Is China Exploiting Europe’s Unrest to Undermine IMEC?

Civil disturbances in France, Italy and India are generally examined through the prism of domestic politics. Economic grievances, immigration, social tensions, ideological polarisation and dissatisfaction with governments provide familiar explanations. Yet when unrest affects several countries central to an emerging geopolitical architecture, it is reasonable to ask whether external powers are merely observing these developments or actively seeking to exploit them.

China is an obvious subject of such scrutiny. Not because every demonstration in Paris, Milan or New Delhi can be attributed to Beijing, but because China possesses both the capability to manipulate political narratives abroad and a strategic interest in influencing the direction of European and Indian foreign policy.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, provides a particularly interesting context.

Announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, IMEC envisages a network of maritime connections, railways, energy infrastructure and digital connectivity linking India with the Gulf, Israel and Europe. It is more than a commercial undertaking. It offers an alternative framework for Eurasian connectivity at a time when China’s Belt and Road Initiative has already established a substantial presence across Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean.

For Beijing, IMEC presents a potential challenge, although not necessarily an existential one. China has invested heavily in ports, logistics infrastructure and commercial relationships along many of the same routes. A functioning IMEC would give India, the Gulf states and Europe greater opportunities to diversify their connectivity, reducing dependence on infrastructure networks in which Chinese companies exercise considerable influence.

But infrastructure corridors depend on more than capital and engineering. They require political stability, regulatory continuity and sustained cooperation among governments. These are precisely the conditions that prolonged civil disturbances can undermine.

Recent unrest in France and Italy has raised questions about foreign information manipulation. European governments have become increasingly concerned about the ability of hostile actors to amplify social divisions, promote inflammatory narratives and exploit political grievances through coordinated online activity. China, Russia and Iran have all figured in European discussions of foreign information interference, although their methods, objectives and levels of involvement differ considerably.

China’s capabilities are not hypothetical. Investigations into the state-linked Spamouflage network have documented operations involving impersonation, manipulated online content and attempts to influence political discourse abroad. Chinese information operations have also targeted European debates concerning NATO, relations with Beijing and the strategic direction of the European Union.

None of this proves that Beijing organised the demonstrations currently affecting European cities. Indeed, attributing spontaneous or domestically organised protests to a foreign government without evidence would be a serious analytical mistake.

The more interesting question is whether China needs to organise them at all.

Modern influence operations do not necessarily require creating a political movement from scratch. Existing grievances can be amplified, competing narratives encouraged and social divisions intensified. A relatively modest intervention in an already polarised environment may produce effects disproportionate to the resources invested.

There is an important difference between directing a demonstration and exploiting its consequences. The former requires organisational control. The latter may involve little more than information manipulation, selective amplification and the cultivation of networks sympathetic to particular geopolitical narratives.

This distinction becomes especially relevant when examining the relationship between protest movements and foreign policy.

Demonstrations concerning immigration, economic inequality or government policy may have no direct relationship with China or IMEC. Nevertheless, sustained instability can consume political attention, weaken governing coalitions and complicate long-term infrastructure commitments. In countries where major strategic projects require parliamentary support, administrative coordination and private investment, prolonged uncertainty can become an obstacle in itself.

Italy occupies a particularly important position in this equation. Its Mediterranean geography, port infrastructure and industrial capabilities make it a natural European participant in emerging connectivity initiatives. At the same time, Italy’s earlier participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, followed by its decision to withdraw in 2023, illustrates the competing strategic choices facing European governments.

France, meanwhile, remains central to European political and strategic decision-making, even if its role within IMEC is less directly defined than that of some participating states. Political instability in Paris can complicate European coordination well beyond France’s borders.

India presents a different challenge. Unlike European economies, India is simultaneously a major commercial partner of China and one of its most significant strategic competitors. New Delhi’s ambitions to develop alternative manufacturing, transport and trade networks are inseparable from its broader efforts to reduce strategic vulnerabilities.

An operational IMEC would strengthen India’s economic access to Europe while deepening its relationships with the Gulf and Mediterranean partners. From Beijing’s perspective, this could gradually alter the balance of influence across an important part of Eurasia.

Yet the suggestion that China might exploit unrest to weaken IMEC must confront an obvious contradiction. Beijing itself depends on stable European markets, functioning trade routes and predictable economic relationships. Widespread disruption could harm Chinese interests as much as those of its competitors.

This makes selective political influence a more plausible strategic instrument than indiscriminate destabilisation.

There is also the question of other actors. Russia has its own reasons to weaken European cohesion and complicate the continent’s strategic partnerships. Iran has interests in the regional balance surrounding Israel, the Gulf and maritime connectivity. These interests may overlap with China’s in certain circumstances without implying a coordinated campaign.

The existence of a common geopolitical beneficiary is not evidence of a common organiser.

What deserves investigation, therefore, is not simply the simultaneity of demonstrations across different countries, but the networks through which political messages travel. Are the same digital platforms, organisations, financial intermediaries or influence accounts amplifying unrest in France, Italy and India? Are narratives directed against European strategic autonomy, India-Gulf cooperation or regional normalisation being promoted through identifiable foreign-linked networks? Do such campaigns intensify around major decisions concerning ports, infrastructure financing or defence and connectivity agreements?

These are questions that can be tested through financial records, digital forensics and documented organisational relationships. They cannot be answered merely by observing similar slogans or political sympathies among demonstrators.

It would be equally mistaken to overlook the domestic causes of unrest. European societies face genuine economic and social tensions. Indian politics has its own complex sources of mobilisation. Foreign interference becomes easier precisely when authentic grievances already exist. Recognising that vulnerability does not diminish the legitimacy of peaceful protest.

Ultimately, the strategic contest surrounding IMEC will not be decided solely by railway construction, port capacity or investment commitments. It will also depend on the political resilience of the countries expected to sustain the corridor over decades.

China has demonstrated the ability to conduct influence operations abroad. It has commercial and strategic interests that could be affected by the success of IMEC. What remains unproven is whether these two realities are connected to the present wave of civil disturbances.

That uncertainty should encourage investigation rather than premature attribution.

For Europe and India, the immediate task is to distinguish domestic dissent from externally directed manipulation, while ensuring that legitimate political disagreements cannot be easily weaponised by foreign interests.

Beijing does not need to bring governments down to complicate their strategic ambitions. It may be enough for those governments to become too distracted, divided or politically weakened to pursue them.

The question is whether that possibility is already being exploited, and whether the countries building IMEC are paying sufficient attention to the political vulnerabilities of the corridor they hope to construct.