Israel’s Mistaken Strategy Regarding Hizbullah

“We taught the bastards how to cope.”

– Cited by Col. Harry Summers, On Strategy, regarding America’s failure in Vietnam.

Last week Israel landed two heavy tactical blows on Hizbullah. Thousands of key members of the organization were hurt or killed in “operation beeper.” On the morrow of the second stage of that operation, the high command of Hizbullah’s elite Rejwan force gathered in an underground bunker in Beirut to plan a counterattack – and were wiped out en masse. No less shocking than the physical blows Hizbullah suffered is the evidence of how deeply and thoroughly Israeli intelligence has penetrated the organization.

So much for the positive side of the story. The negative side is that Israel is in the process of wasting what it has achieved, because its tactical brilliance is unaccompanied by strategic comprehension.

It’s not clear whether the timing of “operation beeper” was chosen by Israel or forced on her because Hizbullah was about to cotton on to the plot. In any event, the blows Israel struck at Hizbullah have caused the war in the north to escalate.  While Israel strikes at Hizbullah targets, including in downtown Beirut, Hizbullah has broadened its attacks to encompass civilian and military targets north of the latitude of Haifa. Leaving the war at this level of escalation is not in Israel’s interest. Additional hundreds of thousands of Israelis’ lives are now disrupted by the war.  The same is true, apparently of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese Shiites. Many have had to flee their homes in southern Lebanon; many are fleeing Dahiya, the Shi’ite quarter of Beirut. The difference is that Israel cannot countenance the disruption of so large a civilian population. By contrast, Hizbullah’s leadership is far less sensitive to the effect of Israel’s attacks on the civilian population, if it cares at all. After all, Hizbullah is party to the Islamic extremist tactic of using civilians as human shields. Israel cannot long tolerate the current situation in its north. It must make things change, and soon.

No acceptable change will take place through negotiations. Prior to the current escalation the conditions Hizbullah sought to impose on Israel were unacceptable.  In order to cease its attacks, Hizbullah required Israel to accept defeat in Gaza and withdraw while enabling Hamas to recover its position there.  Any cease fire Hamas and Hizbullah say they will accept will be at best temporary.  An Israel willing to accept defeat in this war marks itself as prey, and sets Israel up for the next October 7^th, no matter what Hizbullah or Hamas may promise.

But how do Israel’s political and military leadership plan to bring about change?  One can learn that from what they are saying – and from what they are neglecting to do. Israel is moving the crack 98^th division from Gaza to the northern border, but has refrained from a massive callup of reserves. If “operation beeper” and the subsequent attack on the Rejwan command has disrupted Hamas’ command and control – a critical component of any military strategy – Israel apparently has no plans to follow up this achievement. There are no plans to convert Hizbullah’s discomfiture into a genuine military victory, destroying Hizbullah’s forces and forcing their remnants north out of range of Israel’s civilian rear.

To get an idea of Israel’s current objectives, pay close attention to the following statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu on Sunday:

During the last few days we have landed on Hizbullah a series of blows he could never have imagined.  And if Hizbullah hasn’t gotten the message . . . it will yet get the message.” [emph. added]

Well, what is the message? Were I Nasrallah, upon hearing Netanyahu’s message I would smile for the first time in a very difficult week. The attempt to “send a message” is the message. Israel is not acting so as to destroy Hizbullah’s ability to attack her. It wants to “send a message” to Hizbullah to desist. But right now the fight is being conducted at a level where the advantage lies with Hizbullah; it is costing Israel a price it cannot long consent to pay, while Hizbullah can cope quite well with whatever the war is now costing it.

In the words cited above by Harry Summers, Israel isn’t forcing Hizbullah to desist; it’s teaching Hizbullah to cope.

Israel’s current excuse for a strategy is a direct continuation of the mistaken military conceptions – it’s hard to grace them with the term “strategy” – that led up to October 7^th last year and continue to shape its military activity:  “sending messages,” pretending the ability to shape the enemy’s psychology by “imposing costs,” while the enemy is willing to bear any cost to destroy us. One doesn’t deal with such people by trying to affect their cost-benefit analysis. The only way to deal with them is to destroy them, and the only way to do that is by means of large Israeli maneuver forces penetrating north of the Litani river, killing Hizbullah fighters and driving the civilian population out of those areas Israel deems necessary for it to hold for its own security. Israel’s current “strategy” against Hizbullah is a waste of time, treasure and lives. And by the way, it is simply wasting the effect of the IDF’s brilliant tactical strokes during “operation beeper” and after, which could and should have opened a campaign to destroy the enemy.

The lesson of Israel’s mistaken strategy against Hizbullah, like the lesson of October 7 2023, is that Israel needs to abandon the misconceptions of “sending messages” and deterrence for a strategy of destroying those who threaten it. Unfortunately, Israel’s current strategic misconceptions are those that Yoav Gallant, Hertzi Halevi, Gadi Eisenkot and Benny Gantz were brought up on professionally, and they continue to shape Israel’s military practice today. There are commanders in the IDF who do possess an instinct for the jugular, whose whole orientation is toward destroying the enemy rather than “sending him messages.”  The crew of faux professionals named above have carefully weeded many of them out of the ranks.

The central reason why we should hope that Gidon Saar, a civilian with a long and intimate familiarity with Israel’s strategic challenges, is speedily appointed defense minister is that he shares with the Prime Minister the conviction that the overriding object in Gaza is to destroy the enemy. What’s true for Hamas is true for Hizbullah.  Let’s hope that Saar is appointed soon, and that when he enters the office of Minister of Defense he doesn’t forget to bring a broom.