Military or Mercenaries? Pakistan a Dual Role Actor on Global Political Theatre

There is a saying in my native language, Sindhi: “There are people who ask the thief to steal, and then warn the owners that thieves are coming.” This aptly describes Pakistan—more precisely, its military, which is the real power behind the state. There is a famous joke: most countries have a military, but in Pakistan, the military has a country.

Pakistan’s military has long acted as a double player on the stage of global geopolitics. Rather than functioning as a conventional national army, it has often behaved like a mercenary force, pursuing shifting alliances and interests.
In the context of a potential US–Israel war with Iran, Pakistan’s military has reportedly positioned itself as a “mediator” between the United States and Iran. Yet history complicates this role. It was under General Mirza Aslam Baig that Pakistan allegedly provided nuclear know-how to Iran. At the same time, Pakistan maintains influence over Sunni religious groups in Iranian Balochistan while also sustaining working relations with Iran’s Shia regime.

This duality is further exposed domestically. Shia organizations, such as Imamia Students Organization, groups like zainbian, have at times been linked to violent protests in Pakistan in response to US–Israel tensions with Iran—violence that has even targeted Pakistani soldiers and civilians. These developments reportedly compelled Pakistan’s current army chief, General Asim Munir, to warn Shia clerics that violent reactions to international events would not be tolerated, bluntly stating that those who “love Iran should go and live there.”

Shias constitute roughly 10–15 percent of Pakistan’s population and are also represented within the military, though the institution remains predominantly Sunni and Punjabi in composition. This imbalance has historically led to grievances over discrimination. The last widely recognized Shia army chief was General Musa Khan in the 1960s. Given recent tensions involving Iran, disenchantment among Shias within Pakistan army could deepen further.

Pakistan has often benefited from global crises while officially aligning with the United States but quietly advancing its own strategic interests. During the Korean War (1950–53), for instance, a class of Pakistani nouveau riche emerged through the export of jute and cotton—much of it sourced from what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Sheikh Mujibur Rahman once remarked, “I smell jute on the roads of Islamabad,” highlighting economic disparities between former East and West Pakistan.

These inequalities contributed to the 1971 separation of East Pakistan emerging as independent Bangladesh on the world’s map. The conflict resulted in mass atrocities, including the killings of millions of Bengalis and widespread sexual violence. The genocide in 1971 was, in many ways, a mini-Holocaust—one for which Pakistan still owes a formal national apology to the people of Bangladesh. Yet Pakistanis continue to accuse Israel of being a “genocidal and apartheid state.” The irony is striking: a country whose military has been implicated in the killing of millions of its own citizens now positions itself as a mediator between the United States and Iran. That alone gives me serious reason to doubt its credibility.
In 1958, General Ayub Khan imposed martial law, initiating over a decade of military rule. Despite Pakistan’s participation in U.S.-aligned alliances such as SEATO, CENTO, and RCD, anti-American and anti-Israel sentiment grew during this period. Ayub Khan’s book “Friends Not Masters”—reportedly ghostwritten by his information secretary Altaf Gauhar—criticized U.S. policy even as Pakistan remained strategically aligned with Washington.

Altaf Gauhar himself was rumored to have visited Israel in the 1960s. He was also associated with Agha Hasan Abedi, founder of the now-defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which was later accused of facilitating illicit financial flows, including during the Afghan war against the former Soviet Union.
Pakistan’s ties with Iran date back to the era of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, while it has simultaneously maintained deep strategic relations with China. Pakistan also played a key intermediary role in the rapprochement between China and the United States in the early 1970s—a contribution acknowledged by leaders such as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

Pakistani rulers are fond of saying, proverbially, that “Pakistan’s friendship with China is higher than the Himalayas (Mount Everest) and deeper than the ocean.” From a needle used to sew a shirt button to heavy water for nuclear development, from the so-called economic corridor to gas pipelines, and from conflicts with India to operations against Baloch rebels—almost everything in Pakistan appears to be “made in China.” China holds deep economic and military interests in the country. Even skullcaps, rosaries, and other accessories used for Hajj and other Muslim prayers are also manufactured in China.

Pakistani mullahs and leftists alike, who often accuse Israel of being “anti-Muslim,” remain largely silent when it comes to alleged atrocities against Uyghur Muslims in China. At one point, China used the offices of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, then head of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, seeking his support to negotiate with Uyghurs in its Xinjiang province.

Despite strong rhetoric from Pakistani religious and political groups criticizing Israel, there is often relative silence regarding the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China—highlighting another layer of geopolitical selectivity.

Under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Iran even provided military support to Pakistan, including Cobra helicopter gunships used during the Baloch insurgency of the 1970s.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s early leftist movements initially supported the Chinese Revolution of 1949, but faced repression at home. Over time, political alignments shifted, with religious groups emerging as pro-Western allies during the Cold War.
It often appears as though Pakistan hits the jackpot whenever the region—or even the world—is at its worst in times of crisis. Take Afghanistan as an example: it has been reduced to rubble, in part due to Pakistan’s policies and its treatment of the country as if it were its fifth province. Successive Pakistani governments, military generals, and the ISI have enriched themselves—amassing wealth, lands, and influence both domestically and abroad.

They bear significant responsibility for condemning four or five generations of Afghans to the burdens of war, displacement, destruction, and death. What Pakistan’s generals termed “strategic depth” came at an immense human cost. The communist coup of April 1978, followed by the Soviet invasion, effectively prolonged military rule under General Zia-ul-Haq, whose dictatorship lasted twelve years. He became a chief patron of Islamist militant networks, acting as a midwife to the so-called “Islamic jihad” from Egypt to Peshawar. Reports of his association with world’s would be most wanted terrorist Osama bin Laden only reinforced this perception.

His successor, General Pervez Musharraf, along with his inner circle, continued controversial policies. Osama bin Laden was eventually found living near the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakol, Abbottabad, raising serious questions about complicity or negligence. Musharraf’s government was also accused of playing a “double game” during the War on Terror while receiving billions of dollars in aid under the Coalition Support Fund.

The military establishment opposed the Kerry-Lugar Bill, which aimed to strengthen civilian institutions and democracy in Pakistan. During Musharraf’s tenure, American journalist Daniel Pearl was murdered by Omar Saeed Sheikh, a militant with past links to Pakistani intelligence agencies and his involvement in the 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking.

Even secular and nationalist Pashtuns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan were also punished through the imposition of the Taliban over them. They suffered the most from the Pakistani military’s so-called “collateral damage.” The shooting of the young schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai is one such example; she and her family were among the victims, alongside hundreds who were killed.

Mullah Fazlullah, , a former lift operator, Baitullah Mehsud, a former perfume seller turn terrorist kingpins and many others were products of this environment shaped by the military. Even the assassination of Benazir Bhutto is often viewed in this broader context.

Mary Anne Weaver, an American journalist, wrote in her profile of Osama bin Laden—published in The New Yorker a couple of years before the September 11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on the United States—that during Tomahawk missile strikes targeting bin Laden in Khost, Afghanistan, five officers of the Pakistani Army were killed at his training camp. This incident became a point of tension between the Pakistani military and the United States even before September 11, 2001, according to Mary Anne Weaver.

Placing individuals such as Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan under house arrest, previously, or convicting former ISI chief General Faiz Hameed—possibly due to his association with the deposed Prime Minister Imran Khan—does not absolve the Pakistani military or the state of its broader responsibility for the spread of extremism and militancy across the region and beyond.

Pakistan’s recent attempt to position itself as a mediator—portraying a reformed, peace-oriented image akin to a “reborn Desmond Tutu”—appears largely strategic. This role may be aimed at diplomatically isolating India and strategically countering Israel, while simultaneously advancing the interests of allies such as China and Saudi Arabia. However, any mediation effort that excludes key stakeholders like Israel, or fails to hold accountable actors such as Iran’s clerical establishment, cannot be seen as genuine or complete.

Moreover, any potential geopolitical changes in Iran pose a significant challenge for Pakistan—particularly given the risk of spillover or even fragmentation pressures emanating from its own restive, mineral-rich Balochistan region, where Baloch separatists are engaged in a long-running insurgency against the Pakistani state.

A number of Pakistani analysts openly comment on the current US–Israel versus Iran situation. They argue that Pakistan does not intend to engage in conflict with Israel, but it possesses the “capacity.” By “capacity,” they refer to nuclear capability—once termed the “Islamic Bomb.” This is seen not as a direct threat to Israel or India alone, but as a potential risk to the region and even the wider world.