The Fantasy of Defeat: An Interview With Hillel Cohen

“The point is that there is no political will on both sides to end the conflict,” claims Israeli historian Hillel Cohen when talking about a possible resolution to the current state of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Cohen is well known for his scholarship regarding the relationship between Zionism and the Palestinian Arabs during and after the British Mandate. Army of Shadows, one of Cohen’s most critically acclaimed books, provides a nuanced and balanced perspective in describing the multitude of reasons why some Palestinian Arabs collaborated with the Zionists during the British Mandate. 1929, another one of Cohen’s popular books, uniquely describes the violent, pivotal events between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs during August of 1929 and the motivations that led to it. Recently, I had the opportunity to interview Cohen over Zoom. In this interview, Cohen not only continues to provide a remarkably balanced analysis of Arab-Israeli relations, but specifically offers indispensable insight on the emergence of Palestinian identity, Israeli hostility to Palestinian identity, and the collective fantasies that aid in perpetuating the conflict as a whole. 

Richard McDaniel (RM): What is the most common misconception about the Arab-Israeli conflict that you’d like to dispel?

Hillel Cohen (HC): I think that different people have different misconceptions. For many Israelis–I wouldn’t even call it a misconception, but for Israelis, or Zionists, or Israeli Jews, it is very difficult to accept the idea that Zionism–or the Zionist project–really harmed the Palestinians, and that they have a level of responsibility for that. Actually, when I say it, for example in public lectures, many times people from the audience start to argue with me [and ask]: “How come? We all know that [the Palestinians] have better hospitals and infrastructure than other Arabs?” Or, [they might say]: “To be under Israeli control is much better for them than to be under a Syrian or Iraqi state.” For the Palestinians, what I see is that, for many of them, it is very difficult to accept why the Jews came to the land of Israel–first of all, that the Jews have strong linkage or feeling towards this place, both historical and religious attachment, and that the basic aim or goal of Zionism was not to expel the Arabs or to take their land, but rather to save Jewish lives and to create a safe haven for Jews. 

RM: In The Iron Cage, Rashid Khalidi writes that, in 1922, “many of the Arabs of Palestine were already coming to think of themselves in national terms as a people.” Doesn’t your book Army of Shadows describe how a large proportion of the Palestinian Arab population elevated individual and familial identity over national identity under the British Mandate? When did a unified Palestinian nationalism take preeminence?

HC: This is a good question. You know, we speak about a process. We don’t speak about a dichotomy between “this day there is nationalism” and “yesterday there was no [nationalism].” So, when we try to analyze this process, we can start from the post-First World War years–this is what Khalidi does, and rightly so–and speak about a Palestinian national movement and the emergence of Palestinianess. After 1922 or 1921, Palestine for the first time had clear borders, where before it didn’t. When you have clear borders and a concrete political unit, and you have a national movement, the national idea spreads more and more. The task of the nascest [Palestinian] national movement was to instill national norms and national ideas among the population, and this is a process. In 1922, many saw themselves as Palestinian Arabs, but the questions were: What does it mean and what are the duties or the rights that derive from [this identity]? We can see that this process continued during the 1920’s and 1930’s. When we study the [Arab] revolt of 1936, one cannot ignore that most of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine participated in one way or another. I mean, it can be by participating in a strike, or rather aiding the rebels, or participating in the armed struggle. Still, of course, there were people who didn’t feel committed or attached to the national idea: They gave priority to other identities, or they gave priorities to their self-interest. You can see it in every nation, of course. So, you could see people in the resistance and people who weren’t. There are many different kinds of reactions to a certain political moment. 

RM: That makes complete sense. So, you’re saying that Palestinian nationalism gradually came into existence? There wasn’t a period where Palestinian nationalism really took preeminence? 

HC: Some people argue that [Palestinian nationalism] only came about after the Nakba of 1948. Some people say “no,” and say that [Palestinian nationalism] came only after the establishment of Fatah or the PLO in the late 1950’s or early 1960’s. But, this is all the same process. In this period that we’re talking about–late Ottoman period, early Mandate, during the Mandate–the Jews saw or witnessed the consolidation of the Palestinian people, and they said: “This is not a real people. They were not a people 10 years ago. Why should we consider them as a people?” And until now–I mean part of Israeli policy in a way is based on the assumption that the very process of the emergence of the Palestinian people actually can be reversed: “If they were not a people 100 years ago, they can not be a people again now.” This is the root of the idea of dividing between Gaza and the West Bank and dividing the Palestinians of the West Bank among themselves and between them and the Jerusalemites. The political logic is that if they are not seen as a nation, they do not deserve the right of self-determination or a state. Sure enough, the mirror image is the negation of the concept of “the Jewish people” by the Palestinians, [such as] in the PLO charter but not only that.

RM: What were the most important fissures that the Zionists successfully exploited and deepend in Palestinian Arab society under the British Mandate?

HC: First of all, the Palestinian national movement was under unique circumstances–if you compare it to the Syrian, the Iraqi, the Egyptian [national movements]–because Palestinians had, and they still have, a competing national movement in their land. The very same land is disputed by two national movements or by two peoples. This made the Zionists try to prevent the consolidation of Palestinian nationalism. So, I don’t know if we can speak about successes. I mean, at the local level or at the tactical level, there were many successes. But, if you look at the process as a whole until now, it was not a success. I mean, Palestinian nationality–even a Palestinian state is recognized by most of the states, as you can see by the UN resolutions. But, still some people believe that it can be broken, or reversed. Take, for example, the Israeli idea of giving responsibility over Gaza not to an official Palestinian body, but rather to extended families. [Some Israelis] don’t recognize the Palestinian authority, and [some Israelis] don’t recognize Palestinian nationalism. They are aware of the importance of family ties in Palestinian political structure and identity. So, they believe [that] “families” or “hamules” can replace the national movement (Hamas included) and rule Gaza. Some people promote the same idea in regard to the West Bank: To create the emirate of Nablus, the emirate of Jenin, and so on instead of one united Palestine. This is why some Israelis even wouldn’t use the terms “Palestinian” or “the Palestinian people,” but rather [call them] the Arabs of the Land of Israel.

RM: Do you think that will actually happen? Do you think that Netanyahu will try to give responsibility for Gaza and the West Bank to extended families and further divide the Arab population?

HC: I don’t know if he would try, and I don’t believe [that] this fantasy can be realized, though history tells us that some fantasies–Zionism included–have materialized. 

RM: If the Husseini faction, the Palestinian nationalist press, and the religious establishment didn’t instigate division between the Arabs and the Jews, do you believe that there would have been peace between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs under the British Mandate? 

HC: No, I don’t think that the conflict is only because of the Arab reaction. The problem was Jewish immigration to Palestine. I mean, the native Jewish communities were welcomed by the Palestinian Arab national movement, and they were invited to be part of the new nation. But, the main question for the Jews at that time was, as it was called then, the Jewish question of Europe. Namely, the rejection and the persecution of Jews in Europe. So even if the Jews of Palestine could have lived in peace with the Arabs, there was no viable solution to the Jewish communities in antisemitic Europe. I mean, [there were] millions and millions of Jews in Europe between two world wars, between pogroms and the Holocaust, and they were in need of a safe haven. The main option since the mid-1920s was Palestine. Now, you have to remember–most people do not remember it, but if we take the total number of Palestinian Arabs in 1918, the number of Palestinian Arabs after the war was around 600,000.  The number of Jews in the world was 12,000,000. So, you have 20 times more Jews than Palestinian Arabs. Today, they have equal numbers. This is a different story. But, then it was this 1 to 20 proportion. That means that if 2 million, 3 million Jews come to Palestine–even if they are very peaceful–the Palestinian Arabs would become a minority, and they would be under Jewish sovereignty. Even if the Jewish Zionists would be the most–I don’t know democratic, pluralistic, open minded, you name it–the Palestinian Arabs would have lost their status as the majority and as the owners or masters of the land. So, this is why, even with the best intentions of both sides, the situation in the country would have changed totally against the Arabs. Now, the solution or the political thinking among Arabs and among Jews–but mainly among Arabs–was: “Ok, let the Jews of Europe come and settle. Not in one place, not in Palestine. They can come some hundreds of thousands to Palestine, one million to Syria or Egypt or Iraq, and then they would be a minority everywhere. They would be saved from European antisemitism, but they would not be a political power that would endanger the political rights of the Palestine Arabs.” 

RM: So, the idea was to divide and spread the Jews? 

HC: Yes, as to prevent them from taking control over Arab land. This was one of the ideas. But, most Zionists wanted a homeland, in which they are a majority because they wanted to live as a normal people. This is the root of the conflict. 

RM: So, you’re saying that Jewish immigration and Zionism is at the root of the conflict? 

HC: Yes. But at the same time, one cannot ignore the dire need of Jews to [their] homeland, so what I suggest here is not a moral judgment but a historical analysis. Does it mean that the Jews didn’t have the right to come to Palestine? I mean, [should] they have stayed wherever and been killed? No. So, it doesn’t mean that Zionism is wrong. The results are wrong. But, this is a different story. 

RM: Generally, do you think US involvement in the conflict has improved or worsened relations between Israelis and Palestinians?

HC: I think it worsened it. And, again, this fact doesn’t mean that it was wrong by itself. 

RM: Why do you think that the US worsened it? 

HC: It worsened it because it gave the Israelis the feeling that they can do whatever they want to, including settlements in the West Bank and Gaza–whatever they want and be supported in arms and so on. This is among the sources of the Israeli fantasy of defeat. If there is no American support, I don’t think that any Israeli would believe that they could defeat the Palestinians, the Arab world in general, and [specifically] Iran. One should also compare it to the Russian support of the PLO in the 1970’s, or the Iranian support of Hamas now. It gives them [the Palestinians] the notion that they can defeat the state of Israel. 

RM: What do you think is the most realistic solution to the conflict right now? 

HC: I don’t see any realistic solution to the conflict. I don’t think that the people want a solution to the conflict. I mean, many of them do want a solution, but many others give priority to the desire to control the [entire] country, or [are] driven by fear, which is understandable. Thus, people are not enthusiastic to work for resolving the conflict, especially if they believe that they can defeat the other side. So, if you can defeat the other side, why compromise? This is what I call the fantasy of defeating the other. So, the Arabs–some of them, of course, not all of them–have this fantasy, and the Israelis–some of them–have this fantasy. If both peoples realize or come to the conclusion that they cannot defeat the other, a solution can be found. I mean the debate about [whether] 50,000 refugees have the right to return, or 20,000, or 100,000–it will be marginal. The debate whether which settlements would remain or would not remain would be marginal. The point is that there is no political will on both sides to end the conflict. 

RM: Because both sides want the entirety of the land?

HC: And they believe that they can defeat the other. To want the entirety of the land, this will continue forever. But, the idea that you can defeat the other–this is a thing that can change. 

RM: So, there is hope for the future of the conflict because the desire to defeat the other can be changed? 

HC: I hope so.