Israel’s Next Government: Getting In, Staying Together, Getting Things Done

In a recent Haaretz podcast, Anshel Pfeffer described the gamble behind forming a minority government first and broadening it later. The order matters. Parties may refuse to enter a coalition while Netanyahu remains a plausible alternative, yet reconsider once another prime minister controls the agenda and can offer them a place in government. Taking office changes the choices available to everyone else.

Israel’s institutions make that approach possible. The cabinet depends on the Knesset, but its members need not represent 61 of the parliament’s 120 seats. Initial approval can come from more votes in favor than against, with some parties abstaining or supporting the government from outside (meaning helping it take or remain in office through parliamentary votes without joining the governing coalition or holding cabinet positions). Removing it through a constructive vote of no confidence requires 61 members to agree on an alternative government. As a result, a cabinet may be easier to establish, and harder to replace, than its size suggests.

Staying in power does not mean a government can get things done. It may remain in office because its opponents cannot agree on a replacement, while still lacking the votes to pass a budget or laws. Parties outside the coalition can support particular measures without taking responsibility for all the government’s decisions. It can also leave each difficult vote subject to negotiation. Written commitments on budgets, priorities and consultation would make such an arrangement more predictable, although no agreement can eliminate political shocks.

Arab parties are central to this calculation, but treating them simply as votes misses what their participation means. Their voters have interests in personal security, housing, municipal services and equal treatment. Cooperation must produce results they can defend to their communities. Parties also differ over how closely to associate themselves with a government whose security policies they may oppose. Support from outside can preserve that distance, but it cannot indefinitely substitute for delivery.

The alternative of attracting ultra-Orthodox parties creates another set of dependencies. Recent reports of Eisenkot prioritizing those negotiations show how quickly strategy can shift. Concessions on military service and religious education could make a coalition possible while weakening promises of a fairer distribution of obligations and hurting Netanyahu’s chances of forming his own coalition and government. Partners who campaigned on those promises would then have to explain their retreat. Meanwhile, Avigdor Lieberman’s rejection of reliance on Arab parties narrows everyone’s options. One party’s refusal increases another party’s bargaining power.

A larger coalition therefore offers no automatic solution. More seats provide protection against defections, but more partners can introduce additional demands and vetoes. The practical question is which arrangement can agree on the decisions that cannot be postponed. Allocating ministries is easier than deciding who serves, which schools receive funding, or how government responds when security policy divides its supporters.

The negotiations should therefore distinguish immediate arrangements from lasting commitments. A temporary compromise can give lawmakers time to act, but those who benefit from it may try to keep it in place. Postponing a dispute can help establish a government; repeatedly postponing it can undermine trust between partners. The useful test is whether a concession creates a workable next step or merely transfers the same conflict to the next budget vote.

Washington adds another layer. Trump retains the presidency and executive authority, while Democrats take control of both chambers of Congress on January 3. Israel will face different sources of American influence: a president directing diplomacy and much security cooperation, and legislators controlling appropriations, conducting oversight and seeking conditions on assistance. Congressional preferences do not automatically become policy; legislation still confronts presidential veto power and the difficulty of assembling majorities.

Nor will Democrats speak with one voice. Israeli analysis distinguishes established supporters of security assistance, progressives seeking conditions on weapons transfers, and those advocating broader restrictions. Replacing Netanyahu could improve the atmosphere with some Democrats. It would not settle disagreements over Gaza, settlements or Palestinian rights. Arab participation might signal political inclusion, but American legislators would also judge what the Israeli government actually does.

Changes in U.S. financial support would directly affect negotiations over Israel’s budget among coalition partners. Recent reporting points toward continued aid followed by a negotiated reduction, rather than treating Trump’s earlier announcement of an abrupt cutoff as settled policy. The terms remain uncertain. If Israel must finance more of its defense, less money may be available for the civilian commitments that secured coalition support. Restrictions on particular weapons could create difficulties even when Israel can pay for them.

These pressures can reinforce one another. A concession that holds the Israeli coalition together may make cooperation with congressional Democrats harder. An accommodation intended to preserve American support may provoke a domestic partner’s threat to leave. Trump’s willingness to support Israel on one issue would not necessarily resolve a funding dispute in Congress. Israeli negotiators therefore need to consider how today’s coalition promise will affect tomorrow’s diplomatic and budgetary choices.

A coalition agreement should explain how the parties will resolve their disagreements once they are in government. Can the partners pass their first budget, deliver tangible improvements to Arab communities, address military service and work with both the White House and Congress? Israel needs a government whose members can continue making decisions after the shared objective of replacing Netanyahu has been achieved.