Israel-Egypt: When gas is stronger than diplomacy
The cooling of relations between Israel and Egypt since the outbreak of the war in Gaza has ignited the idea of a possible long-term deterioration of the partnership between the two countries. Pressures from Egyptian public opinion, deep differences about how to run the Palestinian conflict, and security concerns around Sinai have, at first glance, undermined a balance patiently built since the Camp David agreements. Yet, at the heart of this relationship under tension, a pillar resists: energy cooperation, and in particular the gas agreement concluded under the auspices of the United States. Rather than posing a threat, it appears to be a strategic stabilizing factor that benefits both parties, particularly Egypt.
Since the discovery of significant Israeli offshore deposits, notably Leviathan and Tamar, the issue has never been one of production but of export. In the absence of liquefaction infrastructures, Israel quickly understood that its integration into a regional scheme was essential. Egypt then established itself as a natural partner. It has the only operational liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in the eastern Mediterranean capable of transforming Israeli gas into a product that can be exported to Europe and beyond.
For Israel, the interest is clear. The agreement guarantees stable markets, secures long-term energy revenues, and places Tel Aviv in a regional structure that gets around the short-term political uncertainty. By maintaining energy interdependence with the largest Arab country, Israel strengthens its regional legitimacy and reduces the risk of strategic isolation. Gas thus becomes an effective instrument of diplomatic anchorage.
But without a question, Egypt is the one who gains the most from this partnership. Faced with a deteriorating economic situation—high inflation, shortage of foreign exchange, massive external debt—Cairo has a vital need for stable incomes. Israeli gas supplies the country’s liquefaction capacities and strengthens its role as a regional energy hub. Egypt is not just a transit country: it controls processing and export, capturing considerable economic and strategic value.
This position gives Cairo a lever of power that is often overlooked. By becoming a mandatory passage for Israeli (and potentially Cypriot) gas, Egypt consolidates its role with the Europeans seeking energy diversification while strengthening its strategic relationship with Washington. In this context, gas goes beyond simple commercial logic to become a tool for regional and international influence.
The role of the United States is decisive here. By supporting this agreement, Washington is not only aiming for European energy security or the profitability of regional investments. It is above all a question of creating strategic interdependence between two key allies in the Middle East. Energy thus becomes a mechanism for indirect de-escalation: even when political dialogue develops, fundamental interests impose the continuity of cooperation.
This does not mean that the agreement is free of fragilities. A major deterioration of the situation in Gaza could make this cooperation politically costly for the Egyptian regime, subject to public opinion largely supportive of the Palestinian cause. Security risks also exist, particularly in the event of sabotage or increased tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. However, these limits precisely underline the nature of the agreement: a cold, pragmatic, but indispensable cooperation.
Ultimately, the Israeli-Egyptian gas agreement illustrates an often forgotten reality: in the Middle East, the most lasting relations are not necessarily the warmest but those based on converging strategic interests. Gas does not dispel political disagreements or regional fractures, but it prevents them from degenerating into irreversible ruptures. In an environment marked by instability, this form of energy realpolitik perhaps constitutes the real backbone of the relationship between Israel and Egypt.
