The Jewish Power Blog: Unravelling
In 2025, 314 murders were committed in Israel; of these, 255 were of Palestinian citizens (= “Israeli Arabs”). These numbers are slightly higher than those for 2023 and 2024. So far in 2026 the average is one per day. The daily papers headline this tally regularly, and there has been a crescendo of protest over this trend, with the blame generally assigned to the police for not protecting the Palestinian population. Only 15% of the murder cases in the Palestinian community have been solved, compared to 60% in the Jewish sector.
There are certainly Jews who believe – and some who will even say out loud – that as long as the Arabs are killing each other, we should be grateful. And indeed, there is reason to suspect that the minister in charge of the police in the current government, Itamar Ben-Gvir, who is not shy in proclaiming his Kahanist beliefs, subscribes to this approach. That may help explain why in 2023, his first year in office, the murder rate in the Arab sector jumped from 116 to 244.
And while it makes sense that the attitude of the police, “from the top,” probably does influence enforcement policies and allocation of resources out in the field, allowing criminal activities and organizations to thrive, it seems an unhelpful oversimplification to see the entire problem as a policing issue.
While femicide is a problem in both the Jewish and Arab populations, it represents a small percentage of the above homicide rates; the large majority of the victims are young men, and the police usually issue a statement to the effect that the latest murder was “the result of a criminal dispute.” Organized crime, “crime families,” have become a powerful force on the Arab street in recent years, controlling illegal businesses (especially protection), quasi-legal ones (gray-market lending), and legal ones like waste collection.
Why? I don’t know enough to offer a comprehensive analysis. However, here are a few facts and thoughts:
Like any society going through the transition from traditional pre-modern roles and structures, the Palestinians are suffering the psychological fallout from that transition. Their villages are not closed off from the larger world, from secular, capitalistic Israel, from social media and mass media. The liberation of women, the loss of authority of patriarchs, colliding trends of drifting away from religion – and returning to it: all of these create conflicts, dislocation, trauma, and feeling adrift. And thus – a vacuum of authority and structure just waiting to be filled.
The Palestinians in Israel continue to occupy primarily the lowest socio-economic levels. Their poverty rate is 39% compared to 16% among Jews. More telling, Palestinians aged 19-24 defined as “not in education, employment, or training” make up 31% of the population; and for ages 25-29, 24%. These proportions are more than double the ones among Jews. That is, there are a lot of young Palestinian men with no professional or economic horizon. Moreover, the fact that for the most part, education and residence are de facto (and sometimes de jure) segregated in Israel (and often, therefore, employment too) creates built-in disadvantages and alienation. In short: a lot of angry, powerless young men.
Every once in a while the government takes notice of these social and economic challenges and formulates a plan to address them. But for some reason these often get derailed or shelved. For example, most recently, the government has proposed diverting $68 million from a five-year plan set up by the previous government for economic development in the Arab sector – and shifting it to the police and the Shabak (Israel’s FBI) to fight crime – even though a larger sum already allocated for crime reduction in the five year plan has not been spent.
When Cain, the first-born, offers a sacrifice to God, it is inexplicably rejected, while Abel’s offering is accepted. Cain, humiliated, feeling powerless, lashes out violently (Gen. 4). Hannah Arendt has written: It has often been said that impotence breeds violence, and psychologically this is quite true, at least of persons possessing natural strength, moral or physical. Politically speaking, the point is that loss of power becomes a temptation to substitute violence for power. (On Violence, 1969 ed., p. 54)
Franz Fanon, writing of a different but related context, put it a little more sharply: The colonized man will first manifest this aggressiveness, which has been deposited in his bones, against his own people. This is the period when the [natives] beat each other up, and the police and magistrates do not know which way to turn when faced with the astonishing waves of crime in North Africa. (The Wretched of the Earth, 1963, p. 52)
Perhaps we are harvesting the bitter fruit of decades of ambivalence and ambiguity regarding the integration of the Palestinians into Israeli society – and thus into Israel’s economy and governance. As Israeli historian Elie Rekhess has written, “The two conflicting desires of isolating and integrating the Arab community are as old as the State of Israel itself.” For example: in 1954, Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon issued an order to call up all of the 18 year-old cohort of male Palestinian citizens for induction. Five thousand rapidly signed up, seeing the order as a sign of respect and an opportunity to become integrated into Israeli society. However, the army brass and other ministers were less enthusiastic, and ultimately the plan was quietly abandoned and none of the prospective draftees ever served. Now, of course, when Palestinian citizens complain of discrimination, the response is often – “well, if you’d ‘pay your dues’ like we do…”
We can address this complex problem seriously and honestly; or else, as Pirate Jenny sang, “There’s nobody gonna sleep here tonight…”
