Israel’s Security Can’t Depend on Russia

The Current Landscape 

As Israel navigates the post-October 7th landscape and the collapse of the Assad regime, the second Trump administration is driving a profound shift in global and regional politics. As a result, Israel has the opportunity to achieve many of its security objectives operating in an advantageous environment with backing from the US administration. Therefore, Israel should not pursue risky diplomatic gambits to achieve short-term objectives by leveraging Russian influence. Such actions risk jeopardizing long-term Israeli security. Instead, Israel should work with US and regional partners that share its security interests in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran while allowing the ongoing instability in Turkey and Syria to play out, serving Israeli interests—without getting encumbered in another conflict. 

The fall of the Assad regime and decline in Iranian influence across the Middle East have opened the door for Turkey to pose an increasing threat to Israel. To counter this, Israel has implored US officials to support Russian retention of their Syrian bases, thereby limiting Turkish penetration into Syria and the broader Middle East. According to Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International think tank, Israel is concerned  that “Turkey will intervene to protect the new Syrian Islamist order, which could then serve as a base for Hamas and other militants.” This comes on the heels of Turkey’s President, Recep Erdogan, campaigning for Islamic countries to unite against “the growing threat of expansionism from Israel.” Further complicating dynamics in Syria is Netanyahu’s declaration that Israel would defend an independent Druze region in southern Syria if attacked by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces. 

In return for lobbying on behalf of Russia, Turkey expert Hay Cohen suggests that “Israel expects a Russian effort vis-à-vis the United States to act on an agreement that would limit Tehran on the nuclear issue.” This follows reports indicating that Trump asked Putin to mediate a discussion between the US and Iran regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and regional proxy forces. Improved ties between the White House and the Kremlin may give Netanyahu more flexibility to engage with Putin, but this new situation does not alter the stark reality that relying on an autocratic leader for existential security concerns remains a risky gamble. 

The Russian Question 

Moscow’s ‘friendly’ relationship with Tehran may offer Israel (and the US) an improved negotiating position to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. However, this assumes that good-faith negotiations are possible with Russia at the helm and that Russia’s underlying objectives align with those of the US and Israel. There is no reason to take Putin for his word, nor is there any reason for him to align with a US-Israeli position in negotiations with Iran. A nuclear-armed Iran boosts Russia’s leverage and provides a counterbalance to US influence in the Middle East. In the same way, “the heightened threat of North Korean missile attacks incentivizes both Japan and South Korea to avoid alienating Beijing, which they hope will help keep Pyongyang in check,” a nuclear-armed Iran would force Middle East countries to similarly avoid alienating Russia. Additionally, a nuclear-armed Iran would likely be further economically and politically isolated, and with Russia having tens of billions of dollars invested in Iran’s oil and gas industry, Russia would have significant control over Iran’s leadership. 

Russia has also actively subverted Israeli security in the past. In exchange for Iran providing Russia with weapons for its war in Ukraine, Russia increased its military support to Iran and its proxies. Moscow provided Iran-back militias with intelligence, has coordinated militarily with Hezbollah in Syria and has a “well-established informal economic cooperation” with the Hezbollah.  Russia is also providing Iran with advanced military equipment and capabilities, with it being plausible that Russia is providing Iranian scientists with the technical support needed to reach a nuclear breakout. Supporting continued Russian influence in the region as a counterweight to the perceived Turkish threat may appear to be a savvy strategic gambit but empowering Russia to manage negotiations with Iran may introduce significant new and greater security threats to Israel. 

Reassessing the Turkish Threat 

Israeli leadership overestimates the threat that Turkey and Syria pose to Israel in the near-to-mid-term. While Israel should be wary of Turkey’s long-term ambitions across the region, the risk of leveraging Russia to thwart Turkey in the short term significantly outweighs the reward. Israel would be better off continuing to reinforce its deterrence posture on its northern border and let the current events in Turkey and Syria play out–without empowering Russia. 

There is no indication that the new Turkish-backed transitional Syrian government seeks a direct conflict with Israel or to become a conduit for others to attack Israel. Even as Israel has conducted strikes against military targets in Syria, the interim government’s leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has made it clear they do not seek new conflicts and that “the presence of Iranian militias under the previous [Syrian] regime posed a strategic threat to the entire region,” vowing to prevent Iranian weapons smuggling through Syria.  Moreover, al-Sharaa’s forces are still fighting with Assad loyalists across a fractured Syria, with over 1000 people killed in the past few weeks. It is unlikely that al-Sharaa will threaten Israel and its vastly superior military as they prioritize consolidating power and presenting itself as a legitimate governing body—an effort that may take years. While neither al-Sharaa nor the future Syrian government may be considered future allies of Israel, they might adopt a stance of benign neglect if Israel allows tensions to subside.  

This reality is compounded by the tensions between Iran and Turkey over influence in Syria and the broader region as well as instability within Turkey. Following Iran’s criticism of Turkish Syria policy, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened Iran stating, “people who live in glass houses should not throw stones.” While the relationship between these two nations has been described as a “cooperative rivalry,” the rise of a Sunni government in Syria threatens Iran’s regional ambitions, especially as their means to resupply Hezbollah is hampered without access to Syria. Additionally, Turkey is dealing with its own political and economic instability as the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, the leading political opponent to Erdogan and the mayor of Istanbul, has led to mass protests and investor flight. With some polls showing that Imamoglu could defeat Erdogan if he ran for President, his arrest may further increase his popularity, threatening Erdogan’s grip on power.   

Israel’s Path Forward  

Israel is well-positioned to achieve its short-term and long-term security objectives through various strategic options without reliance on Russia. Given the growing tensions between Iran and Turkey, as well as ongoing domestic instability in Turkey and Syria, Israel should focus on leveraging these dynamics to its advantage rather than entangling itself in another conflict. This approach necessitates closely monitoring developments along its northern border while reinforcing strong defensive positions. However, Israel should avoid actions that could escalate the situation, such as inadvertently strengthening Russia’s position in Syria or committing the IDF to an additional front. Israel can afford to allow its adversaries to weaken each other through competition. In the battle for influence in Syria, if Turkey “wins,” then Lebanon and Hezbollah will be cut off from its benefactors—Iran and Russia—opening a window of opportunity for Israel to legitimately defeat Hezbollah if it chooses. If Iran “wins,” then Syria remains the fractured state split by ethnic groups, an outcome Netanyahu has already championed. 

Israel should prioritize preventing a nuclear-armed Iran by capitalizing on its strong relationship with a supportive administration in the White House and strengthening coordination with regional partners—both overt and covert—who share its objective. Israel derives no strategic advantage from inviting Russia into the equation, especially at a time when the political environment aligns with Israel’s broader goals. By prioritizing existential threats—a nuclear-armed Iran and its terror proxies—rather than attempting to counter hypothetical future risks by relying on Russia, Israel reduces the risk of unintended consequences. The gamble of involving Russia in regional geopolitics mirrors Netanyahu’s earlier decision to empower Hamas to weaken the Palestinian Authority, thereby preventing a unified Palestinian actor that could demand a state. While this tactic provided Israel with short-term benefits, the unintended consequence of bolstering Hamas ultimately enabled October 7. While Netanyahu undoubtedly understands the current security risks posed by Russia, Turkey, Iran, and a feeble Syria, he must ensure that short-term security and political gains do not invite future unintended consequences, most importantly, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran shielded by Russia.