Middle East at a Crossroads: Adapting to US Disengagement

While many Israelis are understandably content with the Trump administration’s policies, they often fail to consider the broader picture of long-term US strategic thinking in the Middle East. Despite the excitement over Trump’s current rhetoric and close Israel-US relations, analysts and policymakers must correctly interpret the big picture to develop an adaptive strategy.

In reality, the United States no longer views the Middle East as the center of gravity in global politics. Instead, Washington has increasingly shifted its strategic focus toward the Indo-Pacific, where China’s rise is perceived as the defining geopolitical challenge of the 21st century. While the Middle East remains important due to energy markets, security concerns, and counterterrorism efforts, it is no longer the primary arena of great power competition. As a result, US policymakers see less justification for heavy military involvement in the region, favoring a recalibration of resources toward Asia. This shift forces regional players, including Israel, to reassess their security dependencies and strategic alignments in an era of declining US military engagement.

The End of American Dominance in the Middle East?

For decades, the US has been the dominant military force in the Middle East, providing security guarantees, deterring Iranian aggression, and ensuring Gulf stability. However, Washington’s priorities are shifting. The pivot to Asia, domestic fatigue with Middle Eastern conflicts, and US energy independence have led to a reduced military footprint.

This shift has major implications for regional stability, particularly for Israel. Long reliant on US military backing, Israel must now take greater responsibility for its security. While military aid will continue, Washington is unlikely to reshape the broader Middle East to benefit Israel and its Gulf allies. The key question is whether Israel can adapt to a region where US disengagement creates power vacuums.

The US Military Drawdown: Understanding the Strategic Shift

The US military presence in the Middle East has steadily declined over the past decade. From a peak of over 150,000 troops in Iraq, numbers have dropped to around 30,000, with key bases in Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration withdrew combat troops from Afghanistan in 2021, scaled back deployments in Iraq, and reduced air defense assets in Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration also signaled a full withdrawal from Syria.

This shift is driven by three key factors. First, Washington’s strategic focus has shifted to counter China’s rise. The South China Sea, Taiwan, and great power competition now dominate US military planning. The Pentagon has redirected resources to Guam, Japan, and Australia, prioritizing Pacific deterrence over Middle Eastern commitments. Trump’s approach to Europe and the Russia-Ukraine war also reflects this recalibration. He seeks to push Europe toward greater security independence while also trying to remove Russia from its alliance with China by improving relations with Moscow.

Second, American public opinion has turned against prolonged Middle Eastern conflicts. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cost trillions of dollars and thousands of lives, with little long-term gain. Both Biden and Trump have sought to scale back involvement, facing bipartisan pressure against large deployments. Support for Israel is also declining, particularly among younger voters.

Finally, the US is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil, making Gulf security a lower priority. With near energy independence, the need for military presence to protect oil routes, such as the Strait of Hormuz, has diminished. This has pushed Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to seek new security partners.

As Washington shifts its military focus to counter China, Beijing has expanded its economic and strategic presence in the Middle East. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has deepened Chinese ties with Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Additionally, China’s recent mediation in the Saudi-Iran détente signals a willingness to fill the diplomatic vacuum left by US disengagement. For Israel, this raises both risks and opportunities: Chinese economic investments could be beneficial, but Beijing’s growing security partnerships with Iran complicate strategic calculations.

What Does US Disengagement Mean for Israel?

1. Iran’s Expanding Regional Influence: With fewer US forces in Iraq and Syria, Iran and its proxies—Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias—gain more freedom to operate. With reduced fear of an immediate US response, Tehran can entrench itself along Israel’s northern border. Though Israel has weakened these groups since October 2023, Iran is already working to rebuild them.

2. Less US Mediation in Regional Conflicts: The US has historically played a stabilizing role in the Middle East, mediating between Israel and Arab states. In the 1960s and 1970s, it prevented conflicts between key allies, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. With Washington less engaged, regional disputes may escalate—especially in Syria, where Israel must coordinate with Turkey.

3. Arab States Seeking Alternative Security Partners: The Abraham Accords reflect two major trends: Arab states’ growing concern over Iranian expansion and their realization that the US is a less reliable security guarantor. Washington’s hesitancy to back Mubarak in 2011 or Saudi Arabia after the 2019 Houthi attacks on Aramco raised doubts about its commitments. Israel, forced to counter Iran for its own security, is increasingly seen as a stabilizing force, being not only strong, but also determined.

How Should Israel Adapt?

To address these challenges, Israel must reshape its security strategy. Strengthening regional alliances is critical. Military and intelligence cooperation with the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia should deepen. The concept of a ‘Middle East NATO’ is gaining traction, driven by shared threats from Iran and its proxies. Regional security cooperation has accelerated through forums like the Negev Forum and joint military exercises such as Desert Flag and the Red Sands Missile Defense Experiment. Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have shown interest in Israeli missile defense systems like Iron Dome and Arrow 3, while cyber cooperation is expanding between Israel’s Unit 8200 and Gulf cybersecurity agencies. Though promising, these efforts remain informal, lacking a unified command structure or mutual defense treaty.

Key obstacles remain. Unlike NATO, Middle Eastern states have diverging security priorities—Israel focuses on Iranian missile threats, while Gulf nations balance internal stability and economic ties with China. The US encourages cooperation but avoids committing to a formal alliance. To advance, Israel should strengthen intelligence-sharing, expand joint air defense, and enhance military interoperability before expecting deeper integration.

However, Israel must also enhance military self-reliance. Expanding domestic arms production, particularly in missile defense and munitions, will reduce dependence on US exports. While Trump removed restrictions on military shipments to Israel, growing Democratic opposition to military aid suggests future administrations may impose stricter conditions. A 2024 Gallup poll found that 47% of Democratic voters now favor restricting military aid to Israel, up from 27% in 2016. If this trend continues, Israel may face conditional aid or reduced support, increasing the urgency of bolstering domestic production.

Balancing relations between the US and other global powers is therefore essential. While Washington remains Israel’s closest ally, its shifting priorities require stronger ties with India, Greece, Cyprus, and the Gulf states. Managing relations with China and Russia is also crucial—Israel must carefully limit Chinese economic influence while maintaining strategic cooperation with Beijing and Moscow.

Finally, investing in cyber and AI warfare is vital. Future conflicts will be fought as much in cyberspace as on the battlefield. Israel must continue developing cyber defense and offensive capabilities, particularly against Iranian threats. In 2023, Israel reported over 2,500 cyberattacks from Iranian-linked hacker groups, with targets ranging from government agencies to water treatment facilities. At the same time, Israeli cybersecurity exports reached $11 billion, solidifying its status as a global leader in AI-driven defense solutions. AI-driven intelligence gathering and autonomous weapons will help maintain its military edge.

Conclusion: A New Middle Eastern Security Structure

The US military retreat from the Middle East is not a complete abandonment but a slow, strategic shift that forces regional actors to take greater responsibility for security. For Israel, this presents both risks and opportunities.

The challenge lies in facing an aggressive Iran, an uncertain Arab security landscape, and a reduction in direct US military deterrence. But the opportunity is significant: Israel can take a leadership role in a new regional security framework, forging deeper alliances and reshaping the strategic balance in its favor.

The Middle East is at a crossroads: One path leads to a new security order led by regional powers, the other to a battlefield where unchecked rivals carve their influence in fire and steel.