The Majority That Counts
The Majority That Counts
When political leaders fear losing power, they do not necessarily need to falsify an election. They can attempt something more fundamental: redefine the majority whose approval is supposed to confer legitimacy upon government. The votes may be counted correctly, the results officially certified, and the institutions remain formally intact. What becomes contested is the political authority of the outcome itself. A preferred electorate is presented as the authentic nation, while other citizens, though legally entitled to vote, are treated as incapable of authorizing a legitimate government. Israel’s October election makes this mechanism unusually visible, but the struggle over which majority is permitted to count extends well beyond Israel.
After nearly three months away from these pages, I return to a question I raised here before the Israeli election. In “The Election Netanyahu Cannot Lose,” published on July 18, I argued that Israel could conduct a lawful election, count every ballot correctly, and nevertheless fail to translate its results into a transfer of power. I warned that the outcome might be politically interpreted before the election had even taken place, with victory presented as the authentic will of the nation and defeat attributed to fraud, institutional conspiracy, or an illegitimate coalition dependent upon Arab representatives. The events of recent weeks have not established every element of that scenario, but they have exposed the mechanism that made it necessary to consider.
The October 27 election produced 53 seats for Netanyahu’s bloc, 48 for the opposing bloc of Jewish-led parties, and 19 for the two Arab-led lists. None of these blocs independently secured the 61 seats necessary for a parliamentary majority. On November 8, President Isaac Herzog entrusted Gadi Eisenkot with forming a government after factions representing 67 Knesset members recommended him. Yet even the president acknowledged that mutual vetoes among political parties made the formation of a government uncertain. The distinction is crucial: the arithmetic identifies possible majorities, but political commitments determine which of those possibilities can become effective.
Netanyahu supplied an unusually explicit illustration of this distinction in his election-night speech. He claimed that his right-wing bloc possessed a “clear, decisive majority among the Zionist public” and rejected the prospect of a government dependent upon Arab parties. The relevant electorate was no longer simply the entire citizenry entitled to elect the Knesset, but a politically defined population presented as possessing superior authority to determine the nation’s future. Even that definition is contestable: 13 of the 53 seats in Netanyahu’s bloc belong to ultra-Orthodox parties whose identification with political Zionism differs from that of the other coalition parties. The legitimacy of a parliamentary majority cannot therefore be settled by invoking a supposedly self-evident national constituency.
This is not merely a dispute about ideological vocabulary. A majority constructed by excluding certain voters from the definition of the authentic nation is no longer simply the result of an election. It becomes a political classification imposed upon the electorate. The paradox is that those claiming to defend majority rule may attempt to preserve their authority by discounting precisely those citizens whose votes prevent them from possessing a majority. Electoral equality survives at the ballot box, while the political consequences of that equality become conditional. The distinction between votes that may be counted and votes that may authorize government, which I examined in “Israel First, Citizens Last” in July, is no longer hypothetical.
The allegations emerging from Channel 12’s investigative programme Uvda introduce a second mechanism. According to the reporting, information transmitted to police through Netanyahu’s chief of staff, Ido Norden, contributed to the arrest of three Arab Ra’am activists shortly before polling stations opened. The men were subsequently released without charges. Netanyahu invoked allegations of Arab electoral fraud during election day, while questions have since arisen about whether the information supplied to police was intended to generate institutional support for those allegations. Netanyahu’s office denies wrongdoing, and legal authorities are examining the circumstances. These allegations must not be confused with established criminal responsibility.
The underlying mechanism, however, deserves examination independently of the eventual findings. A political accusation reaches a public institution, which responds through investigation, detention, or another official procedure. That response can subsequently be invoked as apparent confirmation of the original accusation. The institution’s authority then supplies credibility to a claim whose evidentiary foundation may remain unproven. This creates a closed circuit of apparent verification in which an allegation generates institutional activity and that activity is presented as evidence for the allegation. No comprehensive conspiracy is required for the vulnerability to exist; the political consequences may arise even when individual officials believe they are performing their ordinary duties.
The third mechanism is less spectacular, but potentially more durable. Political outcomes can be restricted through expectations concerning which coalitions are acceptable, independently of whether their parliamentary arithmetic is valid. The November 2026 Israeli Society Index published by the Jewish People Policy Institute offers unusually revealing evidence. Only 36 percent of Israelis preferred a change-bloc government including Arab parties, while 45 percent ruled out Ra’am as a coalition partner under any circumstances and 62 percent ruled out the Joint List. The average respondent excluded approximately four of the eleven parliamentary parties, and roughly one in ten respondents rejected enough parties to leave no possible 61-seat coalition. These preferences are not constitutional prohibitions, but they demonstrate how political possibilities can become restricted before formal negotiations even begin.
The importance of these findings lies not simply in public prejudice or ideological polarization. They reveal a distinction between a mathematically possible coalition and one considered politically admissible. The electoral system produces a set of potential parliamentary combinations, while parties and voters impose additional restrictions upon which combinations should be permitted to govern. Such restrictions are not automatically illegitimate; democratic negotiations necessarily involve political refusals. But refusing a particular programme is different from treating an entire category of elected representatives as inherently incapable of conferring governmental legitimacy. When that distinction disappears, citizenship remains formally equal while the effectiveness of representation becomes unequal.
The American midterm elections of November 3 offer a different illustration of how political authority is shaped before and after votes are counted. Democrats won control of both houses of Congress despite Republican efforts, encouraged by President Donald Trump, to improve electoral prospects through redistricting in eight states. Those efforts largely failed to preserve Republican congressional majorities. Trump subsequently acknowledged the Democratic victories, while emphasizing his constitutional capacity to resist legislation through the presidential veto. These are different forms of political action, and lawful redistricting or the exercise of a veto cannot automatically be equated with electoral manipulation. Nevertheless, the example shows that electoral outcomes depend upon more than the immediate preferences expressed at the ballot box: constituency boundaries and institutional powers also determine how those preferences acquire practical political force.
The American experience after the 2020 presidential election presents a more direct example of attempts to challenge the legitimacy of an adverse result. Unsupported allegations of fraud accompanied claims that the certified outcome did not express the authentic will of the American people. The political struggle concerned not merely the accuracy of the count but the authority of the institutions responsible for establishing it. The distinction between the events of 2020 and those of 2026 must be preserved, yet both episodes illustrate why the definition of legitimate representation cannot be treated as a secondary rhetorical matter. Whoever succeeds in defining the authentic political people gains influence over the interpretation of the result those people are said to have produced.
Political theory has long examined populist claims to exclusive representation, institutional capture, and democratic erosion. The additional problem I want to identify concerns the conditions under which formally available political outcomes become institutionally and publicly effective. In my theoretical work, I describe this as second-order admissibility: not simply which possibilities exist under established rules, but which conditions determine whether those possibilities may be realized. Applied to electoral politics, this distinction separates the legal production of parliamentary representation from the political authorization of its consequences. The first process counts mandates; the second determines which configurations of those mandates can become governing authority.
The three mechanisms examined here should not be conflated. Redefining the authentic electorate, using institutional responses to confer apparent credibility upon political allegations, and restricting acceptable coalition configurations are different operations with different legal and moral implications. Their significance lies in their potential convergence. A selected population is declared to represent the nation, information concerning excluded voters becomes politically suspect, and parliamentary outcomes involving their representatives are subsequently portrayed as insufficiently legitimate. The result need not be cancelled. Its political consequences can be restricted through procedures, interpretations, and expectations that continue operating after the ballots have been counted.
This also explains why replacing a political leader may not eliminate the restrictions associated with his government. In “Netanyahu Can Lose and Still Win,” published here on August 24, I argued that political authority can persist through institutional arrangements, territorial conditions, security expectations, and exclusions that a successor inherits. An opposition may defeat an incumbent while remaining constrained by political conventions it has itself accepted. This does not make legitimate coalition disagreements equivalent to alleged abuses of state authority. It means that a change of leadership and a change in the conditions governing political possibilities are not necessarily the same event.
Nor should Israel’s present difficulties be described as a completed institutional collapse. The election results were certified, President Herzog followed constitutional procedures, Arab representatives participated in consultations, and legal authorities have acted to scrutinize the latest allegations. These facts demonstrate that institutional resistance remains possible. The danger is more precise: democratic procedures may continue to function while the range of political consequences they can effectively authorize becomes increasingly restricted. An election can be procedurally valid without every possible majority being granted equal political recognition.
For Jewish political thought, this distinction carries particular significance. Jewish historical continuity cannot be reduced to loyalty toward any government or political leader, and criticism of state authority does not require repudiating Jewish political existence. A democratic political community must remain capable of accepting lawful outcomes that its present rulers would prefer to reject. Its continuity cannot depend upon defining dissenting citizens or elected representatives as insufficiently authentic members of the people whose future is being decided. Otherwise, political belonging becomes conditional upon agreement with those claiming the authority to define it.
I return to these pages not to claim that July’s warnings were prophetic, but because subsequent events have made their underlying question more urgent. The central struggle over democratic authority does not necessarily occur when ballots are falsified or elections cancelled. It may occur earlier, when political actors define which citizens constitute the legitimate nation, and later, when they determine which parliamentary outcomes may acquire effective authority. Democracy is tested not only by its ability to count votes, but by its capacity to accept the political future those votes may produce. The decisive question, therefore, is not simply who won the election. It is who possesses the power to determine what winning is allowed to mean.
Yochanan Schimmelpfennig
