The Issues Today

With the exception of the Arab parties, there is broad agreement that Israel’s pre-October 7th security ‘conception’ has failed. No longer will Israel attempt to contain or bargain with terror groups committed to the country’s destruction. Rather, all agree that Israel will continue to proactively target Hamas, Hezbollah and other hostile groups which rearm, rebuild or deploy.

The governing coalition argues that the ‘change bloc’ will be weak and defer to international pressure, leading to a premature withdrawal that will return insecurity to Israel’s periphery communities that already suffered so much over the last three years. They point to the change bloc’s ready acceptance of Gaza hostage and ceasefire agreements early in the conflict which they argue would have left a strong Hamas intact and Israel soon  once again  coming under threat. In this view, the change bloc will squander the strategic advantage that Israel has achieved through its deployment in Gaza, especially in key locations such as the Philadelphi Corridor to stem the cross-border smuggling of arms, in Lebanon within the Yellow Line, and in Syria on Hermon and the surrounds. They also argue for putting into action a plan for the ‘voluntary emigration’ (also dubbed ‘free movement’) of Gazans out of Gaza, with the intent to remove Gaza’s ‘radicalised’ population which in their view provides the fertile soil from which Hamas can recruit and rearm.

The change bloc argues that the governing coalition has no end game or exit strategy in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. They argue this is exhausting the IDF, weakening Israel’s international position and reducing trust among partners. Per the change bloc, Israel under the governing coalition has failed to convert its strategic advantage in Gaza or Lebanon into the total victory that was promised by the prime minister. And it is precisely this lack of trust, and lack of end game or exit strategy that, at least in Gaza, has provided an enabling environment for the terror groups to rearm. The change bloc reject ‘voluntary emigration’ variously as immoral, undesirable and unworkable, a distraction from the need to strengthen deterrence, finish the job and rebuild the shattered periphery communities which they accuse the governing coalition of failing to do.

Again with the exception of the Arab parties, there is broad agreement that Iran remains an existential threat to Israel, that future action is unavoidable, and that a common position against Iran can be a foundation for improved cooperation with regional powers, especially the UAE and Bahrain, but potentially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others.

The differences between the parties involve both backward- and forward-looking questions.

Looking back, supporters herald the governing coalition for its achievements in the two campaigns against Iran. They believe only the sitting prime minister could have leveraged a strong personal relationship with the American president to bring US power to bear in both campaigns, including the decisive bombing of Iran’s heavily fortified Fordo nuclear complex, and the ongoing Hormuz Strait blockade. They also cite apparent successes in taking out Iran’s key nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and in eliminating senior Iranian leadership.

Looking forward, the coalition argues only it can be trusted to resume action against Iran as dictated by Israel’s security needs. The change bloc, they argue again, will fail to be decisive when needed, as evidenced by President Trump’s two endorsements for the sitting prime minister, and will defer to international pressure even when Israel’s existential interests are at stake.

By contrast, change bloc supporters argue the government has failed to secure a decisive victory over Iran when Israel had the chance. They argue it was due to poor leadership that Israel failed to persuade the US that its regime change plan was credible, allowing itself to be outsmarted by Turkish President Erdogan who managed to forestall a Kurd-led ground invasion which was allegedly a key part of that plan. Much vaunted claims about destroying nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities have been proven false, they argue. Instead, Israel’s actions have not meaningfully weakened or deterred Iran, but instead created the conditions for Vice-President Vance’s peace framework – still apparently on the table – that would significantly empower Iran and lock in a strategic advantage that ends up with Israel facing an even greater existential threat than ever before.

Looking forward, the change bloc argues that it is Israel’s declining international standing and poor public diplomacy that limits its capacity to finish the job against Iran because key allies no longer trust or cooperate with Israel, as evidenced by the US keeping Israel out of follow up actions against Iran, the lack of consultation on VP Vance’s peace framework that seemed to discount Israel’s existential interests, and as evidenced by Saudi resistance to openly cooperate with Israel in their struggle against the Houthis. They argue that weak Israeli leadership and poor public diplomacy around the globally unpopular Iran campaign has led to Israel’s international position further plummeting.

With the exception of the Arab parties, and with the Democrats, all parties agree that the two-state solution as envisaged under the Oslo Framework is no longer viable for the foreseeable future.

The governing coalition insinuates that the change bloc cannot be trusted because they will end up entering an agreement with the Arab parties, the price of which will be the two-state solution.

The change bloc denies this, citing the consistent position on this matter of key leaders like Bennett and Liberman, who have long opposed the two-state solution. The change bloc accuses the governing coalition of hypocrisy on this issue. They emphasise the alleged influence of Qatar over key figures working with the prime minister’s office itself, noting that Qatar has arguably done more than any other country to support Hamas and promote Palestinian interests.

Again with the exception of the Arab parties, and the Democrats (and perhaps the Charedi parties too), the other parties agree on the legitimacy and importance of Jewish settlement across the entire ancestral homeland.

They differ in several respects: firstly, the motivation – the governing coalition is driven primarily by a religious commitment, whereas the change bloc is driven more by national and security arguments; and secondly, the level of ambition –  the governing coalition is willing to drive the settlement project faster, broaden its scope, and go furthest to defy international pressure.

The prime minister’s ‘sanctions and cryptocurrency’ comments last week have been understood by many to signal just how far Israel is prepared to go to defy international pressure, a prospect that fills the change bloc, along with a wide range of Israeli experts and industries, with horror. For the change bloc, the governing coalition’s embrace of a pathway towards further isolation creates a second existential risk for the country (after Iran), which shows the recklessness of the governing coalition. More contentiously, the change bloc argues that the governing coalition are willing to support, or turn a blind eye to, the activities of a minority of settlers intent on intimidating and using violence against Arab residents.

For its part, the change bloc has said it would defer the controversial E1 settlement project adjacent to Jerusalem, and generally strike a less confrontational position on settlements than the governing coalition, with the intent to respect human rights red lines, strengthen Israel’s international standing, rebuild trust with (former) allies, and salvage some legitimacy for the wider settlement project.

There are three major issues which arguably most clearly separate the respective blocs.

The change bloc is pushing for an independent state commission of enquiry into October 7th. They believe the governing coalition holds direct responsibility for the failures, based on IDF redeployments away from Gaza ahead of the event, a failure to heed multiple warnings, and a slow and disjointed response. More broadly, the change bloc blames the governing coalition for creating the spirit of disunity and division that prevailed in the country as a result of aggressive and divisive judicial reform proposals which Hamas was then able to exploit.

The governing coalition believes that any such enquiry would in fact be politicised by ‘deep state’ actors under the disguise of independence. It has largely blamed the IDF and security services for the October 7th failures, as well as the preceding Bennett/Lapid government. It does not dispute the spirit of disunity and division that prevailed in the country, but places the blame on the change bloc, noting the rallies, the disruption and the reservist campaign to refuse their service that took place, along with a spirit of religious hatred, including the aggressive targeting of a Yom Kippur event a few days prior to the October 7th catastrophe.

While the governing coalition and change bloc agree in principle to charedi enlistment into the IDF, they fundamentally disagree on the scope and methods for bringing it about.

The change bloc believes in a punitive route, pushing for compulsory enlistment with limited exemptions for the most committed and capable Torah scholars, and with strong prison sentences and financial penalties for others that dodge the draft. They argue that filling the IDF manpower gap is so urgent that the time for soft, consensus-based approaches has passed.

The governing coalition places more emphasis on respect for Torah study, believes a consensual pathway is required, and that a punitive route will backfire. According to the governing coalition, a punitive route will deepen charedi resistance, reverse changes in attitude and belief that are taking place within the charedi community, and lead to acts of mass country-wide resistance that Israel is ill-prepared to handle. Moreover, they argue the IDF is not yet ready to absorb large numbers of charedim, and that the process for scaling up their enlistment must be gradual.

Both sides argue about how far previous frameworks would have led to charedi enlistment. The governing coalition touts its recent bill, which it argues would have led to large numbers of charedim enlisting. The governing coalition further argue that their bill would have led to higher numbers of charedi enlistment than the 2022 bill promoted by Gantz, Bennett and Lapid. The change bloc calls the governing coalition document a ‘draft dodgers bill’ which would have granted large numbers of charedim perpetual exemption while they would continue to receive significant financial support from the state.

Happily, however, Naftali Bennett seems to have taken (part of) my idea for absorbing charedim into the IDF (see this article from June 2024, for example), by promoting the idea of hybrid yeshiva-military bases situated on Israel’s borders in which charedi enlistees would split their daily routine between army service and Torah study. You’re most welcome, Naftali.

There is a weak agreement across most parties that some kind of judicial reform is necessary in Israel, the result of the country’s incomplete constitutional settlement. The failure of the country to finalise a constitution, as intended by Israel’s founders, has led to the emergence of an unsatisfactory and weakly-defined separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary that remains in a state of flux.

For the governing coalition, radical reform is required to address judicial overreach into the legislative and executive processes, the lack of representativeness of the judiciary, and the political bias and groupthink that arises from a process of judicial selection the governing coalition characterises as ‘self-selection’. Per the governing coalition, the current judicial arrangements explain why, despite having a conservative, right-wing government for most of the past two decades, Israel supposedly remains a liberal country. Therefore, the governing coalition believes it necessary to reorient the judicial selection process to include greater say for elected representatives, to sharply reduce and clearly define the limits of judicial power in the legislative and executive processes, and to provide parliamentarians and ministers with immunities and protections from (malicious) prosecution, especially in light of the perceived injustices around the prime minister’s own trial.

For the change bloc, judicial reform as conceived by the governing coalition would have turned Israel into an elected dictatorship. Given that Israel lacks the checks and balances found in other political systems such as the US or UK, they argue the judiciary is the major check on unfettered executive power. They argue that removing or curtailing this check, while the rest of the system remains unreformed, would give the executive virtually unrestricted power that could have been misused to politicise key institutions (for example, the IDF, the police, the electoral commission, and the judiciary itself), trample on the rights of political opponents, the media and minorities, and create a permissive environment within which corruption and patronage would proliferate. For the change bloc, the problem was not judicial reform itself per se, but rather the extreme nature of the specific proposals, and the aggressive non-consensual manner through which a governing coalition with a small majority would have unilaterally driven sweeping constitutional reform. Rather, the change bloc advocates for a consensus-based approach to judicial reform within a process of drawing up a wider constitutional settlement.

Aside from the specific issues identified above, there are a wider range of underlying concerns that shape voter preferences.

The figure of the prime minister himself is a key issue for voters with many characterising elections coming down to a simple question of “Bibi or not Bibi”. The factor that binds the diverse parties that form the change bloc has sometimes been characterised by some as ‘anyone but Bibi’. More broadly, voters tend to look at this in the wider question of the quality of governance. For his supporters, the prime minister has unparalleled gravitas, experience and influence, through his international relationships and recognition, charisma, previous policy successes, and oratory skills in both Hebrew and English, standing head and shoulders above any other Israeli leader. For his opponents, the prime minister has significant moral and character weaknesses that have contributed to a reduction in the quality of governance in the country. Key critiques include the appointment of unqualified, incompetent or weak ministers that can be easily dominated, the promotion of ‘extreme’ ministers that make ‘inflammatory’ comments and undermine Israel’s international standing, the excessive focus of Israel’s public diplomacy on prime ministerial speechmaking to the exclusion of a more systematic and responsive framework, and allegedly distorting government decisions through considerations of personal or political gain.

The economy, especially the cost of living, and pervasive inequalities, remains a key issue. Paradoxically in Israel, the self-described right wing parties of the governing coalition tend to represent the poor and the periphery, while the change bloc parties – more centrist in nature, with both right and left wing components – tend to represent the more affluent populations in the centre of the country. However, efforts by both the current governing coalition and the previous change bloc-led government appear to have made little impact in bringing down the cost of living, with Israel remaining among the most expensive countries in the world.

The religious status quo is also a significant determinant for voters, with the change bloc seeking to revise the status quo to allow for civil marriage and public transportation on Shabbat based on local-level decision-making. There are a range of other priorities that the change bloc have identified in the past, in areas such as kashrut licensing, Western Wall prayer arrangements, and beyond. The governing coalition stands against changes to the religious status quo, and in some cases, may seek to strengthen the role that religion plays in shaping the governance of public spaces.

Finally to the issue that seems not to have captured much attention in the national discourse – Israel’s plummeting international standing. That Israel is, and will remain unpopular seems to be taken as a given, or dismissed on the spurious grounds of antisemitism. It seems that the famous Golda Meir quote – “if we have to choose between being alive and hated or being dead and pitied, we choose being alive and hated” – has been operationalised in Israeli public diplomacy, its limited efforts widely criticised by friends and foes alike.

Aside from Israeli expats and the Jewish diaspora,  Einat Wilf,  the former Labour MK, now standing with the Reservists party, is known to be the most passionate advocate for integrating public diplomacy into Israel’s national security framework. Let us pray for a sea change that brings her success in this endeavour which will benefit all Israelis, as well as the Jewish diaspora communities worldwide.

Taking the opportunity to reiterate my prayer from yesterday’s blogpost: