Lebanon, the Forgotten Conflict in the Middle East
As is often the case, the Middle East keeps the world on edge with a dynamic that at times seems straight out of an action film. Wars, conflicts, and espionage games as I have pointed out more than once demonstrate that in this region, reality often surpasses fiction.
The situation with Iran has captured nearly all international media attention. Analysts and markets closely track every development: from airspace security and the potential cancellation of flights to fluctuations in stock markets. If we look at the region’s main commodity oil its price per barrel has remained within a narrow range, neither falling below $60 nor exceeding $65. This reflects investor uncertainty, as markets remain unable to anticipate the direction the crisis will take. Every statement by Donald Trump or the Iranian government triggers market movements, albeit limited ones, underscoring the caution of investors unwilling to make firm commitments until a clearer picture emerges.
However, it would be unwise to look away from other equally fragile arenas, such as Lebanon. The country continues to grapple with tensions along its southern border with Israel, as well as a complex internal political situation shaped by the challenge posed by Hezbollah an actor over which the Lebanese state appears to exert little effective control. This reality affects not only Lebanon’s relationship with Israel, but also its border with Syria.
Lebanon is caught in a dangerous two-front game, and to understand the current conflict in the Middle East, it is essential not to overlook its internal struggles. That will be the central focus of this article.
The agreement with Israel would be structured around the following phases:
Phase 1: The Lebanese government commits to disarming Hezbollah before the end of the year. In response, Israel halts all military activity by land, sea, and air within Lebanese territory.
Phase 2: Within 60 days, the Lebanese government begins implementing the disarmament plan and deploys Lebanese forces along the southern border. Simultaneously, Israel initiates its withdrawal from key strategic positions in southern Lebanon.
Phase 3: Within 60 to 90 days, Hezbollah completes its military withdrawal to south of the Litani River.
Final Phase: Within 90 to 120 days, Hezbollah dismantles its remaining heavy weaponry and military infrastructure, including missiles, drones, and command centers. At the same time, Israeli forces fully withdraw from Lebanese territory, and Lebanese security forces assume control over all areas.
Lebanon Does Not Even Address Israel Within the Agreements
The current armistice in southern Lebanon is little more than a façade designed to maintain a degree of control over the situation. At its core, this temporary ceasefire does not reflect a genuine willingness on the part of the current Lebanese government to dismantle Hezbollah’s power.
On the contrary, while government reports to Parliament express concern about the development of the Shiite threat, they fail to demonstrate a serious or concrete commitment to disarming the organization. This political ambiguity not only weakens the Lebanese state’s position vis-à-vis Israel, but also perpetuates internal instability, undermining any attempt at a lasting solution.
Before discussing peace or sustainable agreements with Lebanon, it is necessary to examine its political culture. Lebanon’s history is deeply marked by violence: the civil war of the 1970s had profound regional repercussions and contributed to destabilizing existing conflicts, including the Palestinian one.
During that period, Yasser Arafat’s arrival in Lebanon and the PLO’s involvement in the local conflict not only disrupted Lebanon’s internal balance but also fragmented Palestinian leadership. As Fatah lost cohesion and political control, Arafat gained symbolic legitimacy in the Arab world at the cost of creating a vacuum later filled by new actors such as Hamas, who would come to define the future dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The West, unable to grasp these internal dynamics and the long-term consequences of its decisions, failed to manage the process effectively. Over time, the situation spiraled out of control, both in Palestine and in Lebanon.
The persistent aspiration of the modern world to impose a framework that places Lebanon and Israel on a supposed footing of equality—demanding cooperation from Israel despite its clear military superiority over Hezbollah—runs counter to the historical logic of armed conflict, where the victor typically sets the terms. This distortion reveals an uncomfortable reality: there is no firm or coherent opposition to Hezbollah, either within Lebanon or at the international level.
The most recent report from the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, attended by members of the security cabinet, took place at the Lebanese Parliament and included the presence of UNIFIL commander General Diodato Abagnara. The meeting addressed the future of Lebanon’s southern border and compliance with the provisions outlined in the previously mentioned armistice agreement. The central issue under discussion was the potential withdrawal of UNIFIL and the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the region.
Notably, however, these discussions failed to address Israel’s role within the armistice or to consider its position as a party to the agreement. Instead, the prevailing narrative continued to portray Israel exclusively as the enemy and principal aggressor. The fact that this narrative persists without substantial opposition within the Lebanese Parliament itself highlights the absence of a firm, organized stance against Hezbollah and underscores the state’s difficulty in adopting an autonomous position on the conflict.
The agreement calls for the disarmament of all guerrilla organizations, including Hezbollah, on the condition that Israel cease its military offensive. Nevertheless, according to statements published by the Lebanese government itself, Israel continues to be treated as the primary enemy, with the Israel Defense Forces at the center of the accusations. This stance is partly explained by the Lebanese state’s lack of both the capacity and the political will to confront the Shiite community, which maintains significant influence within the government.
While global attention remains focused on Iran, the behavior of other governments particularly in moments of reduced media scrutiny should not be overlooked. The Lebanese government may be supporting Hezbollah, even as it seeks to project a different image to the Western press.
There Is No Indication of Real Pressure to Disarm Hezbollah
The Lebanese government avoids moving in this direction primarily out of fear of triggering a new civil war similar to that of the 1970s, or provoking an internal reaction that could lead to the militia’s takeover of state institutions, as occurred in May 2008 with the occupation of Beirut. This caution has translated into a strategy of political paralysis that prioritizes immediate internal stability over the assertion of state sovereignty.
At the same time, official discourse continues to frame Israel as the primary enemy, shifting Hezbollah away from the center of the problem and avoiding direct confrontation with the Shiite organization. In doing so, the government reinforces Hezbollah’s power and effectively blocks any serious attempt at disarmament.
