How the IDF can subcontract yeshivas and resolve the Charedi draft issue

The Charedi military draft issue continues to divide Israel at a time when unity is more important than ever.

The IDF is short of manpower. The vast majority of non-Charedi Israelis believe all parts of Israeli society should bear the increasingly heavy burden of national defense.

Within the Charedi community, there are signs that attitudes could be changing. Most agree though, left to evolve at its natural pace, large-scale Charedi participation in the IDF will take time – decades, even generations.

Many feel that the draft should simply be enforced against Charedim – it is of no concern what the Charedim think, they must be forced to contribute, against their will if necessary, and if they resist, they must pay the price.

However, there are several problems with this approach.

Firstly, it’s likely to further entangle the Charedi draft issue deeper within the wider ‘culture war’ divisions in Israel when disentanglement may be possible. Many in the Religious Zionist community, for example, feel just as strongly that Charedim should serve, but will stand shoulder to shoulder with Charedim if there’s a sense it is Torah that is being threatened.

Second, the costs of enforcing the Charedi draft will be much higher than the benefits. The Charedi community will go to extreme lengths to avoid being drafted against the will of the community and its senior Rabbis. This isn’t to say it’s right – it’s just to state the facts, like them or not.

Thirdly, many Charedim that end up being forced to serve against their will are likely to be poor and unreliable soldiers with questionable motivation.

Fourthly, a policy of enforced drafting will influence the process of change that is underway in the Charedi community. It could negatively impact not only Charedi attitudes to military service but also the wider dynamics surrounding the future role of Charedim in the country as a whole.

But aside from this, the best reason not to force Charedim to draft is there is a better way, one which can result in the same desired outcomes without having to actually draft Charedim.

This involves the IDF subcontracting yeshivas to perform services for the IDF, including combat duty in various capacities.

This approach is premised on the belief that Charedi draft avoidance is not about cowardice. Charedim are willing to accept enormous hardship for their beliefs.

In addition, this approach is not intended to disrespect the sincere and far-reaching efforts of the IDF to accommodate Charedim. Over time, they are likely to bear fruit with more Charedim willing to directly draft into the IDF.

But we also need a faster solution. One that works today.

How could subcontracting yeshivas work?

• Charedim that affiliate with subcontracted yeshivas and kollels would be exempt from being drafted as individuals. (I will continue referring here to yeshivas only, but this is taken to incorporate kollels and similar institutions).
• Yeshivas would need to meet minimum size and readiness criteria to qualify. Those that don’t may join together with qualifying yeshivas for purpose of subcontracting.
• The IDF would negotiate with the leadership of each qualifying yeshiva. An agreement would be reached on the contributions expected from the yeshiva over a defined period, say five years, with annual and emergency review mechanisms to provide some flexibility. These contributions may include a mix of combat and non-combat roles.
• The yeshiva leadership would then have the autonomy to decide who would serve in which roles. They would agree with the IDF the parameters of when and how those services would be provided – in times of peace and in times of war – subject to a code of conduct.
• These parameters, and the code of conduct, would be reflected in the subcontracting agreement. They would reflect established best practices, and would be further developed over time in light of experience.
• Each subcontracted yeshiva would set up a unit to coordinate provision of services. It would deal with issues like equipment, infrastructure, munitions, training/exercises, combat deployment, and counselling. It would also handle administrative arrangements, including budgeting, accounting and human resources.
• Through this unit, each subcontracted yeshiva would establish its own internal command structure. In so doing, it would receive ongoing training and support from an IDF Yeshiva Liaison and Support Unit set up for the purpose.
• The subcontracted yeshivas would form a national association for purpose of IDF liaison/coordination, advocacy, strategy and implementation.
• A specialized unit within the national association, comprising personnel with appropriate skills and experience, would sit with IDF top brass in a joint command to promote cohesive operational coordination.
• Compliance with the subcontracting agreement would be subject to ongoing monitoring and oversight during the agreement period – by an internal audit function established within each subcontracted yeshiva, and by a specialized team of independent external auditors operating in coordination with the national association and the IDF.
• Arbitration and disciplinary frameworks, comprising arbitrators and judges jointly appointed by the national association and the IDF, would be established to address circumstances of non-compliance or breach – either by the subcontracted yeshiva, or by the specific individuals designated by the yeshivas to perform services.
• As importantly as the ‘stick’ of the arbitration and disciplinary frameworks would be the ‘carrots’. A comprehensive package of incentives would be designed to reward fulfillment of the subcontracting agreement as well as outstanding collective and individual performance in the provision of services. These incentives could include investments in yeshiva buildings and facilities, support for community development around the subcontracted yeshivas, and enhanced professional and vocational learning opportunities.
• These incentives would result in a win-win-win outcome: a win for the yeshivas and the Torah world through enhanced facilities; a win for the IDF and national security with increased Charedi contribution and improving performance over time; and a win for Israel as a whole from the growing participation of the Charedi sector in the national economy.
• Charedim would receive through their subcontracted yeshivas enhanced education and as a result develop professional skills, build experience within the subcontracting context, over time increase their participation in the workforce, and consequently generate higher incomes and make an increasingly positive net fiscal impact.

Why would this approach work better for Charedim?

The differences may seem small, but to my understanding, they are hugely salient for the Charedi world.

Firstly, it would maintain Charedi institutional autonomy from the IDF/State of Israel and assuage deep-rooted concerns about imposition of policies and practices that contradict the Charedi ethos, values and halacha.

Secondly, it would ensure that Charedim remain under the auspices of community structures and leadership frameworks, and within a Charedi environment.

Both these factors address Charedi concern about the exposure of Charedim to secularizing influences within the IDF, a concern that may find some justification from the experiences of the hesder yeshiva movement. It would guarantee that Charedim remain Charedi while they serve.

Thirdly, it would allow for cohesion of military service with continued Torah study within an integrated daily routine. It would better ensure that military service does not come at the cost of Torah and would promote rather than compromise Charedi commitment to lifelong Torah learning.

And fourthly, it would give flexibility for Charedim to themselves determine the age range and profile of the people selected to perform different kinds of service, according to the priorities of the Charedi worldview and lifestyle which is different from other sectors of Israel’s population.

All of these things matter for the Charedi sector.

The important principles underlying this approach are to show as much responsiveness as possible to the needs and priorities of the Charedi sector, and as much flexibility as required to resolve key challenges, without compromising Charedi commitment to Torah values and without compromising the security needs of the State, the People and the Land.