R&AW at 58: The Mossad Connection in a Changing Security Landscape

The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) was established on September 21, 1968, following India’s intelligence failings during the 1965 war and in response to the growing strategic challenge posed by a nuclear-capable China. R N Kao, the agency’s inaugural chief, established an organization that would become instrumental in the intelligence campaign encircling the 1971 Bangladesh operation within three years. After 58 years, R&AW faces a far more complicated geopolitical environment. India now faces a far more volatile strategic environment, with Pakistan struggling with internal instability, the Iran conflict reshaping the Middle East, and the newly formed Mecca Pact creating an untested regional security framework. The fallout from October 7 has further blurred the boundaries between South Asian and Middle Eastern security threats.

Given the shifting threat environment, R&AW’s long-standing connection with Israel’s Mossad is becoming increasingly crucial. The alliance has remained purposely covert, allowing both countries to collaborate without exposing themselves to needless political risk. However, contemporary threats transcend national borders, establishing connections between terrorism, weapons transfers, financing, and state-sponsored networks in South Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. The challenge is whether a relationship based on discrete cooperation can now grow into a more systematic intelligence partnership appropriate for a more interconnected threat landscape.

The Foundations of an Intelligence Cooperation

The cooperation between R&AW and Mossad was initiated nearly simultaneously with the establishment of R&AW. In the late 1960s, R N Kao established relations with Israeli intelligence as both countries grew increasingly concerned about burgeoning security links between Pakistan, China, and North Korea. These concerns were further exacerbated by reports of Pakistani efforts to train Iranian and Libyan personnel in the handling of North Korean weapons with the assistance of China. Cooperation with Israel, according to Kao, provided India with access to a crucial intelligence partner who had experience tracing these networks. The cooperation also served to build a covert channel between India and Israel years before the two countries formalized diplomatic relations in 1992.

The partnership’s first significant test came in 1977. By that time, R&AW intelligence had proven that Pakistan was on the verge of producing weapons-grade uranium at its secret Kahuta enrichment facility. Ezer Weizman, the Israeli Defense Minister, visited India on a covert trip coordinated through R&AW and Mossad back-channel diplomacy. His objective was to persuade India to support Israel in launching a preemptive airstrike on Kahuta. The two operational possibilities explored were Israeli jets refueling in India before hitting the target or Israel launching the strike from Indian land, flying low through Himalayan valleys to elude Pakistani radar.

Ultimately, Prime Minister Morarji Desai rejected the proposal, which was indicative of his wider commitment to restraint and his opposition to military action. The episode, however, revealed the depth of the relationship at an early juncture. While R&AW had established itself as a reliable conduit for one of Israel’s most pressing regional security concerns, Israel was prepared to introduce highly sensitive operational planning to India. The incident’s importance is not solely derived from the operation that never transpired, but rather from the evidence it provided regarding the strategic trust that was already being established between the two intelligence agencies.

Institutionalising the Relationship

By the late 1980s, the liaison between R&AW and Mossad went from sporadic communication to a more systematic association. Until then, the two agencies had mostly interacted through third countries. In 1988, R&AW reportedly established two front companies, Piyush Investments and Hector Leasing and Finance Company Ltd, which were advertized as trading firms dealing in minerals, vehicles, textiles, and spare parts. Their directors were two top R&AW executives. In March 1989, the firms purchased two residences at Gauri Sadan on New Delhi’s Hailey Road, where Mossad’s station chief resided from 1989 to 1992. The Mossad officer, who held an Argentine passport, traded intelligence and operational knowledge with his Indian counterparts. One noteworthy instance was the June 1991 kidnapping of an Israeli tourist by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. The negotiations were reportedly primarily overseen by the Mossad officer and an Israeli diplomat dispatched to Delhi.

The significance of this arrangement extended beyond intelligence sharing. India was supplying operational facilities to Mossad on its soil at a time when the country did not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel. That necessitated both political judgment and institutional trust. The decision to establish such an arrangement may indicate that both parties already considered the relationship to be a strategic asset, rather than a periodic exchange between intelligence officers. Effectively, the relationship had already begun to establish its own infrastructure and channels before the formal establishment of the diplomatic relationship between India and Israel.

Kargil and the Shift to Operational Partnership

A key turning point in the India-Israel relationship was the Kargil Conflict of 1999, which saw a transition beyond intelligence sharing to direct operational support. Israel provided India with Litening targeting pods and laser-guided munitions for its Mirage 2000 planes, resulting in considerable improvements in target recognition and precise strikes. Israel was no longer just a covert provider of intelligence or defense equipment. It was transforming into an operational partner that could meet the immediate battlefield needs of India.

The significance of Kargil extended far beyond the systems provided. It was the first significant military conflict between India and Pakistan since both countries demonstrated nuclear weapons in 1998. Israel’s readiness to offer essential military support during an ongoing conflict illustrated a high level of strategic trust and granted India access to capabilities without jeopardizing its own decision-making. India maintained complete control over how such capabilities were used, whereas Israel demonstrated that its backing could convert into tangible tactical benefits when time was of the essence.

Following Kargil, the partnership continued to develop. In 2000, India and Israel established a Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism, creating a formal mechanism for cooperation on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, homeland security, mutual legal assistance and the protection of classified information. This institutional framework gave greater structure to a relationship that had previously operated largely through discreet intelligence channels. By 2003, the partnership had acquired a broader strategic dimension, with National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra addressing the American Jewish Committee and highlighting the potential for India, Israel and the United States to work together against terrorism. The relationship was therefore evolving from a covert intelligence liaison into a wider security partnership built around shared threats, operational experience and growing institutional trust.

A New Era of Converging Threats

The present geopolitical situation has lent the partnership between R&AW and Mossad a relevance that is much larger than its initial counter-terrorism emphasis. The Abraham Accords have linked Israel to a more interconnected regional security environment, whilst the Mecca Pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan has formed a new defense structure whose practical capabilities and internal cohesiveness are still being tested. The recent rise in tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has served as an additional illustration of the rapidity with which a crisis in a single region of the Middle East can influence the strategic calculations of nations that extend beyond the immediate battlefield, as well as energy routes and maritime security.

Simultaneously, Hamas and Hezbollah have established operate outside of their conventional theaters. European authorities have discovered Hamas-linked weapons infrastructure in Austria, Germany, Denmark, Poland, and Bulgaria, and investigations have revealed larger networks involved in weapons storage and attack planning. Hezbollah has also maintained logistical and fundraising infrastructure in Europe, with networks spanning Germany and other European countries. The Houthis have added another dimension by threatening Red Sea shipping, creating a security climate where developments in Iran, Yemen, Israel and Europe progressively influence each other.

These are therefore not isolated threats. They are overlapping portions of an Iranian-aligned security network that stretches from Tehran to Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, and European cities. Pakistan is at a critical crossroads in this larger environment due to its strategic ties with China, proximity to Iran, and the presence of Pakistan-based terrorist organizations attacking India. This is where the consequences for India become more stark. Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed remain crucial to this danger, but their activities are increasingly intersecting with larger transnational networks. The National Investigation Agency’s chargesheet in the 2025 Pahalgam incident explicitly indicated the need to explore probable linkages between the Pakistan based terror groups and Hamas, marking the first time India’s leading anti-terror body mentioned Gaza based terror group in a terror case. The chargesheet itself explicitly charged Pakistan based LeT and TRF for their role in planning and executing the attack. Subsequent intelligence assessments have revealed increased interactions between Hamas-linked operatives and Pakistan-based groups such as the LeT and JeM. According to reports, these groups are adopting Hamas-like financial and operating strategies, including as digital fundraising and other covert channels. This increasing convergence means that the networks attacking Israel and those threatening India can no longer be seen in total isolation. It poses a common intelligence issue for R&AW and Mossad where information on financing, recruitment, logistics, weapons procurement and transnational movement might be of direct benefit to the other.

The underlying trend is that geography is losing relevance as a means of organizing intelligence priorities. A development in Tehran might have an impact on Yemen, the Red Sea, and Israel, while terrorist networks operating in Europe could jeopardize Israeli and Indian security. R&AW and Mossad have spent decades honing their ability to share sensitive information across these boundaries. The current threat environment has renewed the strategic importance of this accumulated experience.

Conclusion

India and Israel are currently confronted with overlapping security challenges that are becoming more interconnected with Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. A stronger relationship between R&AW and Mossad could improve early warning, intelligence sharing, and collaborative assessments of terrorism, proliferation, cyber threats, and growing regional networks. India’s strategic autonomy and Palestine position remain hurdles, but the shifting security environment makes ongoing intelligence collaboration very necessary. As the R&AW enters its 58th year, the objective is to guarantee that its alliances develop to meet the challenges of the coming decade, which include terrorism financing, cyber warfare, proliferation, and Pakistan’s efforts to diversify its strategic partnerships outside China. The robust collaboration with Mossad may thus become an increasingly crucial feature of India’s intelligence architecture in the coming years.