Persistent Geopolitics: Iran, Socotra, and Egypt

The ongoing war with Iran’s Houthi ally in Yemen over freedom of navigation in the Red Sea evokes a Latin tract written 700 years ago. 

Medieval Papal Diplomat 

A literary episode in 1316 illuminates aspects of our present moment: the appearance of William of Adam’s “How to Defeat the Saracens” (Guillelmus Ade’s, Tractus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi), translated in 2012 by two medievalists, Giles Constable (British) and Ranabir Chakravarti (Indian).  William of Adam was a papal diplomat posted throughout the Persian Gulf, India, and Ethiopia. At the time he wrote, the Crusaders had been expelled from the Holy Land; Acre fell in 1291, marking the last Western foothold in the region. Europeans wanted to return, but the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt blocked them.

Inferences about Iran

A starting point for comparing the world of this medieval treatise to the present is the inference that the attacks on Israel that began on 7 October 2023 included an ancillary goal of destabilising Egypt and challenging its alignment with the West. The 14th-century priest’s proposal to curb Egypt’s power in the Levant offers some curious observations that support this perspective. While centuries separate these events, the past and present share similarities.

Egypt’s Wealth from India

From the late 1200s to 1337, a genre of writing known as “Recapture Literature” appeared in the West. Various Catholic authors advocated for new military expeditions to Jerusalem, looking from the West to the East. William’s tract fits neatly within the genre. Yet, he distinguished himself from his contemporaries with a novel approach: William’s view from India – looking from the East to the West – informed his plan. He argued that Cairo’s wealth—and thus the strength of the Mamluk army—depended on trade routes from India through the Red Sea. If Europeans were to weaken Egypt’s hold on the Holy Land, he wrote, success would depend on choking off Egypt’s access to the Indian Ocean trade. (It’s interesting to note that the Indian historian, Chakravarti, was instrumental in encouraging the translation of William’s treatise. That historiographical footnote by itself is a significant event in bringing these parallels to our attention.)

An Underappreciated Indian Ocean Connection

William’s plan was grounded in a logic understood outside of Europe. Block the Red Sea route. Enforce an embargo. Forcibly redirect India’s trade through the Persian Gulf in alliance with Persia so that Egypt would grow poorer, while Egypt’s competitor in Persia would grow stronger. Seven centuries ago, William recognized the Bab el‑Mandeb Strait (near Yemen and Djibouti) as Egypt’s chokepoint. To lend force to his plan, he recommended basing a European naval flotilla at Socotra Island, located near the mouth of the Red Sea. The comprehensive plan would be built upon a papal alliance with the Ilkhanate rulers of Persia. While that alliance did not come to fruition owing to dynastic developments in Persia, William’s underlying understanding of Persian interests remained valid.

Persian consistency toward Egypt

Iran’s interest in a partnership with the Houthis in Yemen indeed serves a range of immediate Iranian purposes. It is, however, grounded in ancient motivations that William perceived sufficiently. Just as recognizing medieval Persia’s animus toward Egypt made tenable a European alliance with Persia to confront Mamluk Egypt, Iran’s present-day support for movements on Egypt’s maritime and economic doorstep that disrupt Red Sea commerce seems equally natural —and perhaps inevitable.

In this essay, we examine Iranian incentives to aid parties whose activities interfere with Egypt, not Houthi motivations. That Iranian and Houthi interests converge is partly coincidental; that Egypt suffers from that convergence is arguably one of its central products. Houthi attacks caused shipping firms to reroute away from the Red Sea and Suez, cutting Egypt’s transit‑fee revenue. The Houthis’ recent claim that they will stop attacks on Suez Canal traffic partly reflects Iran’s influence and Tehran’s desire to pursue a short‑term rapprochement with Cairo as it recovers from setbacks during the Twelve Day War in June 2025.

The India Trade’s Long Record

Medieval Jews appreciated Egypt’s position as a hub between India and Europe long before William’s proposal in 1316. Tunisian Jewish merchants writing letters from India in the 11th century to family members in Yemen and Egypt already treated the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean as an indivisible system. To them, Cairo connected India, East Africa, Arabia, and Europe. William grasped that reality. Europeans, however, were not ready to act on that insight until Portugal’s rise as a Red Sea maritime power in the early 1500s.

Enduring Geopolitical Conditions

What can we gain now from recognizing this pattern? William’s 700‑year‑old proposal reminds us that Egypt’s role as a hub between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean has been consistent for centuries. And he recognized that Persia – now Iran – is among the powers that consistently seek to weaken or coerce Egypt. 

When we examine Iran’s support of the Houthis’ attacks on shipping, we can surmise that these hostilities are not only religiously motivated strikes against Israel. They are part of a durable pattern—a “geopolitical ecology”—that shapes Iranian behavior.  In 1316, William of Adam recognized the Persian impulse; this impulse is still evident today. 

Concluding Thought

William’s “Red Sea scenario,” to borrow from Professor Chakravarti, suggests that some geopolitical conditions are persistent. Dynasties and governments change, but the behavior of their successors tends to fall into patterns that endure. We should acknowledge the limitations of historical generalizing and analogizing.  Still, we can also recognize the persistence of Egypt’s reliance on the Red Sea trade route and Iran’s impulse to disrupt it.