Syria: Better the devil we don’t know

The troubles of the Iranian axis are coming in waves. The rapid advance of jihadist rebel forces in Syria, which captured the important city of Aleppo and continue to move southward towards Hama, represents another blow to the axis of evil in the Middle East. The regional network of operatives, led by Iran, has suffered a series of strikes in recent months, inflicted by Israel in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and even within Iran itself. Now, another front, which is of critical geographic and strategic importance to Iran— serving as a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea, a front against Israel, and a vital space for rebuilding Hezbollah’s military power in Lebanon—is threatened. It appears that the blows Israel has dealt to the Iranian axis are causing tremors and reverberations throughout the region, and it is clear that they are also connected to the timing of the rebel offensive.

Contrary to the fears about the changes in Syria, which are being spread by the media and leaked from nightly cabinet meetings since the rebel attack, the opportunities it presents, from the perspective of Israel’s strategic interests, overshadow the risks.

The developments in Syria have significant potential to draw Iran and Hezbollah in, as they are likely to invest economic and military resources in an effort to save Assad’s regime and preserve Syria as the only corridor to Lebanon. It is probable that the Assad regime, Iran, and Hezbollah, in coordination with Russia—which is also “heavily invested” in Syria—will now organize to repel the rebel offensive. The ongoing civil war in the country may last a long time.

During the years when ISIS controlled territories in Iraq, the Iranian land route from Iran to Syria was blocked. Now, a similar blockage is expected to affect the land routes from Syria to Lebanon, while Israel will have more freedom of action in dealing with weapon air deliveries through Syria. Assad’s dependence on Iran and Hezbollah for his survival will deepen, but as he fights for his life, he will be even more cautious about getting entangled with Israel, with whom he has already refused to confront in recent years.

In this context, the chances of the recent agreement in Lebanon to restrain Hezbollah in the long term are increasing, as the process of its military recovery, after the war with Israel, will be slowed, and its residual capabilities may be redirected to the Syrian civil war. At the same time, Iran’s appetite for continuing cycles of threats and blows with Israel is expected to wane further, after Israel’s effective strikes within its territory in October, which have already cooled its enthusiasm.

As the entire axis weakens, and its updated priorities focus on Syria, Hamas in Gaza is pushed to the bottom of the list, after the connection between Gaza and Lebanon has already been severed. Israel must take advantage of Hamas’s weakness and its deepening isolation to fulfill its supreme commitment, which stands at the top of the national priority list: to bring back the hostages as part of a deal.

In light of the clear advantages to Israel presented by the developments in Syria, some view Assad’s regime as the “lesser evil” and argue that Israel would be better off with “the devil we know.” According to this view, Assad is a figure with whom Israel can engage in deterrence dialogue (allowing air force freedom of action), he suppresses the Islamist forces that are far from being “Zionist-friendly,” and he maintains a certain degree of stability in Syria and control over weapons, especially unconventional ones, within its territory.

We disagree. Assad, who massacred half a million of Syria’s citizens and used chemical weapons against them, is not exactly preserving stability in the country. He is a central figure in the axis that poses the most significant strategic threat to Israel, and most of Hezbollah’s weapons have come from his production lines, his warehouses, or from Iran through Syrian territory. The ties between the Alawite regime in Syria and the mullah regime in Tehran are deep, and all the efforts by Israel, pragmatic Arab countries, and Western powers over decades to distance Syria from Iran have been in vain.

On the other hand, the many Sunni rebel groups in Syria are not expected to direct their weapons toward Israel, certainly not in the immediate or medium term. Long before confronting the Jewish state, they have a long-standing blood feud with Assad, Iran, and Hezbollah, and also among themselves. Most importantly, unlike Iran and Assad’s regime, the rebels do not have a nuclear program, ballistic missiles, or advanced weapons factories, nor do they have global or regional powers behind them willing to invest billions in them.

Some fear that the rebels will seize chemical weapons materials left in Syria. It is important to understand that most of the chemical weapons stocks were destroyed or removed from Syria in 2013, and the rebels’ ability to take control of the complex preparation and activation processes will likely be limited. In any case, Israel has enjoyed freedom of action over the past decade and has demonstrated the ability to eliminate any strategic threat from Syria.

It seems that, under the current circumstances, and with the necessary caution, Israel would prefer “the devil we don’t know.” This, as long as it leads to the weakening of Iran and the Shiite axis in Syria and beyond, which would mean a dramatic and positive shift for Israel in the regional balance of power. In this context, it is impossible not to recall the famous statement by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, may his memory be blessed, about the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years: “I wished success to both sides.”

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The above was coauthored by Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Udi Evental. He is a strategy and policy planning expert at MIND ISRAEL.