Secrecy, Democracy, and Loyalty

The firing of Ronen Bar reminds me of a fascinating book I read around 1986: Secrecy and Democracy – the CIA in Transition – by Admiral Stansfield Turner, who ran it from 1977-1981. In America, many people think they have the right to know everything. That is certainly true of Congressmen/ women, Senators, Governors, and Pentagon staff.

In Israel we have three “Secret Services”: AMAN- IDF Intelligence, the Shabak, and the Mossad. The less secret they are, the less effective they are. Still, there are many factors that challenge the concept of secrecy.

After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, a State Commission of Enquiry was created. One of its conclusions was that critical information re the possibility of an attack on Israel was not shared. So, suddenly the flood doors opened, and information flooded the system – certainly as far as AMAN was concerned. One problem was that junior Intel officers had the authority to send Intel information to a body in AMAN, that would then distribute it “far and wide”. On the one hand, you could say that it is good that there is no censorship of mid or high level officers in the original unit, so Intel is shared. Unfortunately, some of these junior officers unwittingly distribute either fake news, or partial information which mislead the reader. In some cases, young officers who wanted promotion, put out information that was know for years, thereby flooding the system. (In the monthly summary, the officer could say he fed the system (say) 49 Intel reports – when maybe 5 were actually new.) Spoiler: after the next war, the commission of inquiry will also discover that Intel units/ individuals gave warnings that were not heeded. Every general in charge of AMAN prays that a war will not break out on his watch.

Stansfield Turner talked about Intel agencies in the US not cooperating due to considerations related to prestige. That phenomenon may occur in Israel, but to a much lesser degree. There ARE types of information that the agencies here do not want to share, which is problematic but not critical. I am not at liberty to give examples.

The Mossad has to stay tight lipped, due to the nature of its activity, which is conducted abroad, and inherently illegal in those countries. Obviously, they share Intel, but often it is only the bottom line, protecting sources and techniques. And that condensed Intel may only go to senior Intel and Operation officers for whom the information is relevant – called “need to know.”

The Shabak works in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Operations in the West Bank are conducted according to either Marshal Law, Jordanian Law, or Israeli law. In short, they do whatever they want. Operations in Israel are performed according to Israeli Law only, so Shabbak has a battalion of lawyers to make sure they adhere to the law, and obtain judges’ approval of anything that “strays” from the law – like wiretapping. There are special judges with security clearance with whom they work.

Now the political aspect. The head of AMAN, and the Chief-of -staff are under the jurisdiction of the Defense Minister. The Defense Minister chooses the Chief-of-Staff, with the approval of the PM. The Chief-of -Staff appoints the head of AMAN, but only with the approval of the Defense Minister (who approves all senior officer ranks and positions.) The heads of Mossad and Shabak are appointed by the PM, and are accountable to him first, and God second. (Regardless of who is PM.)

Similar to Intelligence Committees and sub committees in the Senate and Congress in the US, Israel has a Security Cabinet, full cabinet with coalition members, and sub committees. Israel has a National Security Council which is an advisory body, with no operation authority. Regular cabinet members, and even generals in the IDF General Staff are compartmentalized in some cases.

From 1983 (Shamir) until today, apart from Ehud Almert, all Israel’s PMs have had a security background, including two chiefs-of-staff and a general. (Even the average Israeli who served in the army thinks he understands a lot about security.)

In AMAN, the Shabak and Mossad, everybody has to have security clearance, at a level pertaining to his role. That means that even gardeners in the Mossad have to have minimal security clearance. You do not want to go through the process of attaining a high level of clearance. Shabak is responsible for all security clearance in the end.

Now the reason Turner’s book came back to me. The regular Senators and Congressman do not have security clearance. Yet THEY want to know, their assistants want to know, and perhaps even their spouses. Turner gave many examples of leaked secrets by these bodies. Being without a security background, many don’t even realize the severity of their leaks. In Israel, senior security people have secure cell phones, which they use at home – so their partners, who often hear their conversations, have to have a certain security clearance.

In Trump’s first period as president, he leaked a significant secret to TV cameras about Israeli Intel – we were not impressed. Presidents of the US do not have to attain any level of security clearance. If Trump wanted security clearance by the Shabak, he would have a problem. The same could be said of many ministers in the current coalition. In Israel, if Shabak declines a person security clearance, they give no reason, and it cannot be appealed.

Trump shot from the hip when he leaked that information. When PM Netanyahu put on a “show and tell” of the Iranian Nuclear Weapons archives on TV, for all the world to see, he was deliberately exposing secrets for political gain. On later occasions, many details of the way they were stolen became public knowledge. People who understand the implications of sharing those secrets with the world were furious, justifiably!

So in general. PMs in Israel have close relationships with the heads of Mossad, Shabak, and AMAN (who can be summoned by the PM and ministers without need for approval by the Chief-of- Staff.) Mutual trust is a must!

These days, the Shabak is investigating Netanyahu’s most inner circle in the PM’s Office. Money from Qatar seems to have found its way to some of them, or at least some had a hand in arranging money for one or two of them. The police are investigating together with Shabak for two reasons: one is that money laundering may be involved, which is criminal – Shabak does not deal with that kind of crime. The main reason for police involvement is obtaining search warrants, and arrest warrants -while the interest of Shabak is the connection of the PM’s inner circle to a hostile state – Qatar.

Eli Feldstein started working for Netanyahu as a reservist officer, and as such had to attain clearance – he would be party to many conversations that contained secrets. Feldstein was DENIED security clearance, yet he continued to work in the PM’s inner circle as a media advisor. First, he was arrested for leaking secrets to a German newspaper. Recently, his connection to Qatar, or at least Qatari money, was exposed. The investigation is being run by Shabak due to the importance of the security element. Ronen Bar runs the Shabak – for now. Journalists in the know report under restriction of a gaga order, although they are allowed to provide their opinion that Netanyahu is aware of everything happening in his inner circle. If Shabak determines that TREASON was committed, and Netanyahu knew about it (even if he was only a passive partner), his fate is sealed.

So how can Netanyha “trust” Bar, the man who is investigating his inner circle (for now), and who may investigate him? Of course, Gali Maharav Miara, the Attorney General, had to give Ronen Bar the green light to initiate the investigation. So how can Netanyahu trust her? If Bar concludes that Netanyau had an active hand in treason, she will suspend him as PM in a New York minute.

Last night, the government voted to fire Bar. On Sunday, Netanyahu and his coalition will vote to fire the Attorney General. Today the High Court of Justice has been petitioned to determine their fate. Re Bar, the PM has the legal right to fire the Head of Shabak. The Court will be asked to decide if the timing is due to a conflict of interest, relating to the investigation of his inner circle, which will lead to Netanyahu being “questioned”, if not initially investigated under warning.

Analysts think that until Bar or Miara end their careers, whenever that may be, the PM and coalition will compartmentalize them, not invite them to critical meetings, and reject apriori any of their evaluations, suggestions, or instructions (in the case of the Attorney General.)

Israel has a harsh few weeks to look forward to. The regular uncertainly will be compounded by political, legal, and operational uncertainty. The top judges, Bar, and Miara will be under fire, not by the Houtis – and a sealed room will not protect them.