American backing. Such a move would significantly weaken the possibility of a Hamas-controlled Palestinian state emerging on the borders of central Israel and Tel Aviv, turning Hamas’s perceived “victories” into strategic defeats.

I wholeheartedly support this third option, which would open a new chapter in the history of the Land of Israel while carrying almost no significant risks.

If our defense establishment can simultaneously pursue the second option — an upheaval in Iran — I would be delighted and would pray that the Iranian people reclaim control over their nation, dismantling the oppressive Revolutionary Guard.

However, in my view, the key to rising from our current low point lies in the third option. Only by decisively altering the strategic balance can we ensure that Hamas’s so-called successes turn to dust and that Israel regains its rightful place as the dominant force in the region.