Symbolic Alliances vs. Operational Utility in Policy

Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has confronted a strategic landscape defined by encirclement, hostility, and diplomatic marginalization. In response to these conditions, Israeli strategists adopted the Periphery Doctrine during the Cold War, seeking alliances with non-Arab, geopolitically peripheral states such as Iran under the Shah, Turkey under secular Kemalist leadership, and Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie, as all of these countries also feared the threat of Arab radicalism. This doctrine, driven by necessity rather than ideological coherence, represented a structurally reactive strategy aimed at circumventing regional isolation by leveraging asymmetrical alignments.

This article re-evaluates the Periphery Doctrine as both a historically contingent maneuver and a conceptual constraint, then interrogates its legacy through the lens of Israel’s post-2020 normalization efforts. It argues for the replacement of legacy alliance typologies with a functionally grounded strategic model attuned to the complexities of the contemporary multipolar order.

Structural Conditions of the Periphery Doctrine

The Periphery Doctrine emerged under conditions of Arab rejectionism and superpower bifurcation. Devoid of meaningful regional alliances and constrained by its contested legitimacy in the Arab world, Israel sought strategic depth through alignments based not on cultural or geographic affinity, but on regime-level convergence of interests. Iran provided crucial energy access and intelligence collaboration; Turkey offered military-industrial cooperation and access to NATO-adjacent systems; Ethiopia controlled vital Red Sea corridors.

However, the structural fragility of these alliances became evident in their reliance on elite regimes rather than institutionalized national interests. The 1979 Iranian Revolution severed bilateral ties overnight, dismantling one of Israel’s most vital regional linkages. Turkey’s strategic reorientation under the AKP toward Islamist populism and neo-Ottoman regionalism eroded bilateral trust. Ethiopia’s descent into internal fragmentation following the Derg coup further illustrated the vulnerability of personalized strategic arrangements. These developments underscore a key limitation: alliances rooted in regime survival rather than durable national interests are acutely exposed to internal political volatility.

The Abraham Accords and Doctrinal Repetition

The 2020 Abraham Accords have been widely interpreted as a paradigm shift: normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan suggested a reversal of Israel’s regional isolation. However, beneath their diplomatic novelty lies a structural continuity with the Periphery Doctrine. These agreements are less a break from than a reframing of past doctrine: they remain elite-brokered, U.S.-mediated alignments with peripheral Arab actors that share common threat perceptions vis-à-vis Iran.

Unlike the Cold War periphery, however, the current moment is defined by higher fluidity in alignments, reduced U.S. regional commitment, and more diffuse forms of threat, including non-state actors and cyber warfare. Moreover, the absence of Saudi Arabia and the fragility of Sudan’s normalization, exacerbated by its internal instability, illustrate the limits of top-down diplomatic engineering. The October 2023 Gaza conflict reanimated popular Arab solidarity, revealing that normalization initiatives remain vulnerable to shifts in public sentiment and regional escalations. Consequently, these accords must not be misconstrued as a comprehensive realignment; rather, they represent discrete tactical openings that require deep strategic cultivation.

Strategic Diffusion and the Crisis of Coherence

In the absence of a coherent post-Periphery doctrine, Israeli foreign policy has veered toward strategic diffusion—an uncoordinated expansion of diplomatic ties with disparate, often unstable, peripheral states. Engagements with actors such as Sudan, Kosovo, Somaliland, and post-transition Ethiopia, while offering symbolic value, often lack substantive strategic depth. This proliferation of low-density alignments risks diluting Israel’s diplomatic capital and overextending its policy bandwidth.

Moreover, the fixation on formal recognition—often treated as an end in itself—diverts attention from the cultivation of operationally meaningful relationships. This diffusion weakens Israel’s ability to focus on high-value partnerships capable of addressing evolving threat vectors such as asymmetric warfare, energy resilience, and technological sovereignty.

Toward Functional Alignment: A Post-Doctrinal Strategy

To navigate a Middle East increasingly defined by multipolarity, ideological fluidity, and great-power competition, Israel must abandon categorical alliance frameworks in favor of a strategic model grounded in functional alignment. This model emphasizes modular, goal-specific cooperation tailored to sectoral complementarities rather than regime typologies or geopolitical nostalgia.

Key domains for functional alignment include:

1. Security Coordination with Egypt: Enhancing counterterrorism cooperation in Sinai through joint border surveillance technologies, drone operations, and intelligence fusion cells, coupled with sustained military-to-military engagement.
2. Resource Diplomacy with Jordan: Expanding energy-water exchange frameworks (e.g., solar-for-water projects), addressing refugee management, and co-developing agricultural technology to bolster interdependence and regime stability.
3. Eastern Mediterranean Integration: Deepening trilateral energy and maritime security cooperation with Greece and Cyprus through shared infrastructure, joint naval exercises, and environmental risk mitigation strategies.
4. Indo-Pacific Strategic Partnerships: Scaling defense-technology collaboration with India and South Korea, especially in domains like drone warfare, missile defense, and AI-based surveillance, while fostering innovation ecosystems through academic and industrial linkages.
5. Discreet Gulf Engagements: Building covert, trust-based cooperation with Gulf States on cybersecurity, counter-financing of extremism, and coordinated responses to Iranian proxy networks, eschewing overt political deals in favor of resilient functional ties.

Ethical Pragmatism and Strategic Realism

A functionally aligned strategy does not entail ethical relativism. Rather, it requires a mature separation between value projection and operational necessity. Israel must uphold democratic norms domestically and diplomatically while recognizing that selective engagement with illiberal regimes may be instrumental for achieving specific security or economic goals. This form of ethical pragmatism allows Israel to pursue its interests without subordinating them to the illusions of ideological purity or legacy paradigms.

Conclusion: Toward Strategic Granularity

Israel stands at a strategic inflection point. The Periphery Doctrine, once a necessity, has become an intellectual constraint. In its place, Israel requires strategic granularity: the capacity to disaggregate its interests, target functional partnerships, and dynamically calibrate its diplomacy to a rapidly evolving international order. Moving from symbolic alliances to operational synergies will enhance resilience, reduce exposure to regime volatility, and reposition Israel as a nimble actor within the increasingly networked architecture of global and regional power.

In short, the future of Israeli foreign policy lies not in expanding recognition per se, but in refining the logic of engagement. Strategic success in the 21st century will be defined not by who one aligns with, but by what those alignments are structured to achieve.