Israel Must Buy Strategic Autonomy, Not Just American Weapons

Israel’s debate over military aid from the United States is often framed as a question of money. Should Washington continue providing billions of dollars in annual assistance, or should Israel gradually finance more of its own defence? That question matters, but it misses the deeper strategic challenge. A country can pay for its weapons and still lack the freedom to use them when it matters most.

The two governments have begun formal talks on a new security cooperation framework to replace the memorandum of understanding that expires in 2028. The stated ambition is to move gradually from aid towards a more reciprocal partnership, with greater investment in joint research, development and production. This is a sensible direction, but reciprocity alone is not a measure of strategic independence.

For Israel, the real test is whether its military can sustain operations when external supplies are delayed, production falls behind battlefield consumption or political disagreements in Washington complicate access to critical equipment. These are not hypothetical concerns for a country confronting persistent missile threats and the possibility of prolonged, multi-front conflict.

Israel should therefore approach the next agreement with a clear objective. It must use the transition from aid to partnership to secure strategic autonomy: the ability to maintain essential military capabilities and preserve freedom of action when external support becomes uncertain. The goal is not to loosen the American alliance, but to make Israel less vulnerable within it.

The Cost of Dependence Is More Than Financial

The scale of Israel’s reliance on foreign suppliers illustrates the challenge. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States accounted for 68 per cent of Israel’s imports of major arms in 2021–25, while Germany supplied another 31 per cent. These figures concern major arms transfers, not every component or military purchase, but they reveal how concentrated Israel’s procurement relationships remain.

The existing American assistance framework provides $3.3 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing and another $500 million for joint missile-defence programmes. Such support has helped Israel acquire advanced aircraft, replenish capabilities and develop defensive systems alongside American partners. It has also reinforced a military relationship that serves the interests of both countries.

Yet financial independence does not automatically produce operational independence. Israel could replace American grants with domestic funding and still depend on foreign production schedules, spare parts, specialised components, maintenance arrangements and export approvals. The distinction is crucial: the ability to purchase a weapon is not the same as the ability to keep it operational during a prolonged conflict.

Nor does this mean American support is inherently unreliable. Washington remains Israel’s most important defence partner, and cooperation has delivered substantial military advantages. The strategic problem is that no alliance can eliminate political uncertainty or guarantee unlimited industrial capacity. American manufacturers must also meet domestic requirements and commitments to other allies.

Israel must therefore identify which external dependencies could become critical vulnerabilities during a crisis. It should prioritise capabilities that cannot easily be substituted, repaired or replenished, rather than pursue the expensive and unrealistic ambition of manufacturing every weapon domestically. Strategic autonomy begins with knowing what cannot afford to run out.

Israel Has the Industrial Base, but Must Close the Resilience Gap

Israel is not starting from industrial weakness. SIPRI ranked it the world’s seventh-largest exporter of major arms in 2021–25, accounting for 4.4 per cent of global exports. Its defence industry has developed sophisticated air-defence systems, sensors, electronic warfare technologies and other capabilities sought by foreign customers.

But export success and wartime resilience are different achievements. A company capable of designing an advanced interceptor may still struggle to expand output rapidly enough when domestic demand surges. Production depends on specialised components, skilled labour, manufacturing facilities and suppliers that may themselves face bottlenecks. Moreover, export contracts can compete with urgent domestic requirements.

Recent developments offer a practical illustration. In June 2026, Israel’s Defence Ministry approved a further acceleration of Arrow interceptor production and an expansion of stocks. The decision recognised that missile defence requires not merely effective technology, but sufficient inventories to withstand sustained attacks. The strategic question is whether production and replenishment can keep pace with the demands of a prolonged campaign.

The first US-produced Tamir interceptor for Iron Dome, delivered to Israel in October 2026, demonstrates the other side of the equation. Production through the Raytheon–Rafael partnership in Arkansas can expand manufacturing capacity and deepen industrial cooperation. It also creates opportunities for both countries to benefit from shared technology and investment.

Such arrangements should be welcomed, but their value must be judged by the resilience they deliver. How quickly can output rise? Which components remain difficult to replace? How will competing demands from Israel and the United States be managed during a simultaneous crisis? These are the questions that matter more than the headline value of a production contract.

Israel’s objective should be a defence-industrial system that combines domestic production, joint manufacturing and diversified supply where feasible. The measure of success is not complete self-sufficiency, but the ability to sustain critical military functions when normal supply arrangements are disrupted.

The Next MOU Must Guarantee Resilience, Not Just Cooperation

The negotiations over the post-2028 framework offer an opportunity to turn this principle into policy. First, Israel should identify a limited set of capabilities whose interruption would seriously undermine its defence, including critical interceptors, precision munitions and essential components. For each, planners should establish credible requirements for domestic capacity, reserves and replenishment.

Second, joint production agreements should include practical arrangements for periods of exceptional demand. Production capacity in the United States is valuable, but shared facilities alone do not guarantee that Israel will receive what it needs when American forces and other partners face urgent requirements of their own. The two governments should plan for simultaneous demand, supply-chain disruption and emergency production increases.

Third, Israel should protect its ability to maintain and adapt critical systems. Access to technical expertise, software support, replacement parts and relevant intellectual property can be as important as ownership of the hardware itself. Where complete domestic control is impractical, agreements should at least reduce the risk that a single external bottleneck can disable an essential capability.

Finally, both governments should assess the new framework against measurable resilience objectives rather than financial commitments alone. Relevant indicators include replenishment times, production flexibility, supplier concentration and the availability of essential components. Some operational details must remain classified, but the underlying standards can still guide procurement and strategic planning.

None of this requires Israel to distance itself from Washington. On the contrary, a more resilient Israel would be a stronger partner, better able to defend itself and contribute to shared security objectives without assuming that American support will always arrive at the required speed or scale. The United States, meanwhile, would gain from a partnership that combines Israeli innovation with more dependable industrial capacity.

The next agreement should therefore be judged by a harder standard than the amount of aid it provides or the number of joint projects it announces. It should be judged by whether Israel can preserve essential military capabilities when circumstances turn against it. American weapons will remain indispensable to Israel’s security. But the freedom to sustain those capabilities, even under pressure, is what strategic autonomy must buy.