Israel’s Opposition Knows How to Oppose Netanyahu, But Does It Know How to Govern?
Israel’s October 27 election has produced a result that should have been a decisive turning point in Benjamin Netanyahu’s political career. His governing bloc has fallen to 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, eight short of a parliamentary majority. The opposition’s Jewish-led parties secured 48 seats, while Arab-led parties won a historic 19. Mathematically, the forces opposed to Netanyahu command 67 seats. Politically, however, they remain far from a functioning government.
The distinction matters. An electoral majority against a prime minister is not necessarily a governing majority for his opponents. Israel’s opposition has demonstrated that it can mobilise public dissatisfaction with Netanyahu, but it has yet to demonstrate that it can translate that dissatisfaction into a coherent political programme. Removing a leader may unite parties with sharply different agendas. Governing a country, particularly one facing multiple security challenges, requires something considerably more demanding: agreement on priorities, acceptable compromises and a shared understanding of national responsibility.
The results expose this contradiction. Likud remains the largest party with 27 seats, followed by Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar with 21 and the Bennett-Lapid B’Yachad alliance with 12. Yet the opposition’s numerical advantage depends on the participation or support of Arab parties, principally the Joint List and Ra’am. Several Jewish-led opposition leaders have ruled out relying on them to form a government. Consequently, the 67-seat majority exists on paper, but not as an agreed parliamentary coalition.
That is not a minor negotiating obstacle. It goes to the heart of the opposition’s political identity. Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman have maintained reservations about cooperation with Arab parties, while Yair Golan has advocated a broader parliamentary arrangement. Eisenkot, meanwhile, must reconcile these competing positions without alienating the partners whose support he needs. Mansour Abbas has also expressed scepticism about the prospects of an Arab-backed minority government. The opposition, in short, has agreed on whom it wants to replace, but not yet on whom it is prepared to govern with.
The irony is difficult to miss. Voter turnout reached 77.9 per cent, the highest in decades, with more than 5.7 million ballots cast. Israelis demonstrated a substantial willingness to participate in determining their country’s political future. Their political leaders now face the responsibility of showing an equivalent willingness to compromise. A vibrant electoral contest cannot compensate for an elite that remains unable to turn competing mandates into an effective government.
From Anti-Netanyahu Unity to a Governing Coalition
Israel’s recent political history offers a warning. In 2021, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid assembled an unusually diverse coalition that included right-wing, centrist, left-wing and Arab political forces. Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am became part of the governing arrangement, helping end Netanyahu’s uninterrupted tenure. The coalition demonstrated that ideological differences could be managed when parties shared a sufficiently urgent objective.
Yet it also revealed the fragility of a government held together primarily by the determination to keep Netanyahu out of office. Disagreements over security, settlements, religion and state, and relations with Arab citizens repeatedly strained the partnership. The government collapsed in 2022, returning Israel to another election. The lesson is not that cross-party cooperation is impossible. It is that a coalition needs more than a common adversary to survive.
The present opposition faces an even more demanding test. Its leaders must decide whether Arab parties can be legitimate parliamentary partners, whether support from outside a cabinet is acceptable, or whether a broader unity government involving elements of the existing coalition is preferable. Each option carries political costs. Excluding Arab representatives may make a majority impossible; relying on them may provoke resistance among right-wing voters; entering a unity government with Netanyahu could undermine the opposition’s central electoral promise.
The distinction between coalition arithmetic and policy coherence is therefore essential. Even if Eisenkot manages to assemble 61 votes, that would not automatically establish agreement on the policies the government must pursue. A parliamentary majority can elect a government; it cannot, by itself, guarantee that the government can make difficult decisions or remain united when those decisions become controversial.
Security Requires More Than a Change of Leadership
The stakes extend well beyond domestic political manoeuvring. Israel faces continuing security challenges involving Gaza, Iran, Hezbollah and the wider regional environment. The consequences of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack have also left unresolved questions about intelligence failures, political accountability and the future direction of national security. A new government would inherit these problems immediately, not after completing its coalition negotiations.
Eisenkot has sought to address some of these concerns. He has pledged to advance legislation establishing universal military and national service, create a state commission of inquiry into the October 7 failures, reform the budget mechanism and prioritise citizens who serve. These proposals give his emerging political project a more substantive foundation. Nevertheless, announcing priorities is different from securing the parliamentary support required to implement them.
Military conscription illustrates the difficulty. The exemption of many ultra-Orthodox men from military service has become increasingly contentious as the burden on regular troops and reservists has grown. Any serious reform will require political courage, legal clarity and a willingness to confront powerful coalition interests. Parties that disagree over the principle and scope of universal service may find it difficult to support the same legislation once they enter government. The same problem applies to the establishment of an independent inquiry into October 7: agreement that accountability is necessary does not necessarily mean agreement over its mandate, timing or political consequences.
The opposition therefore needs something more durable than a coalition agreement allocating ministerial positions. It needs a minimum governing compact: a set of binding priorities that its prospective partners can defend publicly and implement collectively. Such an arrangement should establish common ground on national security, military and civilian service, October 7 accountability, institutional independence and fiscal priorities. Parties need not abandon their ideological identities, but they must identify which disagreements can be postponed and which commitments cannot be compromised.
Netanyahu’s Advantage May Be His Opponents’ Disunity
This is where Netanyahu retains political leverage. His bloc may have lost its parliamentary majority, but the opposition’s internal divisions create opportunities for him to remain influential. He can seek to preserve his existing alliances, exploit disagreements among his opponents and wait for political calculations to change. A unity arrangement with centrist or right-wing opposition figures may also become a possibility if negotiations reach an impasse, although such a government would require compromises that several leaders have publicly resisted.
Israel’s constitutional process gives the political parties time to negotiate after the official results are presented to President Isaac Herzog. The new Knesset is scheduled to be sworn in on November 10. If efforts to form a government fail, the country could face another election. But another vote would not necessarily resolve the underlying problem. Unless the political parties address their incompatible expectations, Israel could simply reproduce the same parliamentary deadlock with different numbers.
Eisenkot’s leadership will consequently be measured by more than his ability to become prime minister. His military experience and electoral performance give him credibility, but governing requires a different kind of authority: the ability to persuade political partners to accept compromises, establish priorities and remain accountable for collective decisions. Bennett, Lapid, Golan and Lieberman face the same test. None can claim to offer national renewal while treating the practical requirements of coalition-building as someone else’s problem.
The opposition does not need to agree on every question confronting Israel. It does, however, need to explain what it would do together, why those policies matter and how it would maintain a parliamentary majority when disagreements inevitably emerge. Otherwise, its electoral achievement risks becoming another episode in Israel’s prolonged political instability.
Netanyahu may have lost the majority required to govern, but his opponents have not yet demonstrated that they possess the unity required to replace him. The central question after this election is therefore no longer simply whether Israel can move beyond Netanyahu. It is whether the politicians seeking to replace him can offer something more substantial than his removal. Winning against Netanyahu may be the opposition’s common ambition. Governing Israel requires a common purpose.
