The Future of Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent Strategy

The 1968 “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)” Article IX stipulates that nuclear-weapon states are those that “developed and tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967”. Thus, only five countries are considered “nuclear states”: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China. On the other hand, three other countries recognize their possession of nuclear weapons: India, North Korea, and Pakistan. Of these nations, India and Pakistan never signed the NPT, while North Korea withdrew from it in 2003. Consequently, there are eight internationally recognized nuclear powers, both within and outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, when it comes to nuclear proliferation, Israel represents a very special case.

The Jewish State’s nuclear program is considered a well-known open secret and several studies claim that Jerusalem possesses atomic weapons. Today, current estimates suggest the Jewish State has around 80-90 nuclear warheads. Further, the existence of the Negev Nuclear Research Center (NNRC), a vital facility for the development of Israel’s nuclear program, is considered essential to strengthen the regional Israeli nuclear deterrence geostrategy, and like North Korea, Israel is not a signatory to the NPT.

To date, the Israeli government has confirmed the existence of nuclear weapons, and to maintain this secrecy, Israel has been actively preventing whistleblowers from penetrating their project. Nevertheless, there have been exceptions, with Mordechai Vanunu’s case being the most prominent of them. Vanunu, a former nuclear technician at NNRC, leaked extensive information about Israel’s nuclear program and was apprehended by the Mossad in Italy in 1986.

In this way, information from numerous sources comes into conflict with an Israeli government that has consistently refused to address the nuclear issue over the decades, or at least has issued vague threats about its potential. The result is an uncertainty that forms the basis of the Israeli nuclear doctrine, as preventing recognition of Israel’s status as a nuclear power creates a deliberate ambiguity. With this strategy, Jerusalem has sought to discourage Arab states in the region from pursuing their nuclear programs, while the conventional military power of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), combined with a possible nuclear response, seeks to generate a strong deterrent effect against potential enemies.

Curiously, this particular nuclear doctrine emerged from the Cold War, and the first seeds of Israel’s nuclear program were sown in 1952, when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced the establishment of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) (a vital government entity for the development of the country’s nuclear infrastructure). From 1955 onward, under a context of permanent diplomatic crises and clashes with Egypt, Ben-Gurion thought that this initiative was essential to find a way to “establish an additional defensive line, beyond the IDF’s conventional means”.

Instrumental to this goal was France’s willingness to collaborate with Israel; Paris viewed Egypt as a threat to national security, as Nasser provided political and military support to the Algerian National Liberation Front during the Algerian War and threatened French interests in the Suez Canal. The joint military operation launched by the United Kingdom, France, and Israel during the Suez Crisis helped strengthen the Franco-Israeli alliance, thus enabling the two states to reach a nuclear agreement in 1957. As a result, this agreement stipulated that France would send a nuclear reactor to Israel and assist in the construction of a research center in Dimona, which would become the current Israeli nuclear facilities. In return, Ben-Gurion was required to guarantee that nuclear cooperation would be directed solely toward peaceful purposes. Due to the sensitivity and unprecedented nature of this collaboration, the agreement was kept secret.

Meanwhile, the United States (although initially unaware of Jerusalem’s intentions), was early on solely informed about Israel’s interest in obtaining ‘heavy water’. Nonetheless, it was not until 1960 that Washington and the CIA discovered that through the Dimona reactor, Israel was nimbly pursuing a nuclear program (this information was eventually shared with the media in December 1960). To allay the suspicions, Ben-Gurion repeatedly assured both domestically and internationally that Dimona’s objectives were peaceful.

Despite these assurances, this issue would certainly become a source of tension between Washington and Jerusalem during Kennedy’s presidency. The American president, concerned about the possibility of a regional nuclear arms race, did not want Israel to join the list of nuclear powers; in fact, Kennedy thought that if Israel had atomic weapons, the Soviet Union would be encouraged to provide equivalent capabilities to Nasser’s Egypt. Beginning in 1963, Kennedy demanded transparency from Israel and asked for an inspection of Dimona. In April 1963,  Shimon Peres, David Ben-Gurion’s choice to give shape to the Israeli nuclear program, assured Kennedy in a meeting that: “We will not introduce nuclear weapons into the region, and we certainly won’t be the first to do so.” This statement would mark the beginning of an increasingly elusive and unfathomable attitude of future Israeli administrations regarding the nuclear program.

Following Kennedy’s assassination, subsequent US administrations eased pressure on the nuclear issue. Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, the United States made several visits to the Dimona center. The results were uncertain; although no evidence of nuclear weapons proliferation was found, reports of the visits highlighted the facility’s high capacity and ambition, leading to the conclusion that Israel had the potential to develop nuclear weapons. The dynamic that emerged between President Johnson and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol during this period was crucial in allowing the deliberate ambiguity to take root, as although the White House was always suspicious of Jerusalem, Johnson did not want to confront his ally on the matter.

Thus, the nuclear issue became a Pandora’s box that neither leader wanted to open. Despite this, between 1967 and 1968, the United States tried to force Israel to sign the NPT, even making it a requirement for the sale of F-4 Phantom II fighter jets. Although Israel refused to join the treaty, the sale of the F-4s was ultimately approved.

Finally, the administrations of Richard Nixon and Golda Meir sealed a regime of deliberate ambiguity; to achieve this, the United States was required not to make public what it knew about the Israeli program, while the State of Israel was obliged to maintain its opacity. In this sense, honoring Peres’s declaration of “not introducing nuclear weapons into the region” was vital; that way refraining from conducting nuclear tests that would prove that Israel was a nuclear power was crucial. Although there is no official confirmation from state representatives, the so-called ‘Vela Incident’ in 1979 is considered a possible Israeli nuclear test carried out in the ‘Prince Edward Islands’ in South Africa, fie to Jerusalem’s and Pretoria’s closeness at the time that included military cooperation, nuclear development and the exchange of fissile elements.

As mentioned, despite the secrecy and ambiguity, there is general knowledge about the extent of Israel’s nuclear weapons; most recent studies estimate that Israel possesses between 80 and 90 nuclear warheads, although other sources raise the figure to 200 and even 400. However, possessing nuclear warheads is only one aspect of being a nuclear power. When deploying warheads, it is necessary to have the required systems to carry them; this is where the concept known as the “nuclear triad” comes into play. Developed during the Cold War, this approach implies that a power will base its nuclear doctrine on a tripod consisting of three different action mechanisms: 1) ground-based ballistic missiles, 2) strategic bombers, and 3) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Certainly, each element of the triad has the potential to contribute its characteristics, advantages, and strengths to the national nuclear strategy. Furthermore, another benefit is the ability to deter a potential enemy from carrying out a nuclear first strike, since bombers and submarines would guarantee a nuclear response against the attacker. In this way, the state with the nuclear triad gains the ability to carry out a second strike that can result in mutually assured destruction, a fundamental element of nuclear deterrence.

Despite the lack of official confirmation, it is considered highly likely that Israel possesses a functional nuclear triad. On the one hand, while Israel does not have strategic bombers, it has fulfilled this role in the past with its variety of American fighters, such as the F-15I and F-16. Both aircraft fall into the dual-capability category, meaning they can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons. Regarding submarines, Israel possesses five German-made Dolphin-I and Dolphin-II class submarines, with a sixth expected to enter service soon. These vessels are deemed capable of carrying nuclear warheads on both SLBMs and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Finally, according to foreign reports, Israel possesses the Jericho series of ballistic missiles. The Jericho I, a short-range ballistic missile, was obtained thanks to the French-based company Dassault in 1963 as part of the close Franco-Israeli military cooperation these countries used to have. The embargo imposed on Israel by De Gaulle following the 1967 war ended French assistance in the Jericho project, so Jerusalem began developing missiles on its own. The results were the Jericho II medium-range ballistic missile and the Jericho III, whose estimated range would place it in the ICBM category. Today, the Israeli space shuttles Shavit and Shavit-2 are considered derivatives of the Jericho missile project.

As a result of this, Israel’s deliberate ambiguity is to prevent other regional states from pursuing nuclear power, without forcing Israel to reveal its nuclear capabilities. However, Israel has complemented its deterrence strategy with armed responses to those nuclear programs it has deemed threats to its security.

This avant-garde approach is known as the Begin doctrine and has its origins in the 1981 Operation Opera, in which the Israeli Air Force destroyed a supposedly “peaceful” Iraqi nuclear reactor after attacking it by surprise. Despite outrage from the UN and the international community, then-Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared at a press conference: “Tell your friends and anyone you know, we will defend our people with all the means at our disposal. We will not allow any enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction aimed at us.”

Since then, Israel has also applied the principles of this declaration to other countries. For example, in 2007, Israeli fighter jets entered Syrian airspace and destroyed the North Korean-built nuclear facility in Dayr al-Zawr. Immediately after the attack, Jerusalem continued its strategic ‘nebula’, alternating secrecy with ambiguous statements and threats. Curiously, it was not until 2018 that the Israeli government confirmed the details of this operation.

Today, the Begin Doctrine is especially relevant concerning Iran’s nuclear program. Both countries view each other as existential threats, and Iran is a fundamental part of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’. The Israeli government has repeatedly proclaimed that it will not allow Tehran to become a nuclear power, as Benjamin Netanyahu stated in September 2023: “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat. As long as I am prime minister, I will do everything possible to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.”

While the IDF has refrained from attacking Iranian infrastructure through conventional means for a long time (two weeks ago, this strategy failed after Israel decided to proceed and attack most of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missiles factories), it has resorted to other methods to damage and slow down the nuclear program. For example, the Mossad has been blamed for acts such as the assassinations of several Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2020, although cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have been more notable. Doubtlessly, the best demonstration of this is the sophisticated Stuxnet malware (believed to be the result of a joint US-Israeli operation). This ‘worm’ infected thousands of computers and destroyed approximately 1,000 gas centrifuges, necessary for the extraction of uranium-235.

Indubitably, the Israeli nuclear doctrine has been built on a delicate balance: it seeks to keep its enemies mindful of the possibility of nuclear retaliation, while simultaneously seeking to keep the existence of its nuclear program a secret, obscuring its true extent.

Despite this, Israel needs to pursue this strategy to vitalize its diplomatic ties with other Arab countries not allied with Iran (for example, making Saudi Arabia understand that if it wants a civilian nuclear project, it must give us peace or face the same rage -in case it pursues nuclear bombs- Iran has had). Although many critics believe that Israel must be harassed for this strategy, the reality is that if the Jewish people and the State of Israel want to exist for the next 100 years, this must be the path forward.