Strategic Politics: What Germany Must Learn from Israel’s Fragmentation

When Germany faced a political crisis in 1966, the country’s two largest parties—CDU and SPD—set aside their differences and formed a grand coalition. The move was far from ideal, but it prevented a political vacuum that could have destabilized the country. Decades later, in 2005, Angela Merkel confronted a similar scenario and again, rather than risking prolonged instability, CDU and SPD joined forces to ensure governance. In Germany, political engagement is not seen as a concession but as a mechanism for ensuring stability.

The February 23, 2025, elections reaffirmed this approach. While the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) gained 20.5% of the vote, mainstream parties remained steadfast in blocking extremist influence. CDU leader Friedrich Merz ruled out any coalition with AfD, while the Social Democratic Party (SPD), despite a historic drop in support, is once again expected to play a stabilizing role in government. This underscores Germany’s unwavering commitment to systemic resilience over short-term political calculations.

Germany’s coalition model is not accidental; it is rooted in a strategic culture of governance. The CDU, having secured 28.5% of the vote, continues to prioritize economic pragmatism and European cohesion. Without a clear majority, coalition-building is not just a preference but a necessity. The SPD, having slumped to 16.4%, understands that remaining in government—even as a secondary partner—is preferable to risking governance falling into the hands of disruptive forces. Unlike opposition parties elsewhere, SPD views participation in government not as a compromise but as a proactive strategy to shape policy.

AfD’s rise is symptomatic of a broader trend of nationalist populism across Europe. Economic hardship, immigration concerns, and deepening distrust in political institutions have fueled the party’s support, particularly in eastern Germany and among working-class voters. Similar patterns can be observed in France, Italy, and other European nations where disillusionment with traditional parties has led to the rise of radical alternatives. Yet Germany remains distinct: mainstream parties maintain a disciplined strategy of political containment, ensuring that extremist forces remain outside the governing structure.

However, history has shown that exclusion alone is not a sustainable long-term strategy. Israel offers a cautionary tale. For years, its political opposition has refused to engage in coalition-building, believing that abstaining from governance would weaken Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc. In practice, this approach has backfired: it has reinforced the dominance of the far-right by sidelining moderates from key decision-making processes. Over time, opposition leaders who chose not to participate in government found themselves increasingly irrelevant, allowing Netanyahu’s coalition to consolidate power and push policies that further deepened political polarization.

A German politician examining Israeli politics today might well raise an eyebrow at this self-defeating strategy. When political parties refuse to enter coalitions, they do not punish their rivals—they punish their own countries. Politics, after all, is the art of the possible. Those who stay out of the political game cannot influence its rules.

To avoid repeating Israel’s mistakes, German leaders must adopt a twofold approach. First, they must introduce tangible policy adjustments that address the concerns driving voters toward AfD. Economic security, controlled immigration policies, and restoring faith in democratic institutions must become central to the governing agenda. Second, CDU and SPD must refine their coalition-building strategies—not merely as a reactive measure to keep extremists out of power but as a forward-thinking approach that strengthens public trust in mainstream governance.

In doing so, Germany can avoid the pitfalls that have weakened opposition movements elsewhere. The Israeli experience illustrates clearly that political legitimacy must be actively renewed. When moderate parties fail to present compelling, adaptable alternatives, they risk eroding public confidence in democratic institutions. For Germany, this means ensuring that CDU and SPD remain responsive to shifting voter concerns rather than relying on outdated political formulas. If they fail to do so, they may find themselves facing the same crisis of legitimacy unfolding in Israel—watching from the sidelines as the political landscape shifts in favor of the extremes.

Despite internal political shifts, Germany’s relationship with Israel remains steadfast. Both CDU and SPD have maintained strong diplomatic and strategic ties with Israel, ensuring that long-term interests take precedence over fleeting political trends. This institutional consistency is key to Germany’s foreign policy approach—alliances are built to endure beyond election cycles.

Germany’s history demonstrates clearly that political power is not wielded from the sidelines. Engagement, not abstention, preserves stability. The choice is strategic, not merely ideological. Germany’s future stability depends on proactive governance that prioritizes resilience over complacency.