Peace through mediation: Why Oman will not normalise relations with Israel

On a warm February night in Muscat, Oman, El Al flight number 81 entered Omani airspace. A few hours later, the aircraft landed in Bangkok – without incident, and two and a half hours faster than usual. 26th February 2023 went down as a historic day in the history of Israeli-Omani relations. It marks the first time an Israeli commercial flight flew over Oman, which had opened its airspace to Israeli flights three days earlier.

Oman’s decision followed months of efforts by Western diplomats and appeared to be a further step towards Israeli-Arab normalisation. Until then, everything seemed to be going like clockwork. In 2020, the Abraham Accords set the ball rolling; 2 years later, Saudi Arabia, the religious and economic centre of the Sunni Muslim world, opened its airspace to Israeli aircrafts. The Omanis following suit in February 2023 seemed to be just the latest step in a long, gradual development of normalisation.

But this development came to an abrupt halt – as far as Oman was concerned – long before 7 October. Omani officials made it clear that they would not follow the example of Bahrain and the UAE. Indeed, the Omani lower house, the country’s only legislative body, passed a resolution extending an existing boycott of Israeli products and companies. But for many observers, this move by Oman came as no surprise – on the contrary, it is in line with Oman’s longstanding push-pull behaviour towards Israel. What is behind this strange strategy of the Gulf state?

The UN security council in 2015 adopting security resolution 2231, known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.. (UN Photo/Loey Felipe)

The behaviour of the Omanis can only be understood by looking beyond relations with Israel. Israel is not the only state with whom Oman has an unusual relationship; Oman is the only Gulf state, with the exception of Qatar, that maintains excellent relations with Iran, a clear break with the Saudi position. It was not without reason that Oman was instrumental in facilitating the negotiations on the JCPOA in the 2010s by acting as a mediator for Iran.  Oman seems comfortable in this role; just last year it was revealed that American and Iranian officials met in the Omani capital for clandestine talks to revive the nuclear deal. With the election of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, the seriousness of these talks will only increase – and with it Oman’s role as mediator.

Seen in this light, it becomes clearer why Oman’s insists on keeping Israel at arm’s length; only in this way can Oman maintain and expand its role as a mediator in the Middle East, gaining importance and status in the region without having to compete with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

Too close a relationship with Israel can only do Oman harm. In October 2018, Benjamin Netanyahu became the first Israeli prime minister since Yitzhak Rabin to be received by Sultan Qaboos in Muscat. This was promptly followed by a sharp condemnation from Iran, which publicly condemned the Sultan for ‘giving the usurper Zionist regime room […] to create new problems in the region’ by ‘submitting and capitulating to the illegitimate demands of the United States’. It goes without saying that Oman has not issued any more invitations to Israeli prime ministers since then.

Oman is walking a tightrope; it must not antagonise Iran by getting too close to the Israelis, but it must not risk its relations with the U.S. either. The United States have served as Oman’s protecting power through years of security cooperation; the U.S. Air Force, for example, has a presence in southern Oman. It is against this background that the sporadic, half-hearted attempts at rapprochement with Israel must be understood. Oman did not open its airspace to Israel for Israel’s sake, but in order to yield to American pressure and maintain its goodwill.

The presence of the Omani ambassador at the signing of the Abraham Accords should be seen in this context. What some took as a sign that Oman would soon normalise relations with Israel was probably twofold: on the one hand, a concession to the Americans and, on the other, a symbol of how proud Oman is of its mediating role in the Middle East.

The Signing Ceremony of the Abraham Accords at the White House, 2020. (White House Archive/Flickr)

It should be noted that Qatar was not present at the signing of the Accords. This is remarkable, as Qatar traditionally plays the role of mediator in Middle East conflicts, as is currently the case in the ceasefire negotiations with Hamas. Oman has kept a close eye on its regional neighbour in recent years and has taken note of how much the small emirate benefits from its role as mediator.

However, Qatar is finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil its role as mediator – the rifts with Saudi Arabia weigh too heavily, and many Western partners are increasingly critical of its close relations with radical Islamic organisations such as Hamas and Al-Qaeda. Oman is a blank slate in this respect, not least because of its support for Western counter-terrorism operations and its close relations with the Saudis.

There are many indications that Oman will try to expand its role as a mediator in the Middle East and challenge the Qataris. It is already foreseeable that potential future nuclear negotiations with Iran will not be held in Doha, but in Muscat. Oman will be able to hope for the support of the Americans and the Saudis. There is no question of normalisation with Israel beyond polite gestures, let alone peace. The Omani ambition to become the next major mediator state in the Middle East is too strong for that.