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Jon Dyson

More ICJ Tricks – A Gift for Israeli Public Diplomacy

By Rob Bogaerts (ANEFO) - Ga Het Na (Nationaal Archief NL 933-1619, CC0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=37873952
By Rob Bogaerts (ANEFO) - Ga Het Na (Nationaal Archief NL 933-1619, CC0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=37873952

Further deceitful maneuvers by the ICJ

1/    In addition to the travesties of legal and historical accuracy exhibited by the ICJ (see previous article on this blog) the Court adopted other ruses to protect the Arab/Palestinians from scrutiny and criticism.   

2/   Firstly, nowhere in the Report is there any analysis or even mention of Palestinian hostility to the existence of the Jewish state. Palestinian intentions are absent throughout. Yet, every day, the main PA newspaper Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, exudes the aim of bringing the existence of the Jewish state to an end. This eliminationist aim dominates PA ideology, unites its various factions, saturates the speeches of its leaders, motivates and finances the richly rewarded anti-Jewish violence and the non-stop campaign to murder Jews. Even the skimpiest examination of the Palestinian National Charter (1968) confirms the pervasiveness of this aim. 

3/   The exclusion by the Court of Palestinian intentions to destroy Israel enables it to omit any reference to the security needs. It is as if neither the Jews of Israel nor Israel itself faced serious dangers. For the ICJ to have admitted such a need would have meant admitting the source of those dangers – and its entire one-sided case would unravel. Therefore, it was not admitted. For the same reason, when referring to the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, it does so in a special way by the use of passive phraseology. On each occasion, it states that armed conflict broke out (paras 53, 57 and 59). In this way, the intentions of the invading Arab armies to destroy Israel are hidden.  

4/    Further, as is well-known, the conflict predates Israel’s control of the West Bank and the building of any settlements. Therefore, the conflict is not and never was about the West Bank or settlements, and the Palestinian aim was never to end the conflict but to end Israel. This explains why the Palestinians have always rejected proposals to end the conflict with a two state solution – another revealing fact that the ICJ is unwilling to mention. It also shows that it is quite false to blame Israel for the lack of a Palestinian state as the Palestinians have accomplished that themselves. Further, given the repeated attempts by Arab States and the openly declared intention to destroy Israel by both the PA and Hamas, a fair-minded response from a fair-minded UN and its Court would have produced howls of outrage at such open attempts to destroy the supposedly fundamental right (jus cogens in its more imposing Latin) of Jewish self-determination in Israel.  

5/  All this is ignored by the ICJ. It can do so because the composition of the UN is such that for many states, and those they influence, the termination of Jewish self-determination is not considered a moral or legal problem. As a result, the UN offers no criticism, no opposition and no demands that the Palestinians immediately end their eliminationist aims. Nor does it show any sign of obeying its own Charter by taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace. (Art 1 para 1)

6/   Likewise, the fundamental rights of other national groups to self-determination are ignored. The two largest national groupings denied this supposedly fundamental right from which no exemptions are supposedly permitted are also in the ‘Middle East’: the Amazigh of northern Africa and the Kurds. Significantly, although both are largely Muslim, they are not Arab. And in both cases, violations of their supposedly fundamental rights under international law produce not a fraction of the obsessive concern that the UN and ICJ exhibit towards the Palestinians and Israel.

7/   By such devices, predetermined by political positions rather than legal views, the Court is able to shamelessly misrepresent the conflict. If law were dominant we would have seen a storm of protest to demand an end to Palestinian intentions to destroy Israel. Yet no such demand was made by the ICJ – nor by the chief international organization charged by its Charter with the maintenance of peace between states. Consequently, the ICJ only makes demands of Israel and none from the Palestinians. This confirms to the Palestinians that they have no need to change to their aims – and the conflict is perpetuated. 

Two-State Solution

8/  Continuing its serial evasions, omissions and distortions, the ICJ quotes from the recent UN Security Council Resolution of June 2024 (2735). This reiterates:

its unwavering commitment to the vision of the the two-State solution where two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace with secure and recognized borders

9/  This makes two foundational assumptions: 

  • the Palestinians will accept a West Bank-based state as an end to the conflict, 
  • the conflict is essentially a territorial dispute over land distribution rather than an existential battle.  

10/   Yet nowhere in the ICJ Report is there any investigation to test if a West Bank-based state would satisfy the Palestinians and end the conflict. This is viewed as irrelevant to the Court’s endeavor to push Palestinian self-determination as the issue which the Court believes trumps all others. In a stunning disregard for causes and consequences, it sees, or pretends to see, only the formal reasonableness of a two-state solution but turns a blind-eye to the fatal unreasonableness of the Palestinian rejection of the Jewish state.

11/  Clearly, given the weight of Palestinian numbers and their hostility to Israel, the legal rights of Israel to sovereignty over the West Bank are one thing, but exercising them is another. As a result, a ‘solution’ to the conflict can only be achieved in one of two ways:

  1. a complete victory of one side which crushes the hopes and means of the other side for achieving victory, or
  2. by some form of mutual accommodation. 

12/   This is a stark choice and explains why a two-state solution seems a preferable and plausible way forward to many. It suggests a reasonable, equitable, and practical win-win resolution of the conflict. Along with the view that recognition of a Palestinian state is considered morally and legally justified, this seems to settle the issue. It appears so self-evidently superior to alternatives that it is unnecessary to examine actual Palestinian intentions or take into account Israeli fears. This is the position of the ICJ. In this way, it completely avoids any hint that the driving force of the conflict, and the reason the conflict has been prolonged for so long, is the Palestinian rejection of the Jewish state and their intention to destroy it.

13/  The perspective of a win-win/two-state solution may be in the hearts of many in the west, but as long as it remains alien to the Palestinian rulers in the West Bank and Gaza any peace-process is killed stone-dead. As a result, the ICJ, the UN, and many others, cannot address the obvious question that this presents: 

  • How can a Palestinian state intent on Israel’s destruction possibly produce a successful and peaceful two-state solution?

14/   For the ICJ and UN, this question, and those of the previous article, are unanswerable. As a result, they are avoided like the plague and face no public challenge. Similarly, the following question is ignored:

  • How are the ICJ and UNSC proposing to ensure that the Palestinian state will be democratic and peaceful?

15/   Again, the leading international bodies have no answer. Yet Israel is not suicidal. Therefore, it absolutely cannot allow the West Bank to fall under the control of an entity devoted to its destruction. The Gaza Strip under Hamas is a painful but perfect lesson. Therefore, if Israel were ever to accept a two-state solution it needs to possess convincing and reliable evidence that Palestinians and their governments no longer wish to annihilate Israel. This means that acceptance of Palestinian statehood by international bodies should be made CONDITIONAL on Palestinian acceptance of the Jewish state. It means that if a successful and peaceful two-state solution is to be achieved, the PA needs to jettison its Palestinian National Charter and abandon its ambition of destroying the Jewish state. As it is, there is no trace of any effort by the ICJ or the UN to achieve this or even any awareness of its necessity.  

A Golden Opportunity for Israeli Public Diplomacy

16/  Countering legal attacks with legal responses is crucial – but not sufficient.  They also have to be countered politically. Chiefly, this means addressing the underlying attitude of much of the international public that Israel occupies and builds on Palestinian land. Viewed as unfair, morally offensive and an unjustified denial of Palestinian rights, Israel is seen as largely to blame for the conflict. The ICJ Report helps form this sentiment and sustains it with scarcely any robust or public challenge from Israel. This generates great unease among Israel’s friends, potential friends, and the Jewish diaspora. It also provides fertile soil for antisemitism, BDS, accusations of genocide, apartheid, and an underlying view that Israel deserves what it gets.  

17/  The avalanche of anti-Israel activities over the current war in Gaza is a reminder of this. Unless successfully challenged, any sympathy that Israel may attract or PR victories it may achieve will remain partial and temporary. This is because successful public diplomacy is not simply a matter of more information about events or faster response times. The crucial component is to bring the intentions of the Palestinians to destroy Israel to the international public.  Therefore, instead of constantly being at the mercy of media-driven events, Israel should focus on what might be termed ‘causal-events’. These are the factors that explain the conflict – so expertly hidden by the ICJ and the bulk of the international media.

18/ This is why the uncompromising position of the Palestinians presents an unexploited gift for Israeli public diplomacy. Therefore, the focus of Israeli public diplomacy should be on questions that demonstrate the unreasonableness of Palestinian aims. This means that if a successful and peaceful two-state solution is to be possible, the distinction between Two-State Solutions ‘A’ and ‘B’ has to become central to Israel’s state and public diplomacy.    

19/  Two-state solution ‘A’ requires that Jewish national rights are accepted by the Palestinians as the basis for an historic compromise where the two national movements can agree a territorial solution as an end to the conflict. Currently, this is hardly even a remote possibility – with zero Palestinian weight in favor of such a solution. By contrast, two-state solution ’B’ maintains the Palestinian denial of Jewish national rights, whatever the borders. Naturally, Israel cannot be expected to cooperate in its own demise.  

20/  This distinction between ‘A’ and ‘B’ highlights that the driving force of the conflict is the Palestinian desire to end the Jewish state and their refusal to adopt a resolution that allows both parties to live in peace. There are many states and international organizations that are totally familiar with the unyielding opposition of the Palestinians to the Jewish state. Therefore, it is impossible to view their insistent support for ‘B’ as anything but a calculated route to advance the termination of Israel.   

21/   This suggests that Israel and friendly states, with Israel’s many friends in many countries, should engage in a sustained public campaign aimed at the UN and the ICJ. Its purpose is to make the issue of the Palestinian refusal to accept the Jewish state into common knowledge and subject to public discourse. The question-technique is key when it contains the theme of blame/guilt which Israel needs to be known and discussed. For example:

  • What counter-measures do the ICJ and UN propose to realize the end of Palestinian opposition to the existence of the Jewish state? 

22/  Similarly, as there is currently no public knowledge of two-state solution ‘A’ versus ‘B’, constant repetition of these themes is needed, millions of times, to transform them into public knowledge. The idea is to make them so well-known that they become the expected response from Israel – and so direct blame where it belongs. This reinforces the primary message that the ONLY way to end the conflict peacefully and fairly is for the Palestinians to reject the aim of destroying Israel.   

23/  Using questions such as those above, along with resolutions to international organizations and individual states, a public campaign to demonstrate Palestinian intentions can be pursued internationally. Interviews and articles in the foreign media should never miss the opportunity to raise these questions and transform current incidents and issues into public knowledge of the causes and solution to the conflict.  

24/  This approach offers a strategy that allows Israel to take the initiative in public diplomacy. This has numerous benefits:

  1. It demonstrates that the Palestinian refusal to accept a Jewish state is the driving force of the continued conflict.
  2. It demonstrates that without Palestinian acceptance of reasonable solution ‘A’, the crucial building-block for an agreement to end the conflict is absent.  
  3. It demonstrates that as long as the PA will not agree to jettison the Palestinian National Charter and abandon its aim of eliminating Israel, the conditions for a peaceful and successful two-state solution are not present.  
  4. This puts the Palestinians on the diplomatic defensive.
  5. If the Palestinians maintain their adherence to their unreasonable position (solution ‘B’), it exposes them to constant blame for the continuation of the conflict.
  6. If they refuse reasonable solution ‘A’, it also exposes them to blame for the continuation of the conflict. 
  7. By reversing the usual perception of blame in this way it promises to garner support for Israel’s position and so weaken support for the Palestinian position.  
  8. It can unify many in Israel, and elsewhere, to the possibility of a reasoned adherence to a two-state perspective but without the unrealistic and dangerous hope that such a solution is available now under solution ‘B’ conditions.  
  9. Further, if at some future point the Palestinians can be persuaded to accept Two-State Solution ‘A’, with evidence that is convincing and reliable, it is a solution that most Israelis can accept.
  10. Making these issues public knowledge serves as protection for Israel by making it harder for international organizations such as the UN and EU to maintain their outrageously biased pro-Palestinian/anti-Israel stance.
  11. It also limits the capacity of governments to enact anti-Israel measures. 
  12. It indicates Israel’s willingness to enter ‘final-status’ talks if ever there is convincing and reliable evidence of a change of Palestinian heart to solution ‘A’.                                                   

www.arguments4israel.com

About the Author
Born in UK 1944. First Class honors degree in Modern History and Economics. Lecturer in modern history at Manchester University. Director largest independent insurance brokerage in Manchester Founder of Dyson's Pensions and Investment Services in Manchester. Now retired. Made Aliyah in 2008 with my wife. Lifelong cyclist, swimmer and gym fanatic. Member Kibbutz Hamadia, Emeq Hamaianot. Website: www.arguments4israel.com
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