Will the Ultra-Orthodox and the Messianic Right Find a Common Enemy?

The shattered windows at the home of the Deputy Supreme Court Chief Justice are more than just an ugly act of vandalism. They should sound a much deeper alarm. They likely signal a dangerous new phase in the evolution of political-religious violence emerging from the radical fringes of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) society, a brand of violence that is no longer content with mere protest, but seeks to intimidate, threaten, and undermine the authority of state institutions.

The danger does not stop there. The truly ominous scenario is the possibility that radical Haredi violence will converge, even if not formally or structurally, with the operational methods of the radical messianic right. This is particularly plausible if the next government is perceived as center-left and attempts to pass a meaningful Haredi military conscription law. In such a scenario, Haredi extremists on one side and nationalist-messianic extremists on the other could find themselves on the same side of the barricades, facing off against the state.

For decades, the concept of “Jewish terrorism” was primarily associated with radical groups within the religious-nationalist camp, specifically elements operating out of the occupied West Bank settlements. There, land, messianism, and extreme nationalism fused into a worldview that views the state as a legitimate tool only as long as it serves their goals. When the state restricts, evacuates, arrests, or prosecutes, it becomes, in the eyes of these elements, the enemy.

Yet alongside this phenomenon, another equally disturbing arena is developing within the margins of Haredi society. For years, many tended to dismiss radical Haredi violence as localized religious zealotry, unruly protests, or isolated disturbances. But when violence is directed at judges, law enforcement, public institutions, and symbols of governance, it becomes far harder to brush aside as a marginal outburst.

A significant portion of Haredi society views the secular state as a hostile entity lacking true legitimacy. To them, the courts, the police, planning authorities, the education system, and the IDF are not public institutions, but rather arms of a world that threatens the Haredi way of life. The conscription issue is perceived as an existential threat to Haredi society in its current form. Therefore, a meaningful draft law is viewed not as a government reform, but as a declaration of war.

There are precedents for this. Groups like the Jerusalem Faction (HaPeleg HaYerushalmi) or the Sikrikim crossed the boundaries of legitimate protest long ago. They have targeted women they deemed immodest, business owners, public institutions, other Haredi Jews suspected of cooperating with mainstream Israeli society, and even participants in state ceremonies. Their method has been clear: not just to convince, but to intimidate; not just to protest, but to punish.

For a long time, these incidents could be viewed as localized, even bizarre phenomena. But that would be a mistake. When an organized group uses threats, pressure, and violence to enforce a religious worldview and undermine state authority, it is, by definition, political-religious violence.

This phenomenon feeds on a deep-seated siege mentality. In the eyes of extremist Haredi factions, issues like conscription, core curriculum education, or government oversight are not civil disputes, but rather decrees (gzerot) threatening the Torah world. When a political dispute is framed as a battle for religious survival, justifying radical measures becomes all too easy.

This is where the most explosive scenario comes into play: an opposition victory in the upcoming elections and the formation of a government that attempts to legislate a serious Haredi draft law. To broad sectors of the Haredi public, and certainly to its more radical factions, such a law could be perceived as a catastrophic historical decree.

The danger lies not in another wave of demonstrations or road blockages. A strict draft law could spark violent reactions against state institutions and their representatives. What begins as a protest could devolve into campaigns of intimidation, targeted assaults, and attempts to deter judges, police officers, and decision-makers from fulfilling their duties. In such a scenario, Israel could face, for the first time, a phenomenon of Jewish terrorism originating from the radical fringes of Haredi society.

Despite the fundamental ideological divide between the messianic-nationalist right, which views the state as “the first flowering of our redemption, “and the Haredim, who largely view it as a hostile secular entity to be lived apart from, their tactical common ground strengthens in moments of crisis. Both share a willingness to challenge the state’s authority when it fails to align with their religious or messianic worldview.

This is particularly evident in their attitude toward the judicial system. While Haredi extremists view the courts as a secular institution seeking to impose alien values upon them, the messianic right views them as an obstacle to settlement expansion and the realization of the Greater Israel vision. In both cases, the legitimacy of state institutions is rejected whenever they fail to serve a supreme religious or ideological vision.

If a future government is perceived as both anti-Haredi and anti-settlement, the convergence of these two camps could become exceptionally dangerous. There would be no need for a formal alliance or a joint headquarters. It would be enough for both sides to identify the same institutions as the enemy and employ similar tactics of disruption, intimidation, and civil disobedience.

The radical right brings with it cumulative experience in confronting the state: resisting evacuations, assaults, “price tag” actions, and clashes with security forces. If a future government is perceived as jeopardizing the settlement enterprise, there is no guarantee the struggle will remain confined to the West Bank. Those who have grown accustomed to viewing the state as a temporary enemy may well direct that same perception toward its institutions inside Israel proper.

Here lies the dangerous alignment. Haredi extremists will oppose the state in the name of defending the Torah world. Nationalist extremists will oppose the state in the name of defending the Land of Israel. The slogans will differ, the rabbis will differ, and the objectives will differ, but the enemy will be one and the same: the institutions of the democratic state.

The problem is not only that the state has failed to curb the violence of extremist settlers in the West Bank. Under the current government, this violence often receives direct or indirect political backing, while law enforcement and the IDF frequently demonstrate a limited willingness to confront it. The result is that certain extremist groups operate with a growing sense of impunity, fueled by the belief that they serve a higher cause and are therefore exempt from the rules that apply to everyone else.

For years, a reality has developed in the West Bank where violence directed against Palestinians rarely carries a significant price tag. In doing so, the state has, directly or indirectly, contributed to the rise of a radical force that is steadily gaining confidence, experience, and autonomous operational capabilities. History teaches that such forces do not necessarily remain focused on their original targets. Israel may discover that it has helped birth a political “Frankenstein’s monster,” a force accustomed to operating outside the boundaries of the law, which may one day turn those very same methods against the state itself.

Israel has never before had to grapple with a situation in which two such hubs of resistance operate simultaneously against state authority.

If the shattered windows at the home of a senior Supreme Court judge are a sign of things to come, they must not be dismissed as an isolated incident. They may well be a warning of a far broader process: the shift of political-religious violence from the fringes into the center of the battle over the character of the state.

The danger is that two distinct forms of extremism, born out of opposing ideological universes, will discover they share a common enemy: the institutions of the democratic state. On the day that radical Haredim and radical messianists turn their fury against the state itself, the fight will no longer be over conscription, settlements, or the judiciary. It will be over the state’s very monopoly on authority and force, a stage from which many societies have deteriorated into violent internal conflict.

Is this Netanyahu’s Plan B if he loses the upcoming elections?

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