How the Armenian Lobby Limits Yerevan’s Foreign Policy
As Armenia seeks pragmatic ties with the West, diaspora activism risks constraining its freedom of maneuver
While the government in Yerevan attempts to navigate an increasingly difficult regional reality, its most significant obstacle is often found in Washington rather than Baku. The widening rift between Armenia’s political leadership and the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) has become a structural constraint. This disconnect is narrowing Armenia’s room for maneuver at a time when national survival depends on diplomatic flexibility.
This pragmatic orientation has also been reflected in diplomatic channels. In late 2025, senior Armenian officials held consultations with Israeli counterparts, reportedly including Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan’s visit to Israel. These discussions touched on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), often referred to as the Trump Corridor, intended to connect Armenia and Azerbaijan. In late December, in Yerevan, Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan met with Israeli Ambassador Yoel Lion to discuss economic cooperation and technological partnerships, as Armenpress reported. Together, these steps reflect a sovereign Armenia seeking practical anchors in the West and in Israel.
At the same time, the ANCA has pursued a markedly different course. In statements issued in late 2025, its executive director, Aram Hamparian, employed zero-sum rhetoric, accusing Israel of aiding and abetting genocide in Karabakh, territory held for decades by Armenian separatists on internationally recognized Azerbaijani land. The lobby also claimed that Azerbaijan’s involvement in Gaza was an effort to whitewash violence at the expense of Palestinian lives.
This reliance on identity politics clashes with the power politics practiced by Yerevan. For the Armenian government, Israel is a vital channel for technology and economic cooperation. For the lobby, it remains a vehicle for ideological signaling.
This same pattern plays out in Jerusalem. The ANCA has turned a municipal real estate dispute in the Armenian Quarter, known as the Cows’ Garden, into a high-profile political cause. By framing the issue as an existential crisis and lobbying the U.S. Capitol for intervention, the Armenian diaspora has turned a legal and municipal matter into a diplomatic friction point. This includes escalating the discourse around property taxes and foreclosure proceedings against the Patriarchate, moving the debate from a legal framework into the realm of international grievance.
For Yerevan, this dynamic is a liability. While the Armenian government seeks to stabilize and quietly improve relations with Israel, the lobby exports local friction to Washington. This creates unnecessary tension with a key regional actor and U.S. ally at precisely the moment Armenia can least afford strategic isolation.
The sharpest point of contention has emerged around the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity. As the Armenian government explores this U.S.-backed normalization framework as a means of strengthening its sovereignty, the ANCA has launched a public campaign against it. Drawing in part on claims from leaked or partial documents, the lobby argues that the initiative “rewards genocide” and undermines Armenian national interests.
By obstructing this process, the lobby is not merely opposing a specific policy proposal. It is diverging from the broader Western strategy for the Caucasus. This risks portraying Armenia as an unreliable partner to U.S. policymakers and further isolating Yerevan from potential security guarantees. This stance appears increasingly out of step with reality, especially since Azerbaijan has begun exporting fuel to Armenia.
These tensions also intersect with wider regional dynamics. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s efforts to recalibrate Armenia’s foreign policy away from Russia and toward the West have widened a divide with diaspora networks. Iran, in turn, benefits from Armenian dependence and regional instability. In this context, diaspora activism that undermines U.S.-backed normalization frameworks may inadvertently align with Russian and Iranian interests, weakening Armenia’s sovereignty instead of protecting it.
Recent internal unrest highlights the volatility of this divide. The 2024 Tavush protests and the 2025 arrest of Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan underscored the depth of Armenia’s internal polarization. As Armenia’s relations with Russia have deteriorated, analysts at the OSW Centre for Eastern Studies assess that Moscow has sought to support and energize Armenia’s opposition, at least indirectly. Armenian analysts, including reporting by EVN Report, have noted how diaspora activism can at times distort national discourse and constrain policy debate. Elements of the diaspora remain committed to a narrative of perpetual struggle that the sovereign state can no longer afford.
Armenia’s leadership must make clear to Washington that its foreign policy is not outsourced to diaspora organizations with independent agendas. At the same time, policymakers in Jerusalem and Washington should distinguish between lobby rhetoric and the national interests of the Armenian state. Strengthening direct channels with Yerevan is necessary to bypass these obstacles. Armenia requires realism to survive. If the Washington lobby continues to prioritize ideology over strategy, it risks weakening the very foundations it claims to defend.
