IDF investigations are just the start for Israel’s necessary soul-searching

The recent investigations published by the IDF, along with those emerging in the media, are difficult, incisive, and truthful, perhaps marking the start of a necessary process of self-examination. However, these inquiries are ultimately conducted by IDF officers and defense personnel assessing their own actions in order to improve. They do not constitute a comprehensive investigation into all the circumstances that led to the failures of October 7th.

In my view, while these investigations are undoubtedly important – for the bereaved families, the victims, and the necessary systemic overhaul – placing too much emphasis on them risks undermining the broader effort to uncover the full picture. The primary task at hand is a comprehensive inquiry led by an independent state commission. By focusing on these internal investigations, there is a real danger of inadvertently aiding those seeking to obstruct the establishment of such a commission.

Most people read these investigations – filled with shocking and chilling accounts – and instinctively identify specific individuals as responsible for the failure, often among the officers and commanders who were unprepared or failed to act effectively in real time.

But anyone familiar with Israel’s central decision-making processes knows that practical responsibility – beyond just general accountability – rests at the highest levels. In Israel, the Security Cabinet and the Prime Minister ultimately make the decisions. The military can propose strategies and offer advice. Still, it operates under the authority of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, who, almost exclusively, determine policy, its implementation, the scope for action, priorities, and the budget allocated for necessary measures.

The IDF may be Israel’s largest and most powerful organization, but it remains an executive body. While it can fail to interpret intelligence or respond to security threats, it is not responsible for – and does not participate in – policy-making. That authority lies solely with the political leadership.

October 7th was not merely a tactical failure resulting from chance, preparedness, or response; it was a strategic failure from start to finish. When Benjamin Netanyahu made the decision to strengthen Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority, transferring funds to the organization with the explicit aim of blocking any possibility of diplomatic engagement with the Palestinians, Hertzi Halevi was still a lieutenant colonel, and the entire General Staff were relatively junior officers. The roots of this failure lie in long-term political choices, not just military execution.

All of these officers were shaped by the belief that Hamas was deterred and, at most, sought periodic escalations to secure additional funding. They operated within a framework that prioritized keeping the Palestinian Authority weak in comparison to Hamas. Even those within the security establishment who thought differently – particularly in the Shin Bet and Mossad – were silenced. This is a hallmark of Netanyahu’s leadership style: surrounding himself with yes-men and flatterers, often incompetent ones, to maintain the illusion that he alone is the visionary leader, as a giant among dwarfs.

When these officials investigate themselves and publish their conclusions, they are, in effect, serving Netanyahu. By assuming responsibility that is not theirs, they allow him to evade accountability. They engage in a process of introspection and reform that prioritizes the good of the entire nation, while Netanyahu remains fully immersed in the populist game of deflecting blame and shirking responsibility.

I will repeat this again and again: In Israel, the military only executes orders and provides advice. In my book, I described how, when Yitzhak Rabin decided to move forward with the Oslo Accords, with all its implications, no one in the defense establishment opposed it outright. Some pointed out potential drawbacks, others suggested a slower or alternative approach, but in the end, everyone accepted the decision of the prime minister and the Cabinet because that is how the system works in Israel. Consequently, the responsibility rested with Rabin, for better or worse. And as we know, Rabin never hesitated to take responsibility, especially when it came to failures – even when they were not the result of his own actions or negligence.

Similarly, Netanyahu bears primary responsibility for the circumstances that led to the October 7th attack. This does not absolve the military or the Shin Bet of their own accountability – responsibility that demands personal consequences. However, it was Netanyahu who made the decisions, gave the directives, and set the course. Therefore, he, along with his office and Cabinet members, must be the central focus of a state commission of inquiry. And yet, he will do everything in his power to prevent such a commission from being established because he knows full well that there would be no escape from its conclusions.

As citizens, perhaps nearing despair, we have one crucial responsibility, both for the sake of those murdered and injured and to prevent future disasters: to ensure that Netanyahu establishes a truly independent state commission of inquiry, one with clean hands and a broad mandate. If he refuses, then the only alternative is to go to elections and let the people decide. Time is running out.