No refuge for Hamas supporters

The US Department of Justice unsealed a criminal complaint against senior Hamas leaders for orchestrating the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack in Israel that killed over 1,200 people, including 40+ Americans. The complaint details major Hamas attacks that killed US citizens, including the 1996 Jerusalem suicide bombings, the 2001 pizzeria suicide attack, and the 2002 Hebrew University bombing.

Supporting or harboring Hamas is a criminal offense that could result in prosecution and severe penalties

Under US law, particularly 18 USC. § 2339B, providing any form of material support to a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is a serious offense, with broad implications for those who aid such groups. This law, which prohibits any form of support to an FTO, should be of grave concern to senior leaders in Qatar and Turkey.

‘Material support,’ in layperson’s terms, is a very broad term. For instance, someone once translated jihadists texts and distributed them online, arguing it was protected free speech. The court found that the translations provided material support to Al-Qaeda by spreading its message and aiding in its recruitment efforts. On appeal, the court treated non-violent aid as material support because it was intended to further the objectives of Al-Qaeda. In another case, the US Supreme Court ruled that providing training, expert advice, or any form of support — even if purportedly for nonviolent activities — could be considered material support to a terrorist organization if it is done in coordination with or under the direction of the organization. Even seemingly benign support, like teaching peaceful conflict resolution, can be construed as material support if it indirectly aids a terrorist group’s agenda​.

According to the unsealed complaint: Hamas operates in several countries outside the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Turkey, Qatar, Lebanon, and Iran are identified as providing harbor and support for Hamas leadership. Qatar is a central location where these leaders reside and operate, directing Hamas’s activities from afar. Hamas leaders have used Qatar as a base to make public statements supporting terrorism and to coordinate with other countries and groups that back Hamas. As discussed in my earlier Letter to the Editor, ‘Qatar’s Role,’ in The Jerusalem Report (Dec. 2023, p. 6), Qatar’s dual role as both a mediator and a host to senior Hamas leaders has raised significant concerns (even apart from the more general perils of negotiating with terrorists discussed in my most recent piece).

Turkey harbors senior Hamas leadership, allowing them to conduct its operations with relative freedom. Turkey’s harboring of Hamas leadership arguably has enabled the organization to maintain its operational structure and plan terrorist activities without facing direct threats of capture or intervention. Both Qatar and Turkey are crucial to Hamas’s operational effectiveness, providing safe environments for its leaders to reside, communicate, and coordinate the organization’s activities, which arguably provides material support to Hamas. Given the serious allegations, implications for key leaders cannot be overstated.

A clear warning for Emir Tamim, Sheikh Mohammed, Erdoğan, Fidan, Akar, and Meshaal

Reading between the lines, the unsealing of this complaint sends a pretty clear message to Emir Tamim, Sheikh Mohammed, Erdoğan, Fidan, Akar, and Meshaal: you too may be held accountable if you support Hamas.

Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani is the ruler of Qatar, overseeing the nation’s foreign policy and alliances. Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, as Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, is responsible for executing the country’s diplomatic and economic strategies. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey is the key architect of Turkey’s foreign policy, which has included providing political support to Hamas. Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, has been deeply involved in the diplomatic aspects of Turkey’s relationship with Hamas, including intelligence-sharing. Hulusi Akar, Turkey’s Minister of National Defense, oversees military operations, including support that could benefit Hamas. Khaled Meshaal is a senior Hamas leader who coordinates the group’s financial and logistical strategies, primarily operating from Qatar.

Prosecutors could charge these individuals with conspiracies to provide material support and providing such support to Hamas under 18 USC. § 2339B. Support may include financial aid, military equipment, or logistical assistance — actions that, according to the complaint, directly facilitate Hamas’s operations. Even non-military support may be considered material support under US law.

Backing Hamas Could Be Seen as Material Support

Qatar has consistently stated its funds are meant for humanitarian aid, not to bolster Hamas’s military capabilities. Regardless of intent, providing material support can still result in criminal charges. The unsealed complaint treats Hamas’s military arm and its political arm as one, meaning any financial support to Hamas, even if claimed to be for humanitarian purposes, could be scrutinized under US law.

President Erdoğan’s public statements defending Hamas as a “liberation movement” would not be protected under freedom of speech. The unsealed complaint explicitly details how the organization uses social media and public statements as tools to further its terrorist objectives. For example, the complaint notes that “Hamas has leveraged social media platforms to incite violence, recruit members, and spread propaganda that supports its terrorist activities.”

Erdoğan’s public defense of Hamas on social media and other platforms could be interpreted as providing material support to a terrorist organization if these statements are seen as aiding Hamas’s objectives. There is no ‘freedom of speech’ defense for actions that materially support terrorism. In fact, the complaint goes into elaborate detail about how Hamas strategically uses social media to advance its terrorist agenda, stating: “Hamas’s social media campaigns are designed to recruit individuals, incite violence against civilians, and glorify acts of terrorism.” This aligns with US legal interpretations that consider public endorsements or the dissemination of terrorist propaganda as material support. If President Erdoğan uses public platforms to defend Hamas, his statements can be viewed through a similar lens — providing material support by legitimizing and encouraging Hamas’s activities.

Suspected secretive intelligence-sharing and military support by Turkish officials to Hamas may be difficult to prove definitively, but if corroborated, such support could lead to potential charges under US law.

Activists Should Rally for Vigorous Enforcement, Not More Flexibility in Negotiating with Terrorists

Hamas’s use of public statements and social media is integral to its terrorist operations, and those who assist in these efforts — whether through direct action or public defense — could be held accountable under 18 USC. § 2339B. It is crucial to apply these laws vigorously to prevent further support for terrorist activities, whether that support comes in the form of financial aid, logistical assistance, or public endorsements that align with Hamas’s objectives.

Continuation of these activities would entitle a federal court in the United States to impose criminal penalties on those involved, including imprisonment and substantial fines, for their roles in providing material support to Hamas as an FTO under Section 2339B. Title 18 provides for imprisonment for up to 15 years (or for life if death results from the offense) and fines. Under §§ 981 and 982, the court can order the forfeiture of any property involved in a violation of the statute.

Before rallying to be more flexible in negotiating with terrorists, activists should rally for these laws to be more vigorously enforced, holding accountable those who enable terrorism through material support.