IRAN, the Instrumentalization of International Law

The United Nations established a body of law that every state is, in principle, expected to follow—subject to certain exceptions.

At its core lies a principle: the Responsibility to Protect—a universal principle confronted with the reality of power politics.

A principle born from the failures of the 20th century.

Adopted in 2005 by the UN after the massacres in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) rests on a simple idea: when a state does not protect its population—or worse, persecutes it—the international community must intervene. That is the principle as stated. Up to that point, all countries agree.

This principle targets four major crimes:

• genocide
• crimes against humanity
• war crimes
• ethnic cleansing

In theory, it marks a break. It limits the absolute sovereignty of states. In practice, its application remains conditioned by politics, not by morality—contrary to what some in Europe and elsewhere would like to suggest, often out of cynicism.

The Iranian case is emblematic. The situation described has persisted for 47 years. No intervention within the diplomatic framework has succeeded in freeing populations, whether in Iran or in Lebanon. Who is willing to deal with terrorists who cause deaths within your own country? No country has acted. Tomorrow, if the regime seeks to appropriate the Strait of Hormuz—an international waterway—what will be said? That no one warned us?

A structured but conditional doctrine

R2P is based on three pillars:

1. State responsibility
   Each state must protect its population.
2. International assistance
   The international community may assist states.
3. Intervention as a last resort
   If the state fails or becomes a persecutor (Iran, Afghanistan):

• sanctions
• diplomatic pressure
• humanitarian aid
• military intervention

However, the latter requires authorization from the Security Council. This is where the UN becomes powerless.

This is the tipping point. This is where instrumentalization begins.

The Security Council lock

Five states hold veto power:

• United States
• Russia
• China
• France
• United Kingdom

Direct consequence:

Concrete cases:

• Rwanda → no intervention
• Syria → Russia/China veto
• Myanmar → China veto
• Gaza → political deadlock
• Ukraine → Russia veto

Conversely:

• Libya (2011) → authorized intervention, but one that led to the chaos that still prevails today

Law depends on the balance of power.

Here we are. Like UNIFIL, a largely theoretical “interposition” force between Hezbollah and Israel—often marked by impotence and complacency.

We speak endlessly of “international law” while knowing full well that we have no real means to enforce it. This is therefore a serious and lasting illusion, imbued with cynicism.

Law without enforcement mechanisms

The UN has:

• no army
• no police force
• no global coercive power

It depends on states.

R2P is therefore:

• a legal principle
• a moral principle

These remain principles—swept aside by the member states of the Security Council, which operate solely through power relations. This is far removed from true international law.

• but not an automatic mechanism

The instrumentalization of international law

International law is not absent. It is used.

A variable-geometry application

Principles are mobilized according to interests:

• invoked to justify intervention
• ignored when they constrain
• blocked when they are inconvenient

Examples:

• Libya → law mobilized
• Syria → law paralyzed
• Iraq (2003) → law bypassed
• Ukraine → law asserted without enforcement capacity

Law becomes a political language—the cynicism of the powerful.

Structural double standards

Law is not universal in its application. It is conditional.

States are all the more powerless and unable to apply these principles as they invoke international law forcefully to justify their inaction and cynicism in situations that have lasted for decades. Regarding Lebanon, some trace historical ties back to the Crusades, others to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916—while conveniently forgetting the Drakkar bombing of October 23, 1983, carried out by Hezbollah.

Who prevented the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia—a small, resource-poor country—from causing more than five million deaths?

Who intervened in Sudan to prevent over 300,000 deaths already recorded—and still ongoing?

Who was able to stop the Taliban in Afghanistan from pushing women back into the Middle Ages?

When did the UN and major powers intervene to put an end to executions, torture, and imprisonment in Iran—or the segregation faced by women in Kabul?

The decisive role of the veto

A single state can:

• block an intervention
• prevent a resolution
• neutralize R2P

Law is subordinated to political decision-making.

For 47 years, the regime of the mullahs has imposed a bloody dictatorship on a population of 90 million.

Who has proposed intervening so that this people might finally be freed?

Systemic effects

• weakening of the credibility of law
• return of power as the central factor
• use of law as a tool of communication and pressure

The problem is not the absence of law, but the absence of the capacity to enforce it.

Partial and hybrid applications

In most cases, R2P is indirect:

The logic of protection exists, but the legal framework is highly fragmented.

Three models of intervention

Kosovo introduces a key notion:
“illegal but legitimate.”

When major powers converge

Agreements are rare, but explainable. Here, the vocabulary shifts: legitimate action.

Typical cases:

• Kuwait (1991) → oil stability
• Afghanistan (2001) → counterterrorism, followed by the withdrawal of all Western countries
• Libya (2011) → isolated regime
• Somalia (piracy) → global trade

The real rule

Who actually mobilizes R2P?

Consistent actors:

• United States
• France
• United Kingdom
• NATO

Examples:

• Libya → official application
• Iraq (2014) → protection of persecuted Yazidis
• Mali → stabilization (France has withdrawn)
• Central African Republic → protection of civilians
• Kosovo → moral justification

Conclusion:
Only states capable of intervening actually use this principle.

Iran and Afghanistan: structural limits

Afghanistan

• 2001 intervention: self-defense
• humanitarian argument present
• not a formal R2P

Today:
no intervention despite the internal situation. Human rights and women’s rights are violated and ignored.

Iran

Limited actions:

• sanctions
• resolutions
• diplomatic pressure

For 47 years, Western countries have emphasized diplomatic action—with no results. The current conflict is a dramatic demonstration of this. The attempted nationalization of the Strait of Hormuz—an international waterway governed by legal treaties—is yet another illustration. From now on, we are and will remain confronted with the denial of law, replaced by power dynamics. Today Hormuz, tomorrow Bab el-Mandeb, the day after Malacca in Asia—global sea lanes turned into toll highways?

Lebanon

The collapse of the country is driven by the presence of Hezbollah, a terrorist organization aligned with the Tehran regime. Corruption is such that the disarmament of this militia—mandated by the UN—cannot be achieved by Lebanese forces alone, which are far too weak. This was known from the outset. Hezbollah, which has never ceased firing on northern Israel, has triggered a highly active war at Tehran’s request, following the involvement of the United States and Israel. The Jewish state must eliminate this permanent threat to its northern region, under constant rocket fire. The operation is underway. Israel alone must resolve this situation, while Lebanon’s longstanding allies have been unable to act for years. Otherwise, the country’s condition would be different.

Why:

• military power
• major strategic stakes
• support from Russia/China/Iran

Implicit rule of the system

Conclusion

The Responsibility to Protect exists.

But it operates only in one specific case:
when the interests of major powers converge with the moral objective.

Otherwise:

• deadlock
• circumvention
• or inaction

R2P is not an automatic mechanism.

It is:

• a legal framework
• a moral principle
• a political tool

And in the real order of the world:
power determines when law applies.

For those who have not yet understood or accepted it, law is not morality. Once again, the well-known statement by the late Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons—echoed by Churchill and General de Gaulle—is confirmed: states have no friends, only interests.