Not a State, Not a Collapse: Syria’s Third Option
On May 20, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a stark warning to the Senate: Syria’s transitional government, he claimed, is only weeks away from collapsing into another full-scale civil war. His remarks came on the heels of a high-profile meeting between Donald Trump and Ahmad al-Sharaa—better known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani—in Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. president appeared to offer tacit recognition of Julani’s leadership as a potential stabilizing force in the region.
Rubio’s warning stands in sharp contrast to the administration’s endorsement, hinting at a deliberate U.S. strategy to keep its options open in Syria’s fragile landscape. This tension suggests the new Syrian governance model is still being closely watched—and could shift at any moment. International summits and billion-dollar pledges convey a sense of stability, yet they mask a fractured reality: a system lacking formal institutions, a unified chain of command, or any collective vision beyond temporary coexistence. For now, this arrangement endures—precisely because its factions have yet to confront each other directly.
Syria’s next chapter centers on investment rather than politics. Partnerships with Saudi Arabia, technical aid from Turkey, and economic ties with the U.S. and EU outline a vision for enduring stability. Yet the language of rebuilding masks a deeper aim: a race to dominate infrastructure and its oversight.
Israel, though officially absent from these efforts, must engage. The stakes extend beyond borders or diplomacy to a fluid web of influence in a system where control remains uncharted.
Fragmented Authority: The Tribal Mosaic of Post-Assad Syria
After Assad’s fall, Syria did not reorganize under a central authority. Instead, a loose administrative order took shape under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa—Abu Mohammad al-Julani—once al-Qaeda’s most prominent figure in Syria, now the architect of a new transitional regime. HTS does not govern through institutions but through networks: Julani consolidates authority by brokering individualized arrangements with each tribal bloc, urban constituency, and factional power center. His control is real—but fragmented, transactional, and constantly renegotiated.
In the northwest, tribes like the Bakkara and Mawali offer HTS conditional support in exchange for local dominance. The Omran Center (2025) notes their allegiances shifted repeatedly—from Assad to the opposition to HTS—based not on ideology but expedience.
East of the Euphrates, the al-Akidat, al-Shaitat, and Baggara act autonomously, striking their own arrangements with U.S. and Kurdish forces. Reports from COAR (2019), the Washington Institute (2024), and Omran confirm these tribes bypass HTS entirely and assert control over oil routes and access.
In central Syria—particularly Homs and Hama—tribes like Bani Khalid and Hadidiyin retain local influence rooted in prewar patronage and logistics. HTS has little presence here, facing a political culture unreceptive to northern Islamist authority.
Along the coast, former regime networks still control port and transit infrastructure, but power is fragmented and increasingly localized. New Lines reports targeted violence in Alawite areas, while ISW notes signs of discontent and low-level reorganization. HTS remains absent from these zones, operating only through intermediaries.
In Suwayda, Druze clans maintain an autonomous enclave with local courts, police, and tax systems, firmly rejecting HTS’s model since early 2025. According to Carnegie and The Washington Institute, their leadership has reached out to Jordan, France, and—reportedly—Israel, positioning themselves as regionally self-contained.
In the northeast, governance rests with the Kurdish-led Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which expanded control after Assad’s fall and the quiet drawdown of Russian support. Kurdish authorities have deepened ties with France, the U.S., and the UAE, while maintaining secular courts, autonomous trade, and control over key oil corridors. A limited agreement with HTS near Tell Tamer, detailed by the Washington Institute, ensures a line of non-engagement—but Rojava continues to operate entirely on its own terms.
Urban Leverage and Internal Discipline
HTS’s urban strategy hinges on pragmatic deals over formal control. In cities like Damascus and Aleppo, it works through surviving industrial and technocratic elites—figures who managed to preserve core services, contracts, and logistics through every regime. For them, Julani offers continuity, not ideology.
A system of oversight, since spring 2025 consolidated under Anas Hattab—long-time intelligence operative and now interior minister—anchors this architecture. Arab-language investigations by Anadolu Agency and BBC Arabic trace Hattab’s arc from “shadow emir” of HTS security to architect of the new General Intelligence Directorate. He vets senior appointments, controls access routes, and serves as the principal liaison with Turkish intelligence.
Julani’s inner circle blends HTS loyalists with ex-regime technocrats. Chief sharia authority Abd al-Rahman Atoun (Abu Abdullah al-Shami) still guides legal policy; Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and Prime Minister Muhammad al-Bashir, along with others, manage external affairs and civil administration.
This hybrid regime contends with internal dissent. In early 2025, a splinter faction—Saraya Ansar al-Sunna—emerged in the north, accusing Julani of abandoning jihadist principles. The group has claimed attacks on Alawite communities and denounced HTS’s internal crackdown. In response, Julani placed mosque oversight under a newly expanded religious directorate loyal to HTS, asserting control over imams and suppressing internal dissent.
The economic foundation remains Watad Petroleum, officially dissolved in 2022 but still active through renamed fronts. Argus Media confirms that Watad resumed Turkish imports in late 2024 and continues distributing fuel to bakeries, hospitals, and transit hubs across Idlib. A Jusoor for Studies report from March 2025 shows how this logistics network enables political control: pricing, distribution, and access are calibrated to reward loyalty and marginalize dissent.
Riyadh’s Strategic Entry
Following U.S. sanctions relief—reportedly secured during President Trump’s May visit to Riyadh at the direct request of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—Saudi Arabia seeks to establish itself as a lead investor in Syria’s postwar recovery. According to Al Eqtisadiah, the Gulf Cooperation Council is preparing to host a dedicated Saudi–Syrian investment forum by early 2026, aimed at channeling capital into infrastructure, energy, and agriculture through formalized multilateral frameworks. This initiative, still in the planning stages, is seen as part of a broader regional shift toward economic normalization with Damascus.
Meanwhile, on the bilateral front, SANA reports that the Saudi ambassador to Syria met with the Minister of Transport in Damascus to discuss technical coordination on overland logistics and reconstruction of major road corridors. This comes alongside energy-focused talks: Solarabic confirms that senior representatives of the Saudi firm Alfanar held direct negotiations with Syrian officials on launching solar and wind projects, with an emphasis on decentralized generation and grid stabilization in underserved areas.
In a sign of broader financial alignment, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar recently settled Syria’s outstanding debt to the World Bank, according to a May 2025 IMF briefing.
These moves are cautious but deliberate. Saudi Arabia is not injecting federal funds into a unified Syrian platform—it is building modular footholds: energy here, transport there, each tethered to bilateral assurances and local guarantees.
HTS is not the architect of any of these efforts. Its role is to stamp permits, secure territory, and sign localized memoranda—but the money flows elsewhere. Each project operates through its own compact, localized structure: a contractor executes the work, a local tribal leader guarantees stability, and a financial operator ensures risk control. What gets funded isn’t ideology—it’s what works.
The Turkish Operating System
Turkey acts with focus. Across three northern zones, it has established a layered institutional order. Schools, hospitals, telecom lines, and cadastral offices follow Turkish templates; the lira is used in everyday transactions; court disputes reference Turkish law; welfare is distributed through Ankara-based agencies. Administrative coordination is handled by MIT officers embedded with Turkish military units across a network of military sites, overseeing political loyalty and digital reporting.
HTS plays a symbolic role in Idlib, but the structure of governance is Turkish. The strategic goal is clear: to transform the border region into a stable buffer aligned with Ankara’s legal and economic system. Just as importantly, Turkey shaped the environment in which Julani became not only functional but internationally tolerable—by enforcing institutional discipline, curating calm, and ensuring that power looked orderly. A high-level delegation recently proposed joint investments in Syrian ports, while bilateral trade continues to surge, with plans to restore the 2007 free trade agreement and reach $10 billion in volume. As Asharq al-Awsat notes, Ankara is using logistics, energy, and banking infrastructure to push southward—toward the central and coastal corridors traditionally dominated by Assad and watched closely by Israel. The friction serves strategic aims: both sides now treat access to Syria’s interior as a live contest, where airspace and influence are increasingly inseparable.
The Transactional Bloc: UAE, Qatar, and the U.S.
The UAE is establishing itself as a key mediator in Syria’s economic normalization. Following the U.S. sanctions relief and the launch of SyriUS Energy, Abu Dhabi has signaled interest in shaping the next phase—not through flagship investments, but by leveraging its financial infrastructure and ties to Western institutions. According to 7al.net, Emirati policymakers are exploring mechanisms to assist Syria’s reintegration into international finance, with a focus on infrastructure recovery, banking normalization, and long-term energy support. As noted by CNBC Arabia, Emirati backing may become essential if American banks hesitate to underwrite Syria’s energy recovery. In that case, Gulf liquidity—channeled through UAE-based funds and logistics platforms—could replace Western capital and keep the reconstruction pipeline operational.
Qatar serves as a major financial player in Syria’s transitional phase. In early May, Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad Yusr Barniya confirmed a Qatari grant of $29 million per month, extended over three months and potentially renewable. Administered through the UNDP and exempted from U.S. sanctions, the grant covers about one-fifth of Syria’s current public wage bill, specifically targeting civil-sector salaries in health, education, social welfare, and civilian pensions. Reuters reported that the U.S. administration approved this initiative as a Qatari-mediated stabilization measure, with strict conditions excluding any military-linked institutions. In tandem, Qatar and Saudi Arabia jointly paid off Syria’s outstanding $15 million debt to the World Bank, enabling the resumption of World Bank operations in the country after a 14-year freeze. According to Qatari Finance Minister Ali bin Ahmed al-Kuwari, Syria may now access up to $180 million in institutional allocations, with further support expected for electricity sector development. This approach—coordinated, shielded by U.S. waivers, and focused on stabilizing civilian systems—reflects Qatar’s sustained commitment to shaping Syria’s recovery through formal channels.
The United States acts as the third pillar in this arrangement. It does not provide direct federal funding but offers guarantees and regulatory cover through private capital and international consortia. According to CNBC Arabia, U.S. firms are already involved in a strategic energy development plan coordinated with Syria’s transitional government. The initiative includes modernization of the national grid, construction of smart energy hubs in the northeast, and supply chain frameworks for refined fuels—implemented through American-led technical teams operating under OFAC-compliant structures. The project gained momentum after President Donald Trump’s meeting with Ahmad al-Sharaa in Riyadh, which preceded the issuance of General License 25 allowing transactions with Syria’s central government and public institutions. The State Department described this as a revocable framework—contingent on Syria meeting specific benchmarks, including counterterrorism cooperation and the expulsion of foreign militias.
No shared strategy exists; interests converge. Each actor is entering through narrow corridors: the U.S. through compliance frameworks, Qatar through humanitarian finance, the UAE through selective diplomatic hedging. Turkey alone is building a coherent governance system—but even that remains confined to its zones of influence. Julani, meanwhile, stands at the center of it all without controlling any of it. He administers the appearance of unity, while the actual architecture belongs to others.
Israel’s Strategic Dilemma
At the Riyadh summit, Donald Trump raised the prospect of normalization between Israel and Julani—on the condition of “sustained stability.” The comment served as a directional marker, not a policy commitment: if this structure holds, Israel should be compatible with it.
As of May 2025, Israel confronts a complex choice: to engage with the new Syrian reality through investments and quiet political influence, or to stand aside and risk losing long-term strategic leverage. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the withdrawal of Iranian forces created a power vacuum that Turkey is now rapidly filling. Ankara is expanding its military footprint, laying the groundwork for air and naval bases, and helping shape Syria’s new army and governing institutions.
Within this shifting landscape, Israel views investment in Syria’s southern regions—particularly in Druze-majority provinces—as a form of soft power, a way to stabilize border areas and prevent Iran’s return. But such moves risk being cast as foreign interference and provoke a sharp backlash from Turkey, which has already publicly condemned Israeli activity in the region. The complexity is compounded by the need to coordinate with other regional actors, including Jordan and the UAE.
As of now, Israeli investments in Syrian projects are only possible indirectly—through third countries, private contractors, or non-state consortia. The most promising areas include water infrastructure (such as restoring springs in the south and managing cross-border flows toward Jordan), and targeted energy and telemetry initiatives tied to border security.
These ventures are less about profit than about strategic positioning. Israel is trying to stabilize specific zones, reduce the risk of tribal radicalization, and limit Iran’s ability to reassert itself in southern Syria. Direct economic expansion is off the table—Julani’s authority lacks recognition, and local clans are only loyal on a transactional basis. Still, technical channels via the UAE and Jordan are serving as backchannels for signaling, oversight, and early-stage investments. Israel operates outside the formal political framework, but it remains one of the few actors with the capacity to influence outcomes—not through rhetoric, but through operational control on the ground.
The New Export Model
A system where the state yields to a network of brokers now defines an exportable model, distinct from mere anomaly. Until now, such structures tended to emerge as side effects of collapse—in Libya, Yemen, Haiti. But Syria is different: this model isn’t just being tolerated, it’s being actively designed and maintained. For the first time, major powers are involved in constructing a managed space without sovereignty, without institutions, and without a center.
Rubio’s warning remains pertinent. The system’s rigidity, more than its fragility, poses a threat: it endures only so long as no actor tests its limits. No one is trying to turn HTS into a full-fledged state. But many are keen to replicate its mechanics: control without accountability, integration into global systems without recognition, coercion without sovereignty. If the Syrian model proves durable, it won’t remain unique. It will become the default operating system—not just for Syria, but for future zones of fragmented order.
