Israel’s Intelligence Paradox – Precision Abroad, Surprise at Home

Since June 13, Israel has reportedly been conducting one of the most daring and precise intelligence-led operations in its history, deep inside Iran, approximately 1,500 kilometers from its borders. According to multiple reports, Israeli operatives have targeted senior military leadership, nuclear infrastructure, and surface-to-surface missile launchers. Some of these strikes were allegedly carried out from within Iranian territory, using real-time intelligence and highly detailed knowledge of where the targets were located. The operation reflects a level of intelligence penetration that is extraordinary, even by Israel’s long-standing reputation for excellence in such missions.

This was not an isolated success. Over the past year, Israel has reportedly assassinated Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh while he was in Iran and eliminated top Hezbollah commanders in Beirut. Each of these missions relied on years of intelligence work, combining human sources and advanced surveillance. These achievements highlight Israel’s strong intelligence and its ability to turn information into accurate and powerful operations.

And yet, the same country that can strike with precision thousands of kilometers away was blindsided by the surprise attack of October 7, 2023. It was the most devastating assault in Israel’s modern history. More than 1,200 Israelis were killed, hundreds kidnapped, and entire communities in southern Israel were harmed by Hamas. This was not a failure against a distant, highly advanced adversary but rather against a familiar and closely monitored group operating just across the border.

How is this possible? How could Israel know where Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is hiding, anticipate when Haniyeh would arrive in Iran, and locate Iran’s missile systems, yet fail to uncover Hamas’s intention developing a few kilometers from its own territory?

To answer this question, it is crucial to distinguish between two fundamentally different kinds of intelligence: tactical and strategic. A useful framework for understanding this comes from Brig. Gen. (res.) Itai Brun, former head of the IDF’s Military Intelligence Analysis Division. In his book Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes, Brun explains that intelligence must deal with both “secrets” and “mysteries.”

Secrets refer to facts that exist in the present, such as where someone is or what is happening in a facility. These can be uncovered through collection. Mysteries, on the other hand, involve assessing possible futures, such as what an adversary might do, why and why not. These are far harder to determine because they depend on evolving motivations and decisions that may not yet be finalized.

Put simply: questions like “where” and “how” have clear answers. Questions like “whether” and “why” are harder to answer. The former are secrets waiting to be discovered; the latter are mysteries that require judgment, empathy, and a deep understanding of human behavior and strategic context. That is why strategic intelligence, which relies on interpreting mysteries, is inherently more complex and fragile.

One of the biggest problems exposed on October 7 was Israel’s illusion of immunity. This was driven both by the illusion of deterrence, when a country feels very strong and believes its enemies are too afraid to attack, it can become overconfident. It may ignore warning signs or assume that no real danger exists. This mindset contributed to the mistaken belief that Hamas would not dare launch a major attack. But perhaps even more dangerously, Israel’s exceptional ability to uncover secrets may have created a false sense of confidence that it could also uncover mysteries. This led to the belief that if Hamas ever decided to act, that decision too would be immediately visible.

Looking ahead, Israel surely must continue to strengthen its tactical intelligence ability. These capabilities are often built around technologies that can be developed, bought, and improved. They rely on systems and processes with clear objectives and measurable outcomes and are typically structured through what is known as the Targeting Cycle: identifying a threat (Find), locating it precisely (Fix), monitoring it (Track), selecting the appropriate response (Target), executing the action (Engage), and evaluating the results (Assess). Tactical success depends on engineering, coordination, and the ability to act on concrete information, all of which Israel has repeatedly demonstrated with world-class precision.

But in order to solve mysteries, equipment alone is not enough. Strategic intelligence is different. It is not just about machines or data; it is about how we think. To improve it, Israel’s intelligence community must develop better methods for analysis and, more importantly, cultivate emotional and intellectual discipline. Analysts and leaders need to learn how to hold competing possibilities at once, to understand the mindset of the adversary even when it appears irrational, and to speak honestly about uncertainty without fear of judgment.

Therefore, to prevent the next October 7, it is not enough to know where our enemies’ bases are, what weapons they possess, or even what plans they’ve made. We must also accurately assess their motivations and intentions, while recognizing the inherent limits of our knowledge. This requires humility and the willingness to prepare for scenarios we may not fully understand. Strategic intelligence demands a mindset shift. Because when intelligence surprises occur, it is often not the information that was lacking, but the readiness to think differently.