Netanyahu, Israel and the Fight for Its Future

Israel’s October 27 election comes at a defining moment for the Jewish state. After the trauma of October 7, years of conflict and mounting questions about regional security, voters must decide not simply who should lead the country, but how Israel can protect its citizens, preserve its alliance with America and build a more secure future. Benjamin Netanyahu’s return could reinforce his determination to finish the wars; a change of government could open the door to a different strategic approach.

Israel is approaching an election that will help determine the direction of its national security, its relationship with Washington and its prospects for lasting peace. The immediate question is whether Benjamin Netanyahu can secure another term as prime minister. The more consequential question is what the country expects its next government to achieve.

The October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attacks shattered Israel’s sense of security and exposed serious failures in intelligence, preparedness and national leadership. The wars that followed have reshaped the region, placed enormous demands on Israel’s armed forces and brought difficult questions about the country’s long-term strategy into sharper focus.

Israel has demonstrated formidable military capabilities. Yet military superiority alone cannot guarantee a lasting settlement, eliminate every threat or ensure that the country’s enemies abandon their ambitions. The challenge is to translate battlefield achievements into durable security.

For Netanyahu, that means persuading voters that his government can complete its objectives and prevent another October 7. For his opponents, it means demonstrating that Israel can defend itself effectively while pursuing a different approach to the conflicts surrounding it.

Neither proposition can be judged simply by the identity of the next prime minister. Israel’s electoral system requires parties to assemble parliamentary coalitions, meaning that the composition of the next government will be as important as which party finishes first. A majority in the 120-seat Knesset requires 61 seats, and no single party has historically secured an outright majority on its own.

The election therefore presents Israelis with several interconnected choices: how to deter future attacks, how to bring the current conflicts to a sustainable conclusion, how to address the Palestinian question and how to preserve the strategic partnership with the United States.

These are questions of national survival and long-term strategy, not merely a referendum on one politician.

The Election: Security, Leadership and Accountability

Netanyahu has been one of the most influential figures in modern Israeli politics, serving as prime minister across multiple terms. His supporters point to his emphasis on national security, his efforts to strengthen Israel’s international position and his determination to confront threats from Iran and its regional partners.

His critics, meanwhile, argue that the October 7 security failure demands political accountability and a reassessment of the policies that preceded it. They also question whether the prolonged military campaigns have delivered a sufficiently clear path toward lasting security.

The opposition, led by figures including former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, has sought to present an alternative to Netanyahu’s governing coalition. But removing an incumbent is not the same as establishing a workable government. Any new administration would face difficult choices over military priorities, relations with Washington, the future of Gaza and the balance between security requirements and diplomatic opportunities.

Israel’s proportional electoral system makes coalition arithmetic particularly important. Parties must secure at least 3.25% of valid votes to qualify for parliamentary representation, and smaller parties can influence the composition and priorities of a governing alliance.

The decisive question, therefore, is not simply whether Netanyahu’s Likud remains the largest party. It is whether a coalition can command a parliamentary majority and establish a coherent strategy for the years ahead.

Can Israel Turn Military Strength Into Lasting Security?

For decades, Israel has pursued a strategy commonly described as “peace through security.” The underlying principle is straightforward: a state surrounded by potential adversaries must possess the military strength, intelligence capabilities and deterrent power to defend itself.

That doctrine has shaped Israeli policy toward Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and other armed groups. It has also underpinned the country’s close relationship with the United States, whose military assistance, intelligence cooperation and diplomatic support have been central to Israel’s security.

The Hamas attacks of October 7 exposed a devastating weakness in the assumption that existing defenses and deterrence would prevent a major assault. The failure was not simply tactical. It raised fundamental questions about intelligence assessments, political decision-making and the ability of Israel’s security institutions to recognize and respond to a determined adversary.

For Israeli voters, accountability is therefore inseparable from security. A future government must establish what went wrong, ensure that the relevant institutions learn from those failures and restore public confidence in the country’s defenses.

The subsequent military campaigns have also highlighted the limits of force. Israel can inflict substantial damage on hostile organizations and their infrastructure, but the destruction of military assets does not automatically eliminate the political, ideological or social conditions that allow armed movements to regenerate.

That does not diminish the importance of defeating terrorist organizations or preventing them from launching further attacks. It does mean that military objectives must be accompanied by a clear understanding of what follows.

What constitutes success in Gaza? What arrangements can prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its capacity to threaten northern Israel? How should Israel respond to Iran’s military and nuclear ambitions? And what political and security structures could reduce the likelihood of another major regional war?

These questions require more than battlefield victories. They demand a strategy that links military action to achievable political outcomes.

A returning Netanyahu government might interpret the election as a mandate to press ahead until it believes the threats have been sufficiently reduced. A new administration might seek to combine deterrence with a broader diplomatic recalibration.

Either approach would face the same fundamental test: whether it can make Israel safer over the long term.

The Regional Opportunity Before October 7

Before the Hamas attacks, Israel was making progress toward a wider regional realignment.

The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, established or advanced normalization between Israel and several Arab states, most notably the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Discussions about normalization with Saudi Arabia also offered the prospect of a broader transformation in regional relations.

The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, offered another potential avenue for economic integration. By connecting infrastructure, transport and trade across several regions, the project envisaged closer links between India, the Middle East and Europe, including Israel’s port of Haifa.

These initiatives reflected a possibility that had long eluded the region: Israel could strengthen its security while expanding its economic and diplomatic relationships with neighboring countries.

October 7 and the ensuing war in Gaza profoundly complicated that prospect.

The humanitarian devastation in Gaza, international criticism of Israeli military operations and the absence of a comprehensive political settlement have made regional normalization more difficult. The conflict has also intensified scrutiny of Israeli policy in the West Bank and raised concerns among countries that had been exploring closer ties with Jerusalem.

Yet the broader opportunity has not necessarily disappeared.

Arab states have their own interests in regional stability, economic development, technological cooperation and containing Iranian influence. Israel, for its part, has strong reasons to seek a regional environment in which its neighbors have a greater stake in cooperation than confrontation.

Rebuilding that momentum would require credible security arrangements, sustained diplomatic engagement and a political framework that addresses the concerns of Palestinians as well as Israel’s neighbors.

The next Israeli government will have to decide whether regional integration remains a strategic priority or whether persistent conflict will continue to dominate the national agenda.

The Palestinian Question Cannot Be Ignored

The future of the Palestinians remains one of the most difficult and consequential questions facing Israel.

The October 7 attacks hardened attitudes among many Israelis toward Hamas and reinforced fears that territorial concessions could create new security threats. Those concerns cannot be dismissed. Any future arrangement must protect Israeli civilians and prevent armed organizations from using Palestinian territory to launch attacks.

But the absence of a credible political horizon also carries risks.

The lack of progress toward a viable Palestinian state, continuing violence in the West Bank and the expansion of Israeli settlements have complicated relations with international partners and weakened prospects for a negotiated settlement.

In July 2024, the Knesset adopted a resolution opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state, reinforcing the political obstacles facing a two-state solution. The central challenge for any future government is to explain what alternative arrangement could provide lasting security for Israel while addressing Palestinian national aspirations.

A permanent condition of unresolved conflict would impose costs on both populations and make regional reconciliation more difficult. Conversely, any diplomatic framework that fails to address Israel’s security concerns would be unlikely to command sufficient support among Israelis.

A sustainable approach would have to confront both realities.

For Israel, the objective should be a future in which its citizens can live without the recurring threat of terrorism, rocket attacks and regional war. For Palestinians, a durable settlement would need to address governance, security, political rights and their aspirations for self-determination.

There is no simple formula, and the October 7 attacks have made the political terrain more difficult. But refusing to confront the question does not make it disappear.

The next government will need to determine whether a credible political framework can be developed under conditions that protect Israel’s security and offer Palestinians a viable future.

The United States: Israel’s Essential Strategic Partner

The relationship between Israel and the United States remains one of the central pillars of Israeli security.

American military assistance, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic support and advanced defense technology have helped Israel maintain a qualitative military advantage over potential adversaries. The partnership has also given Washington considerable influence over the regional security environment.

President Donald Trump has played a prominent role in this relationship. During his first administration, he moved the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and helped broker the Abraham Accords. His second administration has continued to place considerable emphasis on Israel’s security and the possibility of reshaping regional diplomacy.

But close partnerships do not eliminate differences over strategy.

The conflicts involving Iran and Gaza have placed difficult questions before Washington and Jerusalem about military objectives, the costs of continued confrontation and the conditions necessary for a sustainable settlement.

For Israel, American support is a major strategic asset. For the United States, the relationship must be managed alongside wider interests, including the security of American forces, energy-market stability and the risk of a broader regional war.

That creates a challenge for whichever government emerges in Jerusalem.

A Netanyahu-led administration would need to maintain close coordination with Trump while demonstrating that Israeli policy advances shared security objectives. A successor would face the same requirement, even if it preferred a different approach to diplomacy or the conduct of military operations.

Israel cannot assume that every tactical decision will enjoy unlimited American support. Nor should disagreements automatically be interpreted as a breakdown in the alliance.

The more important question is whether both governments can maintain a common strategic framework while discussing their differences directly.

For Israel, preserving American confidence means demonstrating that military operations have clear objectives, that security commitments are credible and that diplomacy remains available when it can produce meaningful results.

For Washington, the challenge is to support Israel’s right to defend itself while assessing how regional policies affect wider American interests.

The alliance is most useful when it combines military strength with strategic coordination, rather than allowing disagreements to undermine cooperation.

The Domestic Fault Lines: Military Service and Judicial Reform

Israel’s security challenges have intensified longstanding domestic disputes.

One of the most contentious concerns the exemption of many ultra-Orthodox Jewish men from compulsory military service. Israelis who serve in the armed forces, including reservists repeatedly called up during prolonged conflicts, have questioned why large sections of the ultra-Orthodox community should remain outside the same obligations.

The dispute has implications beyond the military. It touches on equality before the law, religious identity, coalition politics and the distribution of national responsibilities.

Any government that seeks to maintain public confidence in the armed forces will need to address the issue in a way that is both politically workable and broadly defensible.

Judicial reform is another major fault line. Netanyahu’s government pursued changes that opponents argued would weaken judicial independence and increase political control over the courts. Supporters of reform have argued that elected officials should have greater authority over institutions they regard as insufficiently accountable.

The dispute triggered substantial public protests before the October 7 attacks and remains part of the broader debate over Israel’s democratic institutions.

The next government will inherit both issues alongside the demands of national security.

A country facing prolonged military pressure requires public trust, institutional competence and a sense that national burdens are being shared fairly. Domestic disputes cannot always be resolved during a security crisis, but postponing them indefinitely risks deepening divisions.

Israel’s future security will depend not only on the capabilities of its military and intelligence services but also on the resilience of its political institutions and the willingness of its citizens to sustain a common national effort.

An Economy Under Pressure

Israel’s economy has shown resilience despite repeated security shocks, supported by its technology sector, defense industries and established international commercial relationships.

But resilience does not mean that the costs of conflict are evenly distributed.

Tourism, agriculture, construction and other sectors exposed to disrupted travel, displaced communities and repeated military mobilization have faced considerable pressure. Reservist call-ups also impose costs on businesses, workers and families, while uncertainty can delay investment and economic activity.

The longer regional instability persists, the more difficult it becomes to separate the security agenda from the country’s economic prospects.

A government that prioritizes defense must also consider how to sustain the resources needed to support it. That means protecting critical infrastructure, maintaining investor confidence, assisting affected communities and ensuring that the economic burden of national security does not fall disproportionately on particular groups.

Regional normalization could offer economic opportunities by expanding trade, transport links, investment and technological cooperation. But those gains would depend on improved security conditions and progress toward arrangements acceptable to Israel and its potential partners.

The next government will therefore face a dual task: ensuring that the country can meet its defense requirements while creating the conditions for economic recovery and long-term growth.

What Comes After Netanyahu?

The election could produce a continuation of Netanyahu’s leadership or a change in government. Neither outcome, by itself, guarantees a fundamental change in Israeli policy.

If Netanyahu returns to office, he may seek to demonstrate that his strategy of military pressure and deterrence can deliver the security outcomes he has promised. His coalition partners, the military establishment, public opinion and relations with Washington will all influence how far that approach can be sustained.

If the opposition forms a government, it will inherit the same security threats, the same regional uncertainties and the same need for American support. A change of leadership could create opportunities to reconsider military priorities and diplomatic initiatives, but it would not remove the underlying challenges.

The composition of the coalition will be critical. Parties with differing views on the Palestinians, religious exemptions, judicial reform and the conduct of the wars may struggle to agree on a unified program.

A new prime minister would also face immediate demands for accountability over October 7, decisions about the future of Gaza and the challenge of managing relations with neighboring states.

Netanyahu’s political future is therefore only one part of the story. The more consequential question is whether Israel’s next government can establish a coherent strategy that combines national defense with a credible path toward regional stability.

Israel Must Define What Victory Means

Israel’s October 27 election comes at a turning point. The trauma of October 7, the conflicts that followed and the uncertainty surrounding the region have placed the country’s security doctrine under intense scrutiny.

Netanyahu may return with a renewed determination to finish the wars and demonstrate that Israel’s enemies cannot threaten its survival without facing overwhelming consequences. A change of government could create an opportunity to reassess priorities, restore diplomatic momentum and explore a future less dominated by recurring military confrontation.

But the fundamental responsibilities of the Israeli state will remain the same: protect its citizens, prevent terrorist attacks, maintain a credible deterrent and preserve the alliances on which its security depends.

Achieving those goals requires more than military superiority. It requires accurate intelligence, accountable leadership, sustainable defense planning and a clear understanding of how military operations contribute to long-term political outcomes.

It also requires a serious assessment of the regional opportunities that could emerge from improved relations with Arab states, a more stable relationship with Washington and progress toward a political framework that addresses the Palestinian question.

None of these objectives is easy. Nor can any Israeli government guarantee that its adversaries will abandon their ambitions. But a strategy built entirely around perpetual confrontation risks leaving the country permanently consumed by the next security crisis.

Israel must remain capable of defending itself against those who seek its destruction. At the same time, it must determine what conditions would allow its citizens to live in greater security, prosperity and normality.

The election is therefore about more than Netanyahu’s political survival. It is about the relationship between strength and diplomacy, deterrence and reconciliation, and the immediate demands of war and the long-term interests of the Israeli state.

The next government will have to answer a question that no military campaign can settle on its own: how can Israel turn its capacity to defend itself into a future in which its people are not perpetually preparing for the next war?