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Meszár Tárik
MCC Migration Research Institute

Iranian-Kurdish rapprochement and its effect on Israel

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has vowed to ‘resolve’ the issues with Iraqi Kurdistan. On the second day of his official visit to Iraq, Pezeshkian met with several Kurdish officials in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

Nechirvan Barzani, the President of Kurdistan, described Pezeshkian’s visit as historic and assured that Kurdish territories would not be used to threaten Iran’s security. Pezeshkian is the first Iranian president to officially visit Kurdistan. ‘We have historical and cultural ties with Iran,’ Barzani said during a press conference.

The discussions primarily focused on bilateral relations, with a particular emphasis on security. Speaking in Kurdish, Pezeshkian stated that his visit aimed to strengthen ties with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region while addressing unresolved issues. One of the key concerns for Tehran is the claim that Erbil is allegedly sheltering armed members of Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups.

The Iraqi central government and Iran have already reached an agreement

In March 2023, Iraq and Iran signed an important security agreement to take action against Kurdish opposition groups in northern Iraq. This pact was intended to ease years of tension between the two countries, especially after Iran had previously carried out military strikes against these groups operating in the Kurdistan Region. One of the central elements of the agreement was that Iraq and Iran would make a joint effort to disarm the Kurdish opposition groups and remove them from the vicinity of the two countries’ shared border.

The Persian country’s leadership has long feared that these Kurdish organizations pose a security threat to them, as Iran is also home to a significant Kurdish minority, some of whom are seeking autonomy and greater independence. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurds have often found refuge on the other side of the border in the past. In recent years, Iranian Kurds in particular have fled to northern Iraq, whose presence is seen by many as a security threat.

The disarmament and suppression of some Kurdish groups may be a long-term milestone in the settlement of relations between the two countries, but it also poses a serious challenge to Kurdish autonomy aspirations. Resistance from some Kurdish organizations continues, so the effectiveness and durability of the agreement is still in question.

Are Kurdish-Israeli relations changing?

One of the key questions surrounding the Iranian-Kurdish rapprochement is how it can be reconciled with the Iraqi Kurds’ strong ties to Israel. Historically, relations between Israel and the Kurdistan Region have been driven by mutual strategic interests. Israel has long supported Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and self-determination, seeing this as a way to weaken several regional powers and secure a reliable ally in a hostile environment. However, the Kurdistan Region’s growing openness to cooperation with Tehran could create tensions. The main issue is that Iran has been one of Israel’s greatest adversaries in the Middle East for years. Both countries see themselves as regional powers and have indirectly clashed in various regional conflicts. For Israel, the possibility of an important ally aligning more closely with Iran could be cause for concern.

What are the reasons behind the shift in Kurdish policy?

The situation in the Kurdistan Region is particularly delicate, as it must navigate relationships with several regional powers, including Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and the United States, all of which exert significant influence. Given the Iraqi Kurds’ heavy reliance on these countries, especially in terms of economic and security support, they are compelled to take diplomatic measures to ensure their survival.

While Israel may find it challenging that one of its allies is engaging directly with Iran, the Kurds are clearly striving for a delicate balance. Their goal is to ensure that their relations with Israel do not conflict with their negotiations with Tehran. At the same time, they are wary of allowing agreements with Iran to endanger their long-standing cooperation with Israel.

The key question, therefore, is how Kurdish leaders will manage to balance the interests of various regional and global powers, and what the long-term consequences of this diplomatic strategy will be.

The Israeli-Kurdish relationship in brief

Although formal diplomatic relations between Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Israel have never been established, their ties date back to the mid-1960s. During this period, Israel saw the Kurds as valuable allies in their effort to weaken the Iraqi regime. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel provided covert support to the Kurdish insurgency as part of its broader geopolitical strategy to build alliances with non-Arab groups in the Middle East.

Since then, Israel has maintained a special relationship with the Iraqi Kurds. In 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) initiated a referendum to seek independence from the Iraqi central government, and Israel was the only country to support and call for Kurdish independence.

A few years ago, there were official calls to formalize relations between the two parties. In the fall of 2021, over 300 prominent figures gathered for a meeting in the Kurdish city of Erbil in northern Iraq, where they discussed, among other things, the possibility of formalizing relations between the two countries and even Iraq potentially joining the Abraham Accords in the near future. However, the meeting took an unexpected turn, as participants were threatened with prison sentences during the event, and the leadership in Baghdad reacted with extreme hostility to the efforts to normalize relations.

According to reports, there are currently more than 500 Jewish families living in the Kurdistan Region.

About the Author
Since September 2020, I have been a PhD student of the Arabic Studies program of the Doctoral School of Linguistics at Eötvös Loránd University. From September 2021 I am a participant in the Mathias Corvinus Collegium PhD Program and a researcher at the Migration Research Institute, where I study the situation of ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East, mainly Iraq and Egypt. I also deal with the Arabic language and its dialects, as well as the international relations of the Arab world and its role in the world economy.
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