Saudi Arabia on High Alert — Caught between Iran and the US

Over the weekend, Trump surprised the international community by authorising American military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which he described as a “spectacular success”. In retaliation, Khamenei’s government warned the US of “dangerous consequences and far-reaching implications”, although it did not provide further details. Meanwhile, Iran’s complex neighbor across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, remains on high alert. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been urgently consulting with all GCC member states, navigating the strategic pressure of being caught between Washington and Tehran. This article critically evaluates Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward the US and Iran through the lens of defensive realism.

From a historical perspective, the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the US dates back to the formative years of the Kingdom, when American firms played a central role in the establishment of Saudi Aramco. According to Washington, the two nations have long been significant trading partners and have aligned over shared interests in regional security and oil stability. The US maintains a military presence in Riyadh, with missile systems and over 2,000 personnel stationed there. Additionally, Saudi Arabia continues to acquire American military technology, with its most recent procurement reportedly valued at up to 142 billion US dollars. This suggests that Riyadh has historically depended on Washington for regional defense.

Diplomatic relations, however, seem comparatively less robust than the military alliance. Although trade ties have continued to prosper, significant tensions have surfaced over Saudi Arabia’s human rights record and foreign policy decisions. High-profile incidents, such as Obama’s support for the Arab Spring and the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in a particularly violent manner, have drawn attention to the possibility that the US-Saudi partnership rests predominantly on arms and oil interests. Nonetheless, both nations perceive Iran as a serious threat to regional stability, with Riyadh largely aligning itself with American strategic objectives. As a result, cooperation between Washington and Riyadh remains enduring and consistently reinforced by shared security concerns.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has had a gradually deteriorating relationship with Iran — one that shifted from cordiality in the 1960s to disagreements in the 1970s, heightened anger in the 1980s, and outright hostility since the 1990s. The two nations have effectively treated each other as adversaries by backing opposing factions in Yemen’s civil war, conducting sectarian executions, and engaging in frequent rhetorical hostilities. Their rivalry is also underpinned by distinct religious affiliations — approximately 90 per cent of Saudis follow Sunni Islam, while a similar proportion of Iranians adhere to Shia Islam. Both aspire to regional hegemony, though the US has consistently and exclusively supported Saudi Arabia.

In a surprising development, China brokered a reconciliation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, raising questions about Riyadh’s strategic alignment and defense cooperation with the US. However, tangible progress in their bilateral relations remained limited before the outbreak of conflict between Israel and Iran. Thus far, the normalisation process has been largely symbolic, as China positioned itself as a diplomatic mediator without proposing any alternative security framework to rival the existing US-led regional order. Diplomatically, Mohammed bin Salman’s administration has voiced criticism of Israel’s military actions against Iran, yet it has opted to remain uninvolved in the unfolding conflict between the two adversaries.

Following yesterday’s US air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordo, Natanz, and Esfahan, a senior adviser to Khamenei warned of “irreparable consequences” for American forces stationed across the Middle East. In response to the heightened threat, the Trump administration has publicly advocated for regime change in Iran, while issuing advisories urging American citizens in the GCC to refrain from non-essential visits to military installations. As tensions escalate, all US military bases in the GCC remain on high alert, since any Iranian offensive against them would, under the Peninsula Shield Force security agreement, trigger direct Saudi involvement in the conflict.

Nevertheless, due to this mutual defense arrangement, Iran is more likely to target American military forces located outside of GCC countries, aiming to avoid overextension in the event of a Saudi retaliation and to preserve its ongoing normalisation efforts with Riyadh. This remains uncertain, however, given Iran’s view of its nuclear enrichment programme as essential to regime survival, while the US maintains a strong military presence across all GCC member states. At present, Mohammed bin Salman has assumed a leadership role among GCC counterparts, reiterating the importance of regional unity and the need to avoid escalation, signalling Riyadh’s continued commitment to its cautious reconciliation with Tehran.

Another threat Iran has raised following American involvement in the Israel-Iran conflict is the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil shipments pass daily. Such a move would pose a direct risk to Saudi Arabia and, by extension, its fellow GCC states, as a significant portion of Aramco’s oil exports originates from Dammam, a city situated inland from the Strait. Paradoxically, such an action would also obstruct Iran’s own oil exports, on which the regime is heavily dependent, given that over 95 per cent of Iranian crude is shipped from Kharg, a port similarly located beyond Hormuz.

As a result, Saudi Arabia is now understandably cautious due to legitimate concerns, as 42 per cent of the kingdom’s GDP derives from oil revenues, and Tehran’s threats directly endanger its energy security. Should Iran attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia’s heavily public sector-dominated economy may struggle to fund the salaries of the 30 per cent of citizens employed by the state, potentially sparking domestic unrest. While Aramco retains the option to export crude from ports in Jeddah or Yanbu, doing so would require extended land transport and longer maritime routes, thereby incurring additional costs and reducing revenue from its principal export market, the US.

In summary, Saudi Arabia is currently uneasy, positioned between the US and Israel in their conflict with Iran. The government of Mohammed bin Salman remains reliant on American military support and is committed to maintaining US-Saudi defense cooperation. Simultaneously, the crown prince has engaged in cautious diplomatic overtures with his Iranian counterparts. Although this rapprochement remains largely symbolic to date, Riyadh is keen to preserve these tentative gains. Nonetheless, the Ayatollah’s veiled threats to Saudi Arabia’s regional order and energy security carry significant political weight, as they risk undermining domestic stability.