Power plays north of the border

While the entire Western media landscape was abuzz after President Donald Trump announced his bizarre plan to rebuild Gaza, something very disconcerting was taking place north of Israel’s border. It went largely unnoticed, but Ahmed al-Sharaa met with Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss the possibility of forging a defense pact between Syria and Türkiye. While Gaza is important, as there are still hostages languishing in tunnels, developments in Syria merit our attention as well. I would argue that replacing Hezbollah and Iran with Türkiye is not an improvement. In the long term, it might even be worse.

Al-Sharaa’s drive to consolidate and centralize power in Syria

As I wrote in a post last year, the lightning speed with which the rebels managed to topple Assad’s brutal regime was both astounding and impressive. Afterwards, the IDF launched a massive operation, eliminating Assad’s military arsenal, a decision based on the fear that it could end up in the wrong hands. And, it moved into the buffer zone. All of Israel’s actions led to widespread criticism, but from a security perspective, they definitely made sense. Cautious optimism is needed, but too much is still unclear about Syria’s future – democracy or religious dictatorship, unity or a renewed descent into chaos. And, enigmatic as ever, it is still difficult to gauge al-Sharaa’s plans for the future. All of Israel’s actions have provoked fairly mild reactions from Syria’s new leader. He has called on Israel to retreat from the buffer zone but stressed that he would honor the 1974 agreement. And when Assad’s stockpiles were destroyed he remained mostly silent. If I am optimistic – which I very much would like to be – I would argue that al-Sharaa is not seeking a conflict with Israel and, in the long-term, might be interested in having talks with his southern neighbor about the future. His main priority seems to be maintaining Syrian territorial integrity and reconstructing the country. To this end, al-Sharaa is determined to keep northeastern Syria under control, abolishing all of the different factions and folding them into a centralized Syrian army, and providing the Syrian population with hope for the future through rebuilding the devastated country. As late as 2020, Christopher Phillips wrote in his book The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East that eastern Syria looked like a shell of itself, the devastation caused by war leaving deep, visible scars. Moreover, proving that Syria’s future will be brighter under the transition government could lead to a return of many of the Syrian refugees who fled the country over the course of the last thirteen years. Therefore, confronting Israel is simply not at the top of his list. However, al-Sharaa was known as the leader of jihadist HTS, until last year. Therefore, Israel should tread with caution.

Türkiye’s ascent

Phillips also wrote that Turkish aspirations were already clear during the civil war. Officially, Erdogan has always cited humanitarian concerns, Turkish security and Muslim solidarity, as reasons to get involved in the Syrian civil war. But Türkiye’s gaze has been focused on the Middle East for many years, slowly but surely abandoning its focus on the West. There is, of course, Ottoman history to consider and Erdogan makes plenty of references to this era. And while the civil war was still raging in 2020, Phillips argued that the winners seemed to be Russia and Iran. Türkiye seemed to be struggling to gain a foothold in the Middle East and to have largely failed in its endeavors – how different everything is today.

In addition to Erdogan’s list of reasons to get involved in the Syrian civil war, other considerations are important as well. In the last years, it would seem that Syrian refugees have outstayed their welcome. Many of their Turkish brothers and sisters, despite the banner of Islamic solidarity, would like to see them leave. If Erdogan would succeed in sending the majority of them back, it would probably boost his popularity. Secondly, security is indeed a concern, as the PKK is a designated terrorist organization and has committed terror attacks in Türkiye. However, the YPG, which has links to the PKK and is part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has not launched any serious attacks against Türkiye from the border areas it controls, since 2012. Nevertheless, in the past decade, Erdogan has launched several military campaigns, all of them focused on countering Kurdish rebels – who are always called terrorists – and not necessarily against the terror of Daesh. The SDF, which dominates the Syrian northeast, is spearheaded by the YPG. Thirdly, Türkiye seems to have emerged as the true victor of the battle for Syria – at least for now. Its backing of the Syrian National Army has been a good investment, which has now been rolled into the new Syrian military apparatus. And while trying to avoid jihadist factions, like HTS, Phillips added that in the later years of the civil war, Türkiye was tacitly starting to cooperate with jihadists in the field and even arming them indirectly. HTS, however, had remained reluctant to cooperate with Erdogan for a long time, until Assad and his allies launched an offensive against Idlib in 2018. As of that moment, HTS accepted Ankara’s support and protection. The value of these ties has been mentioned frequently by al-Sharaa, as his second official visit was to Ankara. Finally, where Ankara has failed to sufficiently penetrate the Middle East before, due to the fact that Russia and Iran were the dominant powers in Syria, Lebanon was dominated by Iran’s proxy Hezbollah, and Iraq was heavily influenced by Iran, now it finally seems to have begun its rise in the region. It is a substantial development, but could prove worrisome for two actors in particular: the Kurds and Israel.

The issue with the defense pact

Al-Sharaa’s search for a strong ally was to be expected. On the one hand, he wants to prevent Persian and Shiite forces from retrenching themselves in a majority Arab and Sunni country. Russia, of course, cannot assume this role, due to its support for the regime that was toppled by the rebels – nevertheless, Russia has voiced its intention to hold onto bases in Syria. Thus, Türkiye seems suited for the job, as it is a supporter of Sunni Muslims and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. While it is still being discussed, details of the defense pact have already emerged. It could lead to the new Syrian army receiving training from its northern neighbor, the acquisition of advanced Turkish weaponry which would boost the quality of said army and, most importantly, the opening of two new air bases in Syria. Especially the last detail would seem ominous for the SDF, as this would give Türkiye access to Syria’s skies. And while a Turkish presence could help al-Sharaa keep out the Iranians, it could also serve as a deterrent against Israel. Moreover, if Turkish air bases would dot the Syrian landscape, Israel would de facto share a border with the Ottoman Empire’s successor state. Previously, it shared a border with Russia. While Israel successfully managed to create a deconfliction mechanism with Moscow, enabling it to continue striking Iranian proxies on Syrian soil, we have also seen the negative consequences regarding the war in Ukraine. Sharing a border with Russia was a major influence on ties with the Ukrainian government. Moreover, relations with Türkiye are much more problematic, as Erdogan has firmly placed his country in Hamas’ camp and enjoys strong relations with Qatar. Lastly, the strategic partnership that al-Sharaa desires would spell trouble for the SDF. While al-Sharaa has offered Syrian Kurds cultural rights that would be enshrined in the new Syrian constitution and promised them representation in government, the autonomy desired by the latter has been denied. In that sense, the new leadership offers no substantial improvement for Kurdish rights when compared to the Assad regime. Furthermore, it seems that al-Sharaa is already giving up on diplomacy as he stated that he was not optimistic about reaching a deal. Once again, he mentioned Turkish security concerns as a reason. During the civil war, Syrian Arab rebels had already clashed with the SDF numerous times – thus, another confrontation would seem likely. Of course, this has been Ankara’s desire all along. But a Turkish official’s remark that it is too soon to speak of a defense pact, probably refers to one key player that forms the final obstacle: the United States. 

What will the new US administration do?

During President Trump’s first term, Erdogan had already managed to successfully influence him on the need to pull American troops out of Syria – Phillips argues that it was thanks to experienced members of Trump’s cabinet that not all of the troops were brought home. Arguing that Daesh had been defeated – with the terror group launching a bloody attack just a few weeks later – the reason for keeping the forces there seemed redundant. There are still American troops in Syria who are stationed in Deir-ez-Zor. This is probably the last guarantee the SDF has against a full frontal assault. Which is why Erdogan has already stated that the “fabricated” reasons to fight Daesh no longer apply – read, the US needs to pull out and make way for Türkiye. The question is, if Trump will be susceptible to Erdogan’s arguments once again or if he will choose to maintain the small presence he has a little longer. Syrian Kurds will nervously ask what Trump’s plans are, but Israelis should be curious as well: what will the US do in Syria?

The buffer zone: a good bargaining chip

Ideally, a continued American presence in Syria would help prevent a Daesh recovery, offer the Kurds protection, and indirectly aid Israeli security. But, considering that President Trump was already planning on pulling out of Syria during his first term, I would not be surprised, if he decided to complete his unfinished business this time. Considering the vital role played by the SDF in defeating Islamic State it would be embarrassing, yet the Kurds have been abandoned by the US in Iraq as well. Therefore, Israel’s presence in the buffer zone might help.

First of all, security is an important reason, as troops recently came under fire from a new faction that, according to the Alma Center, seems to display terminology and symbols that are eerily similar to those used by Hezbollah. This new faction claims that Syria needs to be liberated from Turkish, American, and Israeli occupation, while conspicuously ignoring the Russian presence in the country. Considering this, Israel could offer al-Sharaa a deadline: once the Syrian army is deployed near the border, Israel will retreat from the buffer zone – a reasonable request, I would say. Secondly, a retreat from the buffer zone could be coupled with guarantees that the Kurds will be protected from a Turkish assault. Kurdish fears about their future are legitimate, when one reads that al-Sharaa addressed a conference in Syria, where one of the attendees was a man responsible for the faction that brutally killed a female Kurdish politician in north Syria – suffering multiple broken bones, she was dragged by her hair, until it detached from her scalp. Thus, Israel could join forces with the US and condition their respective retreats on guarantees concerning the security and rights of Syria’s Kurdish minority. By adopting this stance, Israel and the US could show their willingness to be conciliatory, but not without assurances. It would put some pressure on al-Sharaa and help check Turkish expansion. I would consider this preferable to Defense Minister Katz’s brazen statement that Israel will remain in the buffer zone “indefinitely.”