Rising Lion, Hidden Dragon

The Ayatollah is China’s closest partner in the Middle East. How will Beijing handle this threat to his rule?

It would seem that Iran’s anti-government demonstrations are coming to a climax. Citizens across the country are in open revolt at a scale not seen since the 1979 revolution. Over 12,000 protesters are feared dead at the hands of government forces. And President Trump—speaking, as usual, with all the diplomatic subtlety of a Tel Aviv cabbie—has promised that Tehran will “have to pay hell” if the violence continues. 

Still, as of writing, missiles are not flying toward Tel Aviv (knock on wood) and President Trump has backed down on his threat to strike Iran, at least for now. This isn’t an entirely unexpected outcome, given that regional allies (including Israel) have reportedly asked him to hold off until the Iranian regime is in an even more precarious position. 

To his credit, though, Trump is an exceptionally difficult figure to predict, and US forces are still positioned for a strike. Nonessential personnel at America’s massive Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar have been evacuated, and the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group is en route to the Middle East, where it’s expected to arrive in roughly a week. The George H.W. Bush carrier group is also rumored to be en route to the region. And in Israel, mobile Iron Dome batteries are reportedly deploying around population centers.

Meanwhile, the Ayatollah is said to be moving gold and other assets out of Iran and making contingency plans to flee to Russia. The Islamic Republic, it seems, stands largely alone. Nevertheless, the question remains: Is the Ayatollah’s government weak enough yet to be overthrown, even with the help of American airstrikes? 

For the moment, it’s looking relatively unlikely. And if the Ayatollah were to receive support from his allies, it would become even less so. But ignoring the 5,000-ish Shi’a militia fighters who have crossed from Iraq to support the ongoing crackdown, the Ayatollah has found assistance remarkably hard to come by. 

Indeed, while much has been made of the potential for Russian support, Russia has been somewhat, shall we say, “occupied” elsewhere, and substantive diplomatic support for Iran has failed to materialize. Little, on the other hand, has been made of the possibility of Chinese assistance—which is surprising, given how invested China is in the Ayatollah’s government and how deeply China could shift the regional calculus. Next to Russia, China is Iran’s most important military and economic partner. And Iran is, at least in certain ways, critical to China as well. 

And so we come to the crux of the matter: what can we expect from China? Will Beijing seek to stabilize the Ayatollah’s regime? Will the CCP provide diplomatic cover for Iran in the international arena? Would China embrace an Iranian opposition government if one were to arise? 

It’s impossible to know with any certainty—but luckily for us, we do have something of a precedent to turn to in the form of China’s response to the Arab Spring uprisings, which may give us some insight into the CCP’s Middle Eastern regime-change playbook.

China: the unsung player in Middle Eastern politics

To those not intimately familiar with the Sino-Iranian nexus (i.e., most people), China might seem to be nothing more than an observer in the ongoing soap opera that is Middle Eastern power politics. The truth, however, is anything but. China is deeply tied to the region, and for reasons that can largely be explained in two words: energy security.

Consider: China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil. In 2024, it brought in roughly 75% of its entire oil supply (which accounted for somewhere around 25% of all global oil imports). China is likewise the world’s largest importer of natural gas. And while it boasts sizable coal reserves, China still requires more energy imports than any other country on earth. Unlike the United States and Russia, China is fundamentally unable to meet its energy demands with domestic production—rendering it reliant on foreign imports, with all the vulnerabilities that follow. 

More importantly, however, is from whom China buys its energy. In 2024, China purchased around 15% of its crude oil from Iran—a significant chunk which, according to some estimates, may have accounted for over 80% of Iran’s shipped oil exports that year. At the same time, a further 43% or so of China’s oil was imported from the Gulf States. 

Now, for those without a map handy, this means a significant portion of China’s energy imports—from both Iran and the Gulf States—must transit the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz at the entrance of the Persian Gulf before reaching open ocean. The Iranian government, however, has historically threatened to blockade the strait in response to perceived threats to its rule (most recently, after the 12-Day War). That would be, to put it mildly, not great for China.

So, the stability of Iran, and the Middle East as a whole, really, is essential for keeping China flush with crude—and Beijing has invested heavily in cultivating regional partnerships to serve that end. Untold billions have been poured into the region via the Belt and Road Initiative; recent years have seen Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and the UAE all admitted to the BRICS partnership; and in 2023, Iran was even admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 

But beyond being the largest importer of Iranian oil (often done surreptitiously to skirt sanctions), China is also something of Iran’s military patron. China has been known to provide material and intelligence support to the Iranian military, and in some cases, even the Houthis. This often takes the form of dual-use technology (again, to avoid issues with international law) in addition to things like satellite reconnaissance, transportation logistics, and fuel precursors/guidance systems for ballistic missiles. It’s reported that China is even providing Iran with anti-aircraft systems to replace those Israel destroyed last June.

China and Iran have also held joint naval exercises five times in the last seven years, and perhaps most notably (given China’s obsession with energy security), Beijing and Tehran signed a 25-year strategic deal in 2021 that will see over $400 billion invested in Iran’s infrastructure in exchange for discounted oil, deeper military cooperation, joint weapons development, and increased intelligence sharing. And all of this is on top of Iran’s existing defense contracts with China.

China’s response to the Arab Spring uprisings: the Goldilocks approach

Interestingly, it was precisely because the Arab Spring caught Beijing off guard that China began taking a more active role in the Middle East altogether. This more active role, though, wasn’t the result of any change in ideology; rather, it was just a strategic evolution from the traditional “wait and see” approach that defined China’s initial response to the protests. 

In January 2011, Egypt became the second country, after Tunisia, to rise against a dictatorial government as part of the Arab Spring. But unlike Tunisia, Egypt was an important trading partner with China. So when Egypt’s longtime dictator Hosni Mubarak was threatened by popular unrest, the Chinese government was quick to signal support for his rule. But China was also quick to forge relationships with alternative Egyptian power brokers when his downfall became apparent. This opportunistic approach largely paid off; under Morsi, trade between the two countries increased and Egypt moved further into the Chinese sphere of influence.

But while China escaped the Egyptian uprising relatively unscathed, the same can’t be said for Libya. When mass protests against Muammar Gaddafi began in February 2011, Beijing took a more muddled tack. On one hand, China abstained from (rather than vetoing) UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which paved the way for UN military intervention against Gaddafi. On the other hand, China refused, at least initially, to recognize the National Transitional Council, the interim government created by anti-Gaddafi opposition forces. 

China tried to have its (moon)cake and eat it too—but here, its wait-and-see approach backfired spectacularly. Because of its belated recognition, the NTC refused to protect Beijing’s significant oil and infrastructure investments, leading to an estimated $20 billion in losses for Chinese companies. Chinese nationals had to be evacuated en masse. And domestically, the decision not to veto was heavily criticized as a compromise of the CCP’s non-interference principles and a kowtow to Western demands. 

China learned its lesson. When the Arab Spring reached Syria, the stakes were, if anything, even higher. In 2010, trade between China and Syria accounted for almost $2.5 billion (with China accounting for nearly 7% of Syria’s total trade volume). Avoiding the ideological complications of the wait-and-see approach it employed in Egypt, China was immediately proactive in its diplomatic efforts to navigate the Syrian crisis—but in a manner that incorporated lessons learned from the Libyan fiasco of barely a month prior. 

Rather than bowing to the interests of the West and refusing to support a fellow authoritarian government, China vetoed military action against the Assad regime in the Security Council—ensuring that Russia, Assad’s longtime patron, would not have to stand alone in the Security Council and granting China a powerful favor to be repaid in the future. 

But just a day after China cast its veto, a delegation from a key Syrian opposition group also visited Beijing at the invitation of the CCP’s foreign ministry. So, by supporting Assad but hedging its bets with opposition forces, China ensured there would be no repetition of the disaster in Libya. Ultimately, China emerged from the Arab Spring with a changed policy—one that still rejected intervention, yet actively engaged with both sides of a conflict to influence events to its benefit.

How will China navigate the ongoing crisis in Iran? 

Now let’s apply the Arab Spring case study to Iran. How will Beijing react if it feels the Islamic Republic is at imminent risk of being felled? Will it provide military or diplomatic support for the Ayatollah? Will it recognize an alternative government if one emerges and, if so, when? Only time will tell, but with the Arab Spring as a roadmap, several assumptions wouldn’t be outside the realm of possibility. 

The first and by far the most probable: China will continue to strive, as far as possible without overcommitting itself, to maintain the status quo and current balance of power—but only to a point, and only if it costs China very little.

The Military and Use of Force

Unlike Russia, China is extremely averse to military intervention in other countries’ internal affairs, especially those outside its immediate neighbors. Military entanglement in Iran wouldn’t just clash with the CCP’s core ideology of non-interventionism and state sovereignty; it would also serve little purpose in achieving China’s long-term goals of stability and economic growth in the Middle East. 

So while Iran may be of particular strategic importance to China, it’s unlikely-nearing-impossible that an ever-pragmatic and self-serving Beijing would commit itself to militarily assisting the Ayatollah in any way, despite calls for more Chinese support from Iranian regime officials this past week. 

This is in line with China’s response (or lack thereof) to the 12-Day War, which was tepid at best. Beijing made no moves to mobilize allies, offer security guarantees to either nation, or even leverage its economic relationships with Israel or Iran to de-escalate the situation. 

That being said, China is still providing the Iranian government with military materiel and support services as part of the two countries’ ongoing arms deals, including the radars and surface-to-air missile systems mentioned above. Iran might even be importing more weapons and military hardware than usual, probably in exchange for further-discounted oil. China, for its part, is happy to sell—but it’s doing so for business, rather than ideological reasons.  

Sure, if China felt there was any real danger to its assets and/or Chinese nationals within Iran, it might send its military to extract as many as possible, just as it did in Libya in 2011. But given the Chinese government’s pragmatic flexibility and willingness to work with whatever faction were to end up in power, it’s entirely unlikely China would use its military against opposition forces just to protect corporate assets.

Diplomatic support for the Ayatollah…or someone else?

The United Nations has been suspiciously silent on the Iranian government’s brutal crackdowns throughout the past two-plus weeks (Gaza, this ain’t). 

Still, were the UN to find its backbone and draft a resolution condemning the Ayatollah, China would almost certainly vote against it in the General Assembly. Likewise, if a resolution were drafted authorizing the use of force to protect Iranian protesters, China would immediately veto it in the Security Council. This wouldn’t just be in line with China’s successful handling of the Syrian uprisings in 2011—it would also serve (at least temporarily) to provide the Iranian government with cover and, hopefully for China, in control of an open Hormuz. 

A veto would also grant China yet another favor from Russia to be repaid later. Given Moscow’s reliance on Iranian technology, particularly drones, for its war in Ukraine, the Putin government would almost certainly veto any action against Iran in the Security Council—even if it meant standing alone against the rest of the world, as it was prepared to do for Syria.

Of course, given President Trump’s contempt for the United Nations, this is nothing more than a thought exercise. At this point in American foreign policy, the notion of Security Council resolutions and multinational coalitions seems almost quaint, and unilateral action is clearly the order of the day.  

Either way, as China learned from its successful response to the 2011 uprising in Egypt and Syria, it pays to be diplomatically proactive—particularly in forging relationships with opposition groups that may eventually come to power. And as of now, the most notable opposition group centers on Reza Pahlavi, the exiled Crown Prince of Iran. 

While Pahlavi has been exceptionally critical of China and its partnership with the Islamic Republic in the past, Beijing is willing to play ball with just about anybody—and it’s a good bet that the CCP has already made overtures to Pahlavi’s camp in one way or another, in addition to other Iranian opposition groups.

Would China really abandon the Ayatollah and recognize an opposition leader, even a highly critical one like Pahlavi? Of course—but it most likely won’t happen until the Ayatollah’s goose is well and truly cooked, and until it tangibly benefits China. Beijing’s appetite for risk is low, and it’ll only switch sides when the danger of remaining behind the Ayatollah is greater than embracing his alternative.

Yes, the CCP may see Pahlavi as a Western puppet. And yes, Iran represents more than just energy security to China; it’s also an unsinkable bastion of anti-American, pro-China influence in the region. But at the end of the day, China is endlessly pragmatic—and it’s nearly impossible to imagine the CCP sacrificing its advantageous status quo just for ideology.

Looking forward

It is, of course, impossible to know what will happen in Iran even tomorrow. Will Trump take out the Ayatollah with an airstrike? Will the regime’s crackdown end the protests? Will international help ever come, and if it does, will it be enough to oust the mullahs after almost 50 years? It’s unclear, to say the least.

What is clear is this: China will likely continue its support of the Islamic Republic, to the extent that it currently does, until a more powerful and cohesive opposition begins consolidating power. Or, until the Ayatollah’s government is no longer able to deliver on its oil commitments, which, for all intents and purposes, is the same thing.

Until that point, history suggests that Beijing will wait and see. China will likely do its best to build some type of relationship with Reza Pahlavi and other opposition figures, even while taking token steps to signal support for the Ayatollah (as long as those steps cost China very little). But the moment it becomes clear that the Ayatollah will be toppled, even that halfhearted support will likely end. 

From Tel Aviv to Tehran, we can only hope that moment comes sooner rather than later.