How Many Chinese Spies Are in Israel?

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The increasing prevalence of Chinese espionage activities across Western democracies raises significant questions about similar operations in Israel. It’s being revealed that extensive networks of Chinese intelligence operations in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States (not talking about Asian countries). These cases demonstrate sophisticated methods of infiltration and intelligence gathering that may serve as a template for operations in other strategically important countries like Israel. The question remains whether Israeli authorities are sufficiently vigilant against such threats.

Known espionage cases in EU, UK and US

Many espionage cases have been exposed in the EU, UK, and US. In the UK, a Chinese businessman known as “H6” was permanently banned in December 2024 for engaging in covert activities linked to China’s United Front Work Department, which focuses on foreign intelligence. H6 had integrated into British society, earning a master’s degree and running a consultancy advising UK firms on China. Similarly, Europe saw an unprecedented wave of arrests in April 2024, with six individuals charged for spying for China—two in the UK and four in Germany. Among them were a British Parliament aide and a German assistant to a European Parliament representative.

The United States has faced numerous espionage cases as well. In August 2024, Yuanjun Tang, a naturalized American citizen and former Chinese dissident, was charged with acting as an agent for China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS). Despite his history of opposing Beijing, Tang allegedly collaborated with Chinese intelligence to reunite with his family in China. Earlier cases include Ron Rockwell Hansen, a former US Defense Intelligence Agency officer sentenced to 10 years for attempting to pass defense secrets to China, and Haitao Xiang, who stole trade secrets from Monsanto under China’s “Thousand Talents Program.” These incidents demonstrate China’s focus on both military and commercial intelligence gathering.

The Sophisticated Tactics of Chinese Intelligence Operations

China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) is the principal civilian intelligence and security service of the People’s Republic of China. Established in 1983, it is responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and defending the political security of the Chinese Communist Party.

The MSS has a complex organizational structure:

1. Central Headquarters: Located in Beijing’s Haidian district.
2. Regional Branches: The MSS maintains a network of agencies across China, with departments at provincial, municipal, and county levels.
3. Bureaus: The ministry is divided into numerous bureaus, each with specific responsibilities:
   • First Bureau: Confidential communications
   • Second Bureau: Foreign intelligence operations
   • Third Bureau: Political and economic intelligence
   • Fourth Bureau: Operations in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau
   • Fifth Bureau: Intelligence analysis and reporting
   • Sixth Bureau: Operational guidance for provincial offices
   • Seventh and Eighth Bureaus: Counterespionage
   • Ninth Bureaus: Internal security
   • Tenth Bureau:  External Security and Anti-Reconnaissance Bureau, focuses on:

1. 1. 1. Monitoring Chinese student organizations and institutions abroad
      2. Investigating international anti-communist and reactionary activities
      3. Protecting overseas Chinese staff
      4. Monitoring subversive organizations operating outside of China

1. • Eleventh Bureau: Open-source research (China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)
   • Twelfth Bureau: Social investigation
   • Thirteenth Bureau: Information technology security
   • Fourteenth Bureau: Technical reconnaissance
   • Eighteenth Bureau: US operations

The MSS operates its own police force, the State Security Police, and has broad powers for espionage and detention under China’s National Intelligence Law.

The cases documented in Western democracies reveal several sophisticated tactics employed by Chinese intelligence services. One notable approach involves the strategic placement of agents in positions adjacent to political power. This tactic allows for both intelligence gathering and potential influence operations.

Another method involves the cultivation of business relationships as cover for intelligence activities. The case of H6 demonstrates how establishing legitimate business connections can create opportunities for intelligence work.

Perhaps most concerning is China’s demonstrated ability to recruit individuals from unexpected backgrounds, including students, journalists and migrants (even those married to Israelis). Five years ago, a Chinese student from the Weizmann Institute confided in me that “someone from the Chinese embassy in Israel asked him to collect the names and information of Chinese students on campus.” He politely refused and subsequently relocated to the United States to continue his research, fearing potential retaliation.

Israel’s Potential Vulnerability to Chinese Intelligence

Chinese intelligence employs tactics involving the Chinese diaspora, academic institutions, and business connections—all potential vectors that exist in the Israeli context.

The United States has previously expressed concerns about Chinese investments in Israeli technology companies, particularly those with dual-use applications.

The question of Israeli government awareness and response to potential Chinese intelligence activities remains open based on the available information. Israel maintains complex diplomatic relationships with both China and the United States, navigating competing pressures regarding technology transfer, infrastructure investment, and security cooperation.

As Israel continues to develop its relationship with China while maintaining its critical alliance with the United States, the question of Chinese intelligence activities within its borders deserves careful consideration based on the patterns observed in other democratic nations.