Israel’s Fight for Its Democratic Soul

Israel’s election exposes the gulf between the democratic rights enjoyed by its Arab citizens and the authoritarian realities confronting much of the Middle East. Yet the country’s greatest test may come from within, as national security, political extremism and the future of its institutions collide.

A Vote That Could Change Everything

Israel’s most consequential election in a generation may be decided not in Tel Aviv or the Jewish settlements, but in the predominantly Arab towns of Nazareth, Umm al-Fahm and the Bedouin communities of the Negev. The result could determine whether Benjamin Netanyahu retains power and, more importantly, what kind of country Israel becomes.

Turnout among Israel’s roughly two million Arab citizens is expected to rise from 56% in 2022 to more than 60%, with some forecasts approaching 70%. Arab-led parties could secure around 14 seats in the 120-member Knesset. With neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor its opponents assured of a majority, Arab voters may hold the balance of power.

The prospect challenges a familiar international narrative that portrays Israel as an irredeemably discriminatory state. Arab citizens can vote, organise political parties, elect legislators and potentially influence the composition of the national government. Last month, Israel’s Supreme Court unanimously overturned a decision by the Central Elections Committee to disqualify the principal Arab parties, demonstrating that independent judicial oversight remains an important feature of the political system.

These institutions do not make Israel immune from criticism. Discrimination, unequal outcomes and failures of accountability remain serious concerns. Nor do the rights enjoyed by Arab citizens resolve the separate legal and political questions surrounding Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

But Israel’s democratic competition is a political reality that deserves recognition alongside its shortcomings. The election will test whether the country can defend itself against genuine external threats without compromising the principles and institutions essential to its long-term stability.

The Unfulfilled Promise of October 7

Israel’s election cannot be understood without returning to October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched its assault on southern Israel, killing civilians, abducting hostages and inflicting one of the most traumatic blows in the country’s history.

The attack exposed the brutality of the threats Israel faces. Hamas’s victims included Jewish Israelis and Arab citizens, while Bedouin communities also suffered losses. Some Arab citizens risked their lives to rescue Jewish victims.

For a brief period, the catastrophe appeared to create a renewed sense of common citizenship. The shared experience of terror and grief transcended ethnic and religious divisions. Arab Israelis who helped save Jewish lives were celebrated as heroes, offering a glimpse of a country in which citizenship could unite communities under the most extreme circumstances.

That promise has since eroded.

Years of conflict, bereavement and exhaustion have hardened political attitudes. The far right has acquired considerable influence within Netanyahu’s coalition, while the government has struggled to reassure Arab citizens that their security and dignity are national priorities.

Netanyahu has also failed to demonstrate the inclusive leadership the moment demands. His perceived absence from the lives of Arab families bereaved by the violence has reinforced the impression that their suffering receives less attention from the state.

As Arab Israeli analyst Mohammad Darawshe has argued, the government’s approach has created an environment in which racism can flourish.

For Israel, the consequences extend beyond domestic relations. A country confronting external enemies cannot afford to alienate substantial numbers of its own citizens. The trauma of October 7 must not become a permanent justification for discrimination within Israel’s borders.

Hamas sought to inflict catastrophic damage on Israel. The country must not allow that attack to undermine the social cohesion essential to its survival.

When Security Becomes a Political Weapon

Netanyahu’s campaign has increasingly argued that an opposition victory would bring Arab parties back into government, as happened when Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid formed their coalition in 2021.

Likud has circulated manipulated images and AI-generated videos depicting political rivals embracing Arab leaders. Likud and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist Party have announced plans to deploy nearly 2,000 activists to polling stations in Arab communities, citing allegations of electoral fraud that have not been substantiated. Smotrich has also floated a proposal to ‘Judaise’ areas around Nazareth.

There are legitimate questions about the positions of individual Arab parties. Some have been reluctant to condemn Hamas in the unequivocal terms demanded by many Jewish Israelis. For a country still confronting the consequences of October 7, the willingness of potential political partners to recognise the nature of the security threat deserves serious consideration.

But scrutinising political parties must not become a pretext for treating an entire community’s democratic participation as suspect.

Arab citizens are entitled to vote for candidates who represent their interests. Their elected representatives can negotiate over budgets, public services and government policy. If a party cannot command the confidence of a parliamentary majority, it should lose through democratic competition, not be delegitimised because its supporters are Arab.

Netanyahu’s campaign risks turning legitimate security concerns into a broader question about whether Arab citizens should be permitted to influence who governs the country.

That approach could deepen existing divisions while allowing the prime minister to portray political competition itself as a security threat.

An Opposition Without a Clear Alternative

Israel’s opposition has not offered a wholly convincing alternative.

Gadi Eisenkot, a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces and a leading challenger to Netanyahu, has declared that he will not align himself with any Arab party. Yair Lapid, who previously served in a government supported by the Arab-led Ra’am party, has also promised not to repeat that arrangement.

Their objections cannot simply be dismissed. Any government must be able to rely on partners who accept its basic security responsibilities, and the Arab parties’ positions on Hamas warrant examination.

Yet the opposition has allowed Netanyahu to frame the debate on his terms. Rather than explaining how cooperation with Arab representatives might serve Israel’s national interests, its leaders have often appeared more concerned about the political risks of such an arrangement.

That is a strategic mistake.

Arab communities face urgent problems involving public safety, economic opportunity, education and public services. These are central national concerns, not peripheral issues that can be postponed until after the next coalition is formed.

The question is not whether Arab parties must be accepted unconditionally into every governing coalition. It is whether their participation should be judged by their policies and conduct or rejected because of their identity.

A credible opposition would set clear expectations for any potential coalition partner, particularly on national security, while demonstrating that Arab citizens’ concerns deserve a serious response.

It would also recognise that protecting Israel’s security and addressing the grievances of its Arab population are compatible objectives. A government that can command the confidence of more of its citizens is better placed to maintain national cohesion during a period of sustained external pressure.

Netanyahu’s opponents have an opportunity to articulate that vision. So far, they have not fully seized it.

The Crisis Inside Arab Israel

For many Arab voters, the most urgent question is not who occupies the prime minister’s office, but whether their communities are safe.

Organised crime, illegal firearms and persistent violence have devastated Arab Israeli communities. According to figures cited by the Abraham Initiatives, a record 252 people were murdered in Arab society in 2025. The continuing violence has intensified anger over the perceived disparity between the protection afforded to Arab and Jewish communities.

The problem extends beyond the number of killings. Reports have highlighted the comparatively low proportion of murders in Arab communities that result in indictments, raising questions about investigative capacity, institutional priorities and the state’s willingness to confront criminal organisations.

President Isaac Herzog has described the crisis as a national emergency.

Under National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, whose political career has been associated with hard-line nationalist positions, the police have faced persistent criticism over their handling of Arab communities and protests.

For ordinary Arab citizens, the contradiction is stark: they possess formal citizenship rights, yet many believe the state is failing in one of its most fundamental responsibilities, the protection of life.

The next government must confront this crisis through stronger investigations, effective prosecution, the dismantling of criminal networks and equal police protection. Arab community leaders also have a role in strengthening cooperation with law enforcement and resisting organised crime.

A surge in Arab turnout would therefore carry a message extending beyond the formation of the next government. It would be a demand for security, effective public services and equal protection under the law.

The principle must also apply in the West Bank, where Palestinian civilians have faced violence from extremist Jewish settlers, including attacks on homes and agricultural land. The Israeli government has been widely criticised for failing to respond adequately.

Israel has legitimate security concerns in the territory. Palestinian militant groups pose real threats, and Israeli civilians have suffered terrorist attacks. But security cannot justify tolerating violence against innocent people.

A state committed to the rule of law must hold extremists accountable, including those who claim to act in its national interest. Consistent enforcement strengthens Israel’s credibility and long-term security.

Israel’s Real Existential Threat

International debate over Netanyahu has often focused on the conduct of the war in Gaza and its humanitarian consequences for Palestinian civilians. Inside Israel, criticism has also centred on whether the prime minister has achieved the country’s military objectives, adequately confronted its enemies or delivered lasting security.

Eisenkot has criticised Netanyahu over the failure to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat. Such arguments reveal the central dilemma of Israeli politics: external dangers are real, but decisions about confronting them have become inseparable from questions of leadership, accountability and the character of the state.

October 7 shattered the belief that existing security arrangements could contain Hamas indefinitely. The attack reinforced the conviction that Israel must retain the military capacity to defeat organisations committed to its destruction.

Iran presents a related strategic challenge. Its support for armed groups across the region, hostility towards Israel and nuclear ambitions make deterrence, intelligence and military preparedness essential. No responsible Israeli government can simply wish these threats away.

Nor is there much reason to expect an immediate breakthrough towards a two-state settlement. Palestinian political divisions, Hamas’s continued influence, mutual distrust and the consequences of October 7 have made negotiations exceptionally difficult.

A durable peace would require credible Palestinian leadership, meaningful security guarantees for Israel and political arrangements capable of surviving opposition from extremists on both sides. Those conditions are not presently in place.

Acknowledging these obstacles does not mean abandoning the pursuit of a more stable future. Nor does it remove Israel’s obligation to distinguish legitimate security measures from policies that damage its long-term interests.

The immediate political danger may lie in the domestic arrangements through which Netanyahu seeks to retain power.

If the centre and left refuse to serve in a government led by him, a victory could leave Netanyahu dependent on Ben-Gvir, Smotrich and ultra-Orthodox parties. Such a coalition could intensify tensions in the West Bank, deepen divisions over military service and renew efforts to curtail the Supreme Court’s authority.

Ultra-Orthodox conscription is particularly contentious. Israelis serving in the military, including those fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, have shouldered immense personal costs. A system that exempts substantial sections of the population from military service has consequently become increasingly difficult to defend.

A fairer arrangement would help restore confidence in the principle that national obligations should be shared.

Judicial independence presents another crucial test. Efforts to weaken judicial oversight risk concentrating executive power and removing a safeguard against political overreach. The Supreme Court’s intervention over the attempted disqualification of Arab parties illustrates the practical consequences of maintaining independent institutions.

A Netanyahu defeat could offer an opportunity to change direction without compromising national security. Any successor would still need to confront Hamas, deter Iran and protect Israeli civilians. But a different government could also rebuild confidence in public institutions, strengthen the rule of law and address the grievances of citizens who feel abandoned.

The issue is not whether Israel should be tough on its enemies. It must be. The question is whether its leaders can pursue that objective without damaging the institutions and social cohesion that make the country worth defending.

A Country Worth Defending

Israel’s election is existential, but not simply because Netanyahu’s political future is at stake.

The country is choosing how to balance security and liberty, national identity and equal citizenship, military preparedness and institutional restraint. The consequences will extend beyond the next coalition, shaping Israel’s domestic stability and its ability to withstand external threats.

Hamas has demonstrated its willingness to murder civilians and abduct hostages. Iran remains a strategic concern. Israel cannot surrender its capacity for self-defence, and no responsible leader should promise a peace that present regional realities cannot sustain.

But military strength alone cannot guarantee the country’s future.

Israel must preserve independent institutions, confront violent extremism, address organised crime in Arab communities and ensure that its citizens can participate in national life without being treated as a political liability.

These are not concessions to Israel’s enemies. They are obligations of a democratic state and investments in its long-term security.

If Netanyahu wins, his dependence on the far right could make these objectives harder to achieve. If he loses, his successors will inherit the same dangerous neighbourhood and the same unresolved national trauma. They will have to prove that a different political approach can protect Israeli lives without deepening the divisions threatening the country’s cohesion.

Israel’s political system has survived war, terrorism and bitter internal conflict. Its resilience should not excuse its failures, but neither should those failures obscure the institutions and freedoms that distinguish it from many of its neighbours.

The country’s Arab citizens will have a voice in determining what comes next. Their participation will help reveal whether Israel can reconcile the demands of national security with the responsibilities of equal citizenship.

For all its faults, Israel possesses a political system in which governments can be challenged, leaders can be defeated and citizens can vote for change. The challenge is to ensure that these freedoms are matched by effective government, public safety and accountability.

Israel must remain strong enough to defend itself, confident enough to tolerate dissent and principled enough to protect the rights of all its citizens.

That is the fight for its democratic soul.