Through the Bolivia Agreement, Iran could be preparing the ground for terrorist attacks across the region.
The might of the Ayatollahs, the Shiite clerics who took power in Iranian society after Khomeini’s return in 1979, continues to be erected under the iron fist of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (declared a terrorist organisation by more and more countries around the world) and seeping into Iranian society through the many elite groups such as the Morality Police, the repressive body that ended the life of young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in September 2022, the repressive body that took the life of young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in September 2022, and who patrol the strictness of the extreme interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law in civil society. Since 1979, the population of Iran has been under the repression and suffocation of a system that disturbs the stability not only of the Middle East, but of the entire world.
Argentina is the country of no answers: there are no answers about the bombing of the Israeli embassy in 1992; there are no answers about the bombing of the AMIA in 1994; there are no answers about the murder of prosecutor Alberto Natalio Nisman in January 2015; there are no answers about why the Foreign Ministry shared a meeting with Mohsen Rezai, one of the Iranians accused by the Argentine justice system; there are no answers about why an Iranian plane piloted by the Quds Forces landed on national territory after spending two days in Ciudad del Este, the criminal hub of the Triple Border Area. In a country where there are no answers, threats enter much more easily because impunity allows time to pass and the passage of time leads to oblivion.
Since Hezbollah was declared a terrorist organisation in 2019 by the government of Mauricio Macri, carrying insignia or mobilising references to that organisation is a crime considered as promoting terrorism and must be denounced.
Terrorism can strike anytime and anywhere, but it is true that it can strike most comfortably in countries where security is minimal. The successful fight against terrorism is also an ideological fight: to reduce the chances of an attack almost to a minimum, it is necessary to fight resolutely against radicalisation and against the spectres of radicalisation that flourish in all corners of society and are evident in social networks. Today in Argentina both the ideological and the operational fight are being defeated: the ideological one because there are pro-Iranian and pro-Hezbollah groups in the country that are at the service of a call in the best style of lone wolves, those wolves that act outside the pack. Since Hezbollah was declared a terrorist organisation in 2019 by the government of Mauricio Macri, carrying insignia or mobilising references to that organisation is a crime considered as promoting terrorism and must be denounced.
Today there are people whose social networks display banners and images in favour of the Lebanese terrorist organisation that is the armed wing of Iran and who are united by a deeply violent, anti-Semitic and irritable narrative. In this sense, what is the purpose of a group of people who frequent the At Tauhid mosque in Buenos Aires being connected to individuals whose social networks promote terrorism? Social networks are precisely cyber spaces where wills meet and where operability becomes possible.
Faced with the silence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government and the judiciary, the Islamic Republic of Iran has promoted the signing of an agreement with Bolivia, amplifying that ideological base that in recent years has united 21st Century Socialism and Iranian Islamism, two poles that are presumed to be opposites, but which since the Hugo Chávez years have been robust enough for it to be said that Venezuela should actually be called the Islamic Republic of Venezuela or Tehran’s backyard.
A defence and security agreement between Iran and Bolivia would replicate a penetration very similar to that of the 1980s, when Tehran promoted a clandestine intelligence network through Mohsen Rabbani to produce terrorist intelligence in order to carry out the attacks on the Israeli embassy in 1992 and the AMIA in 1994.