Is the Houthi chaos in the Indo-Med here to stay?

Shortly after Donald Trump’s 2024 election victory, an Emirati geopolitical influencer circulated a provocative tweet suggesting that the Houthis had declared a ceasefire out of “fear” of Trump’s return to the White House. The statement quickly went viral, especially among Trump supporters, but was soon debunked as false information by social media platform X. The source, a pro-Saudi account known for anti-Houthi content, was identified as promoting a fabricated narrative that the Houthis dreaded the incoming US administration.

This unsubstantiated episode illuminates how misinformation about the Houthis and their motives continues to shape public perceptions, particularly in the Middle East’s geopolitical tension and polarized narratives—the US has already launched campaigns on social media platforms to counter the Houthis’ fabrication narrative. Still, now we have the opposite made of. This recent episode further helps to shed light on the ongoing Houthi-driven destabilization in the Indo-Mediterranean region.

Furthermore, contrasting sharply with the viral portrayal, the Houthis’ most recent official statement, issued on October 17, 2024, reaffirms their firm stance toward supporting Palestine and Lebanon, declaring, “We will never abandon Palestine and Lebanon, even if Sana’a is hit with nuclear bombs.” Additionally, the Houthis have updated their maritime threat strategy, now warning they will target vessels attempting to obscure ownership to evade scrutiny, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea corridor and nearby waters (the so-called “Indo-Mediterranean”).

Strategic Alliances and Escalating Threats: Russia, Iran, and Sunni Extremists

Despite the misinformation and propagandistic wishful thinking, a confidential 537-page United Nations report provides an in-depth analysis of the Houthis’ evolving role and influence within the Indo-Mediterranean region, revealing a web of alliances and escalating threats. According to the UN’s assessment, provided to the Security Council Committee overseeing global compliance with UN sanctions on conflict-ridden Yemen, Houthis are no longer acting as a purely localized force; they are leveraging strategic relationships to enhance their capabilities and expand their influence.

Per the recent report, the Houthis have built ties with Moscow, which views them as a potential tool in countering Western influence, particularly in the context of the conflict in Ukraine—the group is utilized as leverage to retaliate against and deter Western support for Kyiv. This cooperation reportedly includes the provision of satellite targeting data relayed through Iranian IRGC-Qods Force officers embedded within the Houthi ranks, enabling more precise attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Additionally, Russian military intelligence officers (GRU) have allegedly been stationed in Sana’a under the guise of humanitarian workers, marking an expansion of Russian involvement in Yemen and providing strategic support to the Houthis. In previous reports, the UN panel of experts has repeatedly highlighted Iran-led efforts to smuggle 9M133 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, AKS-20U assault rifles, and other weapons into Yemen—all bearing Russian specifications and markings. In return for Russian support, the Houthis have reportedly assured safe passage for Russian ships navigating through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint in the southern Red Sea. Meanwhile, the expansion of Houthi-Moscow cooperation also demonstrates an alignment of Russian and Iranian interests in the region, Soufan Center analyzed. Only the OPEC+ cooperation with Saudi Arabia has dissuaded the Kremlin from a more robust armament supply, such as the Yakhont missile—an anti-ship critical threat for Western Navies.

But these ties are not limited to state actors; the Houthis are also working with Sunni extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Somalia’s al-Shabaab. The report highlights this cooperation as largely tactical, with shared goals that allow each group to expand its operational reach and influence. Arms trading between the Houthis and al-Shabaab has increased, providing both groups with resources to conduct joint operations and attacks on maritime targets in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, further straining regional security.

Weeks ago, on the occasion of the Italian carrier strike group of Nave Cavour’s drills with the Indian Navy, Vice Admiral Aurelio De Carolis, commander-in-chief of the Italian Fleet, sounded the alarm on the rising piracy threat in the Indian Ocean region and attributed this surge to the decrease in commercial flow through the Red Sea. He said, “Piracy picked up some years ago, and we must say that up to two years ago, there was a constant decrease in pirate attacks in this specific area (Indian Ocean), although there are other areas in the world where the problem is still significant like the Strait of Malacca.”

Implications for Regional and Global Security

The synergy with AQAP, in particular, reflects a pragmatic approach and could be a case study. By halting hostilities against each other and sharing resources, the Houthis and AQAP have fortified their positions against common adversaries in Yemen, including the UN-recognized government and UAE-backed forces. The Houthis reportedly supply AQAP with drones and other weaponry while also coordinating critical attacks. This partnership allows both groups to exploit Yemen’s southern coastline, offering strategic access points to the Red Sea and Gulf region. It reminds us that the core business of Houthis’ activity is to be part of the future partition of Yemen and that in ten years of civil war, their capability is improved.

Should Russia agree to supply the Houthis with the Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) missile system, the Houthis could target commercial vessels and Western naval assets in the Red Sea with heightened accuracy. Such an escalation could compel Western and regional naval forces to reconsider their security posture, risking a destabilization of this crucial maritime corridor.

Emblematic is the case of the Deutsche Marine frigate Baden-Württemberg: Berlin ordered the military ship (and her support vessel Frankfurt am Main) to avoid Indo-Mediterranean routes to circumnavigate Africa while both were returning in Europe from a monthly-long Indo-Pacific mission. It was proof the Houthis (and its backers) reached the capability to erase the regional deterrence and is a moment of weakness for Western forces’ internal trust–so this is if the German Government didn’t believe that the other Europeans Navy and the US Navy in the area weren’t able to defend the poorly air-defense-equipped German ships.

Are We Ready for a Lasting Influence on Indo-Mediterranean Stability?

The Houthis’ evolution into a well-connected regional mini-power demands urgent action to restore deterrence and stabilize the Indo-Mediterranean–and the main Europe-Asia geoeconomic routes. Strengthened by their partners with Russia, Iran, and extremist groups, the Houthis now pose a sophisticated, multidimensional threat to international security. While per a Foreign Policy essay by Elisabeth Braw, an “undeclared war” against Western ships is ongoing, there is a growing need for a coordinated global response beyond limited engagements in this context.

Despite the magic solution spread by some fanatics, with Donald Trump returning to the White House, a critical question looms: Will his administration choose to intensify US involvement in countering Houthi destabilization—thus far limited to operations like “Poseidon Archer”—or will it continue to scale back, potentially deprioritizing the Indo-Mediterranean in line with an “America First” approach? Should the US step back, the responsibility may fall to Europe, particularly southern nations such as Italy, to spearhead a robust response to contain the Houthi threat and maintain the centrality of the Mediterranean in Europe-Asia connections.

To effectively counterbalance the destabilization, Europe could consider building a coalition with regional partners, including India and Israel. Israel, which currently faces challenges on multiple fronts, may have a particular interest in reinforcing its stance against Houthi forces in Yemen, one of the active arenas affecting its security. Different for India: while it is effectively part of Indo-Mediterranean business, for New Delhi, it could be problematic to proceed in military action such as the one required, given its relations with Russia and Iran—even if they’re changing. In the last instance, a renewed European-led effort would demonstrate a unified commitment to countering the Houthi threat and reinforcing stability across one of the world’s most critical maritime regions–and a new EU push would lead to a reciprocal effort from Washington.