The future of Israel – China Relations
Over the past decade numerous experts have raised concerns about Israel’s approach toward China. They emphasized China’s extensive footprint within Israel and its influence in many areas, namely infrastructure, transportation, and trade. The Israeli government has been challenged to create a firm and clear strategy in the face of the “Chinese threat” and to “choose a side.”
The voices were heard, yet Israel was not in a hurry to heed them. On the contrary, Prime Minister Netanyahu attempted to utilize China against an unbending American administration, to show that Israel has an alternative. These power moves reached a climax in July 2023, when Netanyahu was photographed in his office holding a book written by Chinese leader Xi Jinping that had been gifted to him by the Chinese ambassador, stating that he planned to visit China as soon as possible. This occurred while President Biden was hesitant to invite Netanyahu to the White House. Eventually, a visit to Washington, DC, did occur, whilst the visit to Beijing, scheduled for the end of October 2023, was put off due to the outbreak of the war in Gaza.
It is important to recall that Israel did not have a genuine Chinese alternative, and China, rather than Israel, was the one choosing sides. The Chinese decision, made before October 7, was reflected through harsh statements directed at Israel during “the Guardian of the Wall” Operation in Gaza in May 2021. China’s stance was part of the escalation of their trade war with the United States, and it served to expose Americans’ double standard towards Muslims, Palestinians in particular.
The October 7 war exacerbated this trend. China refused to condemn Hamas, and Israel became a punching bag. The anti-Israeli rhetoric has morphed into sporadic anti-Semitic outbursts in the media and academics, all of which are under Communist Party control.
China’s strategic stance will remain unchanged as long as no significant Chinese interest arises that would necessitate a change in policy.
Two important questions arise here: What is the fundamental Chinese interest that could lead to a shift in policy? And, where does Israel stand in this context?
To address these questions, we need to look to the past. Following the establishment of bilateral relations in 1992, Israel continued to sell China advanced military technologies, despite US concerns, and China considered Israel a unique and significant asset in its development of military capabilities and modernization. A decade later, the Falcon and Harpy crises resulted in a complete halt in the sale of military technology and equipment, as well as a significant decline in China’s strategic perception of Israel as an asset.
Almost another decade passed, and the “Arab Spring” crisis prompted China to recognize Israel as a stable force in the shaking Middle East and to gain useful knowledge from it. At the same time, the Chinese sought to learn about innovation and import advanced civilian technologies from Israel. Chinese enterprises, especially related to infrastructure, increased their commercial activity, including the construction and operation of new seaports in Israel. Trade soared, as China became Israel’s second-largest trading partner.
Recently, especially since the beginning of the Gaza war, Israel’s global image and reputation have been tarnished. China’s immense technological growth changed its view, and it does not consider Israeli technology to be as unique as it once was. At the same time, Chinese commercial interest in infrastructure in Israel remains, although on a global scale, the Israeli market is a minor one for China. Beijing still considers Israel a significant player in the Middle East with remarkable military capabilities. But, unlike previously, this is now seen as a factor that generates wars and destruction while fostering instability.
This strategic perspective isn’t likely to change soon. Should a genuine process of rehabilitation and reconstruction begin in Gaza, followed by a shift by other players in the Middle East (including Syria and Lebanon) from destruction and death to stability, investment and citizens’ welfare, China will undoubtedly want to participate. Taking part in various initiatives, including those led by President Trump, could afford China economic and political benefits.
And where does Israel stand?
Despite all its challenges, China is an incredibly powerful global force that cannot be ignored, and Israel still need China for its economic development. For example, importing goods from China serves to reduce the very high cost of living and is critical for Israeli consumers. Looking at infrastructure, as tenders for the construction of the metro are announced, Israel requires Chinese partners, both for competence and knowledge as well as competitive pricing. The alternatives, such as American corporations, are significantly more expensive and are not in a hurry to arrive. In light of this, Israel needs to continue to collaborate with China while maintaining checks and balances on national security.
Furthermore, if a process emerges to stabilize and build bridges of peace in the Middle East, with Israel playing a leading and proactive role (through agreements ranging from Saudi Arabia to Gaza and Syria), it will be possible to try to rebuild cooperation with China, including integrating companies in various projects in exchange for a more balanced policy. A long-term view will be necessary, along with a vision of peace and regional connections.
