The Blogs: The Islamic Republic’s Nuclear and Space Strategy: A Dual Threat to Stability

In this essay, I intend to answer two important questions about the Islamic Republic’s defense doctrine. First, why is the Islamic Republic pursuing the development of nuclear weapons? And second, how does the regime’s space program serve as the final piece in completing the project of arming a Shia government with deadly atomic weapons?

In what was referred to as a fatwa in 2010, Ali Khamenei reportedly stated that “the use of nuclear weapons is forbidden, and therefore, producing and stockpiling them is unjustified.” However, serious doubts surround both the existence and sincerity of this so-called religious decree. Even if such a fatwa exists, it appears to have been a tactical pronouncement rather than a binding moral stance. First, Khamenei avoided explicitly declaring the production or possession of nuclear weapons as religiously forbidden (haram)—he simply labeled them “unjustified,” a term that leaves open the door for future reinterpretation. In this context, the lack of justification likely reflected a temporary technical incapacity to produce such weapons rather than a principled religious objection. Second, the regime’s persistent pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities directly contradicts any genuine commitment to such a prohibition. In reality, the Supreme Leader’s stance was likely a strategic delay rather than a doctrinal boundary—a point I explore in greater depth in my companion article. Thus, within the Islamic Republic’s own ideological framework, the acquisition of nuclear weapons remains entirely compatible—and arguably even desirable—once technical hurdles are overcome.

The JCPOA: Buying Time

By assembling the various pieces of the Islamic Republic’s military-defense doctrine alongside its religious ideology—as the only Shia government in modern history—one finds sufficient motivation for nuclear armament. Yet, in this path, they have relied not only on technical assistance from Russia but also require time to advance the military dimension of their nuclear program. To buy time, they have employed several tactics.

On the diplomatic front, they have used three levers:
1. Prolonged nuclear negotiations with global powers

2. The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) initiative

3. Media propaganda by their international supporters

Regionally, they established multiple proxy militia groups across the Middle East to divert global and regional attention from their nuclear ambitions toward complex regional conflicts. By equipping these militias with modern light weapons, they increased Western military expenditures in the region while simultaneously destabilizing the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the Gulf of Aden. This has contributed to driving up global energy prices for at least the past 30 years.

Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic’s destabilizing actions in the region have enhanced Russia’s strategic influence in the Middle East, with the Ayatollahs’ actions benefiting Kremlin officials through lucrative energy exports to Europe. Although Iran appears to be under oil sanctions and may not directly benefit from rising oil prices, the real question is: how much has the global economy suffered due to energy price increases driven by the Islamic Republic’s militaristic decisions and those of its proxies? Thus far, through diplomatic and military levers, the regime has successfully secured enough time to advance its military nuclear program. However, time is moving against global security. In other words, the Islamic Republic’s proxy forces act as shields for their nuclear ambitions, and their proxy wars are part of the larger puzzle of completing the atomic weapons project.

The Space Program: A Nuclear Enabler

More precisely, the Islamic Republic will try to preserve its capacity to build a weapon until it can successfully test one, using it as leverage for maximum concessions from the West. At the time of writing, according to IAEA reports, the Islamic Republic is very close to attaining nuclear weapons capability. After cold testing, the indigenous warhead will require a detonation to confirm functionality—there is no alternative to explosion for verifying a nuclear weapon’s reliability. Warheads must be compact enough to fit in missiles and resilient against high pressure and speed when exiting the atmosphere and reentering to strike land or sea targets. They know that a failed nuclear test would spell political disaster for the regime. But what options does the regime have for testing a warhead? There are four: in the air, in water, on land, or underground.

For the Islamic Republic, conducting a nuclear test on land or in water would be akin to suicide. Given their weak infrastructure for handling radioactive materials, they would never pursue those paths. Underground testing requires the construction of explosion chambers, which demand high-precision technology. Moreover, they are aware of the CTBTO seismic sensors near Iran’s borders, and that scientists working with this organization can analyze seismic wave patterns—such as depth, propagation direction, and wave types—to detect atomic explosions.

There are now advanced formulas for calculating the dimensions and precise location of a detonation using seismic wave characteristics, making clandestine underground testing nearly impossible. While not entirely ruled out, underground testing seems unlikely. Instead, the fastest and least costly option appears to be a space test—in special orbits that could direct emitted radiation along electromagnetic wave paths in space, potentially avoiding detection by the U.S.’s 50 infrasound nuclear detonation trackers.

However, a space test offers no secondary containment for harmful radiation effects within their own territories, providing a strong incentive for them to try this route anyway. Thus, the Islamic Republic’s space (missile) program poses a serious threat as a facilitator of nuclear weaponization, and both the regime’s nuclear and space programs must be addressed together, not separately. The West must realize that even limiting Tehran’s nuclear program is not a final solution when they gain the capacity to build and test atomic weapons through their space initiative.

While the West spent over twenty years attempting to contain Iran’s nuclear program, the regime used the JCPOA negotiations and deal period to pave the way for weapon development. My claim is supported by recent interviews with Kamal Kharazi (Khamenei’s advisor) and Kamalvandi (head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization), where they openly expressed the regime’s desire to acquire nuclear weapon capability. This was achieved through an initial strategy of reaching 190,000 separative work units (SWU) with zero nuclear breakout time using IR-9 centrifuges—a strategy that would allow Tehran to hold a nuclear sword over the West in the long run.

The clearest mistake in the JCPOA was granting political legitimacy to the regime and accepting it as part of the Middle East solution—when in fact, Tehran is the architect and supporter of many regional crises, promising paradise to its dead terrorist proxies and providing money and weapons to the living ones. This material and ideological support led to the formation of numerous armed groups across the Middle East aiming not just to destabilize Israel, but also seemingly stable Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, as well as the global energy market and economy. The Islamic Republic’s regional influence grew significantly post-JCPOA, particularly as oil dollars flowed into the pockets of Iran’s clerical rulers.

Human Shields for Nuclear Ambition

None of the oil revenues were spent on Iran’s economy or healthcare. Official health and economic statistics confirm this claim. Not only are the people’s interests ignored in regime contracts, but the Islamic Republic has consistently used Iranians as human shields in pursuit of its deadly ideologies. Nuclear facilities are deliberately located within populated areas and expanded across human geography in a way that any attack would cause maximum civilian casualties, allowing the regime to play the victim. Moreover, the regime has intentionally failed to provide appropriate emergency nuclear response infrastructure or specialized medical facilities. Thus, even a minor incident could become a humanitarian disaster affecting both Iranian citizens and global heritage sites, allowing the regime to attract international sympathy. This regime survives through crises and thrives on disorder. The West has the military capability to dismantle these facilities with minimal environmental damage, but the regime’s anti-people nature has complicated any such plans.

U.S. strategists supporting a nuclear containment deal with Iran must understand that the regime only agrees to deals when technical necessities in their nuclear program require a temporary pause. It’s worth noting that Iran’s uranium supply is limited, and the enrichment cycle requires raw material imports. Thus, even a well-negotiated halt to the nuclear program helps the regime in three ways:

Acquiring yellowcake
Advancing technical solutions for warhead testing
Securing funding for both aspects of its defense doctrine—the regime’s securityand its nuclear armament project to make Iran the first Shia government with the world’s deadliest weapon.

I urge proponents of nuclear agreements to scrutinize the funds released through the JCPOA—whether directly or via U.S. leniency on oil sanctions under the Biden administration. Those funds were used not for humanitarian needs or medicine but for destabilizing the Middle East and advancing their space project—evidenced by the Simorgh satellite launch. Besides “time” and “money,” the regime needs “security” to complete its nuclear program. A nuclear deal gives it all three. Remember: for the Islamic Republic, security means regional destabilization. Analysis of their defense doctrine shows a strategy of internal stabilization through external chaos, empowering the central regime at home and ensuring external deterrence—until they become a nuclear power.

The Arak Reactor and Plutonium Bomb Potential

It’s essential to note: attacking the regime’s nuclear facilities should not merely aim to punish the Islamic Republic or delay its program. It must be part of a broader goal to dismantle the regime itself. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—excluding the Bushehr reactor—can be divided into two segments: the fuel cycle and the bypass path. Fordow was designed to ensure continuity of fuel production even under foreign attack. If a strike doesn’t target uranium stockpiles or heavy water production and the regime survives, secondary countermeasures are likely.

The older Arak reactor (IR-40) could be revived at Fordow or another site—it may even be operational now. Only the IAEA can confirm or investigate this. This reactor doesn’t need enriched uranium and produces plutonium as output. With reverse engineering, this reactor could produce 10 kg of plutonium per year, given access to 9 tons of natural uranium oxide and 150 fuel assemblies. This explains why Khamenei insisted during JCPOA negotiations on preserving heavy water production—a deceptive effort led by Iran’s then-nuclear chief to ensure the future operability of the original Arak reactor. The new reactor design is economically and scientifically unjustified—a betrayal of Iranian national interests, serving only regime objectives. They deliberately designed the new Arak reactor to use heavy water in three channels—for fuel cooling, neutron moderation, and reflection—despite 78 assemblies enriched to 3.3% being active, which could have been used in a light-water reactor. Thus, calculations show that even without enrichment, using uranium oxide, they could produce 10–12 kg of fissile plutonium-239 annually—enough for three plutonium bombs.

Moreover, the recent IAEA report as of February 8, 2025, says Iran has enriched 235U to 60% with a stockpile of 274.8 kilograms. There is concern that beyond enriched uranium, they may be extracting uranium-238 as a by-product—a dense metal with minor radioactivity, but effective as a neutron reflector in plutonium bombs. The IAEA must report how much 238U has been obtained and whether this critical component is being monitored.

Conclusion:

The Islamic Republic’s ideological DNA is rooted in violent expansionism and religious authoritarianism. Its nuclear program is not an isolated military project—it is integrated with its control over oil, gas, and strategic geography (like the Strait of Hormuz), all leveraged for geopolitical influence. As long as this regime stands, no agreement—whether nuclear, political, or economic—will bring security to the Middle East. The JCPOA proved that, as Iranian influence and proxy violence expanded dramatically afterward. The West must understand that the true threat is the regime itself, not just its enrichment levels or centrifuge counts. A future strategy must go beyond containment and deterrence. It must challenge the legitimacy, funding, and survival of a government that has long used its people as shields and its neighbors as pawns.

Only then can long-term stability be restored to Iran, the region, and the global nonproliferation order.