Italy’s ambiguity concerning Turkey, Syria, and Iran persist

On Tuesday, July 30^th, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called on Israel not to fall into the “trap” of retaliation, saying she was “very, very worried” by the situation in Lebanon and by the risk of a regional escalation.

As reported by the JPost, speaking during an official visit to China, Meloni said the international community should continue sending messages of moderation, and that China could help in these efforts, having “solid ties” with Iran and Saudi Arabia.

To understand Meloni’s statements we need to examine a series of cases that recently occurred.

First of all, look at the timing: on July 26^th Reuters news agency revealed that Italy decided to appoint an ambassador to Syria, making it the first G7 nation to relaunch its diplomatic mission in Damascus. This is indeed an issue of serious concern.

Let’s keep in mind that Syria is part of the so-called “Axis of resistance” and a major hub for Iranian and Hezbollah activity against the Jewish State; therefore, Syrian territory is often targeted by the Israeli air force.

Secondly, last April, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Tajani, made some very concerning statements immediately after Iran’s aggression against Israel with over 300 missiles and drones:

“The Iranians have assured us that our Italian soldiers in the area will be respected.” Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Antonio Tajani said this on Stasera Italia on Rete4. “The Italian contingent in Lebanon is under the aegis of the UN, it is in a condition to be protected, I don’t think there are any dangers either for the Italian soldiers or for the Italian citizens in Israel and Iran” explained Tajani, who reported that the Farnesina crisis unit had received no reports from Italians in Jerusalem, Amman and Tehran. As for the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the minister explained how he was assured that “only ships that bring weapons to Israel will be attacked“.

Considering that the European anti-Houthi mission “Aspides” in the Red Sea is led by Italy and Greece, such statements are clearly problematic.

Plus, do Italian troops really need Iran’s reassurance to operate in Lebanon? This obviously does not provide a positive image for Italy’s armed forces.

The Italian government is worried about its 1200 troops present on Lebanese soil as part of the Unifil mission; however, this concern cannot be at the expense of Israel’s security. If we reached the point where Italy needs to worry about its troops’ safety in Lebanon, then the Unifil mission is not working and Italy’s Defense Minister, Guido Crosetto, is correct when he says that the UN should ponder on the results achieved by it and on the need to redefine a strategy.

A third point that deserves to be examined is the statement made by the Italian Foreign Minister Tajani following the October 7th massacre, regarding ceased weapon shipments to Israel in “concern that they’d be used for war crimes”, as already reported by The Times of Israel: “We have decided not to send any more arms to Israel, so there is no need to discuss this point”.

War crimes? Or self-defense?

Italy’s weapons supply to Israel is indeed limited to a small percentage which makes the whole delivery block irrelevant to Israel’s security, about 5%. However, the message conveyed is quite problematic. Especially, since the Italian government did not seem concerned about cutting defense deals with Turkey under Erdogan, as exposed by Al Arabiyya in January 2024.

According to the Arab media outlet, Italy and Turkey are aiming to boost the value of trade between their countries to $32.7 billion (€30 billion) by 2030 from around €25 billion currently, according to an official briefed on the talks. Additionally, the defense deals between the two countries could include Italy’s Leonardo SpA, which works on aerospace and security globally.

Make no mistake, an escalation, with consequent further destabilization of the area would be a major problem for everyone, and for Israel in the first place.

However, it is essential to bear in mind that the main destabilizing force in the area is Iran. The October 7^th 2023 massacre, the drone attack in Tel Aviv on Friday July 19^th 2024, and last Saturday’s soccer field massacre at Majdal Shams were carried out by Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah, all Iranian proxies.

As for Turkey, it is unequivocally siding with Islamist terrorism and Erdogan is supporting Hamas both, on an operational and financial level. This makes Turkey a terrorist-supporting State, just like Iran.

It is not possible to claim a firm stance against Islamist terrorism while at the same time relating with those who support it; to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. It can’t be done. The massacre of October 7, 2023 has led to a watershed that requires us to redefine positions and alliances very clearly.