Ronen Bar: Netanyahu’s convenient scapegoat

Netanyahu’s recent decision to fire Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar — one the Attorney General has ruled is unlawful until his legal review is complete — is scarcely about accountability for the October 7 massacre. 17 months following the devastating intelligence failure that allowed 1200 men, women and children to be massacred and 251 to be taken hostage, his timing reveals his actual rationale behind this facade of his: to silence the man scrutinising his most immediate aides. This is not about national security; it is about self-preservation.

Netanyahu’s public explanation for his attempted firing of Bar rests upon the catastrophic intelligence failure that allowed Hamas to carry out its October 7 slaughter, something that Bar himself admitted, acknowledging that the Shin Bet ‘could have prevented the catastrophic assault if it had acted differently.’ Netanyahu’s claim that he has ‘ongoing distrust’ in Bar’s leadership and handling of the nation’s intelligence agency is, therefore, not entirely devoid of foundation.

The issue staring us in the face, though, is timing: if Bar’s handling of October 7 was the real cause for his dismissal, why did the PM choose to wait 17 months until now? Why now, just as Bar is overseeing an investigation into Netanyahu’s aides that is, frankly, politically explosive, and will leave Israel’s political equilibrium – if it was ‘equal’ before – shaken for a considerable while? It is painfully difficult to escape the conclusion that Netanyahu is far less concerned with accountability for October 7 and more concentrated on neutralising a direct threat to his political survival, particularly when it conveniently surfaces when Netanyahu stands to gain from Bar’s dismissal. The Prime Minister’s refusal, too, to establish a state commission of inquiry into October 7 speaks volumes; if he were genuinely, wholeheartedly committed to matters of accountability for the largest massacre of Jews in a single day since the Holocaust, he would have launched a thorough investigation months ago. Instead, he allowed the dust to settle, just long enough to isolate the Shin Bet from the political fallout of the disaster while protecting his own position.

In February, Attorney General Baharav-Miara ordered a criminal probe into business ties between Netanyahu’s aides and the Qatari government, primarily targeting Eli Feldstein, Netanyahu’s spokesperson who has already been charged with leaking classified IDF documents and faces a possible life term. Feldstein is accused of working for Qatar through an international firm contracted by Doha to feed Israeli journalists pro-Qatar stories during the Israel-Hamas war. The investigation, being overseen both by the police and Shin Bet, threatens Netanyahu’s political standing thusly: if Bar, as the head of the Shin Bet, were to uncover concrete evidence implicating Netanyahu’s aides (or the PM himself) in dealings with Qatar that are potentially compromising, the political reverberations sent through the Israeli political sphere could be cataclysmic.

This would explain why Baharav-Miara flagged a conflict of interest almost immediately when Netanyahu announced his intention to fire Bar, warning in her letter – which coalition leaders believe ‘should be shredded‘ – that the PM could not proceed with Bar’s dismissal ‘until the completion of a clarification of the factual and legal basis that stands at the foundation of your decision.’ Netanyahu, as I submit this article, has recently claimed in opening the probe, she is ‘abusing her authority,’ describing it as ‘dangerous heresy.’

Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer pressured US officials to sideline Adam Boehler after he held direct talks with Hamas; now, Netanyahu applies the same playbook domestically – when the facts become uncomfortable, remove the people uncovering them. This isn’t leadership; as I wrote before concerning Boehler’s stepping-down, it’s damage control. Firing Bar, if the PM is successful, ensures that any findings from the Qatari-ties investigation can be managed or buried, but also sends a message to other officials overseeing politically sensitive investigations: cross Bibi at your own risk.

Bar’s dismissal is not unique, though, instead fitting a broader pattern of Netanyahu’s post-October 7 political realignment. Since Hamas attacked, Netanyahu has steadily removed senior security officials one by one, whose continued presence could threaten his political position: Yoav Gallant, the former Defence Minister from 2022 to 2024, openly criticised the PM’s handling of the judicial overhaul – another article (or fifty) in itself – and security issues. In March 2023, Gallant warned that the reforms to the judicial system Netanyahu proposed posed a threat to Israel’s security, leading Netanyahu to announce his dismissal – though the PM reversed it following mass protests. Harzi Halevi, the IDF Chief of Staff who recently resigned citing his ‘responsibility for the failure of the IDF on October 7,’ was the top military figure at the time of October 7, and while he does bear some operational responsibility, he has resisted political interference in the past in matters of military decisions.

But let’s talk about the legal argument. Israeli law gives Netanyahu the authority to recommend Bar’s dismissal, but the power to follow through is subject to a judicial review. Opposition leader Yair Lapid and several government watchdog groups have already announced plans to petition the High Court if the PM moves any further forward with Bar’s firing, as well as a campaign aimed at pressuring the government to establish a state inquiry into the massacre that was 7 October, 2023.

Legal scholars, too, argue that the PM’s decision is legally vulnerable on two fronts: motivation and timing (both of which we have already mentioned). Professor Barak Medina of the Hebrew University has pointed out that the government’s authority to fire Bar is not absolute, and that the decision must be ‘founded on a sufficient factual basis,’ as he describes it: ‘The fact that a body has the authority to do something, in this case dismiss an official, doesn’t mean it is an absolute power,’ he said, ‘There are limitations on the discretion for executing this power.’

Even if the High Court ultimately decides it doesn’t want to block Bar’s dismissal, the damage to Netanyahu’s credibility has been done: firing a senior security official while he leads an investigation into the PM’s aides is problematic for reasons anyone could guess. The real question if not why Netanyahu is firing Bar – that much is obvious. The real question is how long the PM can continue to evade responsibility for his own failures, at the same time as systematically dismantling Israel’s democratic institutions. The answer may come sooner than the Prime Minister expects.

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