Israel’s Next Government Must Reconcile Its Security Doctrine With Its West Bank Policy

Israel’s October 27 election is unfolding amid a debate over what national security means after October 7, 2023. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has presented a new security doctrine that prioritises prevention, offensive action, military superiority and greater independence in arms production. These priorities reflect a country determined not to repeat the strategic surprise that preceded Hamas’s attack. Yet a doctrine is only as credible as the policies used to implement it.

The question is whether Israel can translate military strength into lasting security while allowing its West Bank policy to generate risks that the security establishment must then manage. Settlement expansion, settler violence and the weakening of Palestinian institutions are not peripheral issues. They shape the environment in which Israeli forces operate, influence relations with Palestinians and affect Israel’s ability to maintain international support.

This is not an argument that Israel should abandon its security requirements or assume that territorial concessions will automatically produce peace. Palestinian armed groups pose real threats, and any Israeli government has a duty to protect its citizens. But that duty also requires examining whether policies adopted for ideological, electoral or territorial reasons serve the country’s broader strategic interests.

Netanyahu’s new doctrine, published on October 18, emphasises acting against emerging threats rather than relying on containment. That approach raises a basic question: how should Israel define prevention when policies on one front may intensify instability on another? Military superiority can disrupt hostile networks, but it cannot by itself resolve the political and institutional conditions that sustain recurring confrontation.

The next government, whatever its composition, will therefore face a test more demanding than choosing between offensive and defensive strategies. It must determine whether its policies in the West Bank support a coherent security doctrine or create liabilities that Israel will pay to manage for years.

More Than a Military Strategy

Israel’s security doctrine has traditionally rested on intelligence, deterrence, early warning and the ability to move quickly against emerging threats. After October 7, the emphasis on prevention and offensive action is understandable. Yet military action is an instrument, not a complete strategy. A credible national security policy must also explain how immediate operational gains contribute to a more stable political environment.

The West Bank illustrates this challenge. Israeli forces confront armed groups and seek to prevent attacks, while the government also oversees a territorial reality shaped by settlement expansion, movement restrictions and competing claims to sovereignty. These policies cannot be assessed separately from the security burdens they create.

The latest figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs are difficult to ignore. OCHA recorded more than 2,060 settler attacks resulting in Palestinian casualties or property damage across about 300 communities since the beginning of the year, averaging seven incidents a day. During the reporting period of September 29 to October 12 alone, it recorded 244 such incidents across 113 communities.

These figures do not establish that every attack stems from settlement policy, nor do they prove that settler violence directly causes every subsequent security incident. They do, however, reveal a persistent challenge to public order. When violence requires intervention by Israeli forces, damages property or restricts access to land, it can create additional demands on security and law-enforcement institutions.

The Israeli state must also consider its own authority. If private citizens can intimidate Palestinian communities, damage property or obstruct access without effective enforcement, the government risks weakening the credibility of its laws and command structures. A doctrine that promises decisive action against threats should apply consistently to violence that undermines security, regardless of the perpetrator’s political identity.

Settlement Expansion Is Also a Strategic Question

Settlement policy is often debated through the competing lenses of ideology, historical claims and international law. Those debates matter, but they should not obscure its strategic implications. The location and expansion of settlements can alter territorial geography, complicate movement and increase the number of points at which Israeli forces must manage friction between communities.

The European Union’s 2025 report on Israeli settlements, published in July 2026, recorded approval of 54 new official settlements in the occupied West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, and the establishment of 86 outposts during 2025. The report described an acceleration of settlement activity and developments pointing towards annexation.

Numbers alone cannot demonstrate the precise military cost of each settlement. Nevertheless, expansion creates questions that a serious security review should answer. Does the protection of new communities require additional deployments? Do access roads and territorial fragmentation complicate operations? Do recurring confrontations divert personnel from other missions? These are practical questions, not arguments that any particular territorial arrangement automatically produces peace.

The same scrutiny should apply to restrictions on Palestinian movement. OCHA’s April 2026 report on West Bank movement and access documented 925 obstacles affecting movement across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as of December 2025. Such barriers may serve specific security purposes, but their cumulative effects on work, health care, education and livelihoods also shape the political environment in which security policy operates.

A policy may provide an immediate operational advantage while imposing longer-term costs. Restrictions that are necessary to address a specific threat should be distinguished from measures whose continued effectiveness is unclear. Likewise, settlement decisions should be assessed not only by their domestic political appeal but also by their consequences for military deployments, territorial stability and the possibility of a durable political arrangement. The strategic question is not whether Israel can exercise control. It is whether the form of control being pursued makes the country safer over time.

The Cost of Strategic Incoherence

The weakening of Palestinian governance presents another challenge. The Palestinian Authority is neither universally trusted nor free of serious institutional shortcomings. Nevertheless, its administrative and security capacities affect the environment in which Israel must operate. If Palestinian institutions become less capable of maintaining order, preventing attacks or providing basic services, Israel may face greater instability and more pressure to intervene directly.

This is not an argument for treating Palestinian governance as a substitute for Israeli responsibility. Rather, it recognises that the collapse of functioning institutions can create security problems that military operations alone cannot resolve. Israeli policy should therefore distinguish between measures necessary to prevent immediate threats and decisions that risk further undermining the institutions required for stability.

There is also an international dimension. Israel’s security depends not only on its armed forces but on intelligence cooperation, access to military supplies and diplomatic relationships. Settlement expansion and unchecked settler violence have consequences for those relationships, particularly when allied governments face pressure to respond. The UN’s September 2026 report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee warned that settlement expansion, displacement and movement restrictions were eroding the prospects for a viable and contiguous Palestinian state.

International criticism should not dictate Israel’s security decisions. But dismissing every external concern as political hostility would also be strategically shortsighted. Alliances are assets, and governments preserve them through credible policies as well as shared interests. A policy that repeatedly creates friction with partners without demonstrating a clear security benefit deserves reconsideration.

The next government should establish measurable standards. It should enforce the law against settler violence, review settlement decisions for their operational and territorial consequences, preserve effective channels for security coordination where possible, and clarify what political future it considers achievable in the West Bank. It should also assess restrictions on movement against specific security objectives and their wider consequences.

None of these steps guarantees peace. Nor would they eliminate the threats posed by armed groups. Their purpose is more basic: to ensure that the government does not pursue short-term political or territorial gains while accumulating strategic liabilities elsewhere.

Israel’s next election should be judged not only by who leads the government or how forcefully it speaks about national security. It should be judged by whether the country’s territorial policies, military doctrine and political objectives reinforce one another. A state can possess overwhelming military power and still struggle to turn that power into lasting stability. Reconciling security doctrine with West Bank policy is therefore not a concession to external pressure. It is a test of strategic discipline.