The Middle East Is Enmeshed In A Regional War
Hamas launched its invasion of southern Israel on October 7, 2023 with the broad intention of igniting a regional war whose end result would be Israel’s destruction. While Hamas clearly failed to destroy Israel, which has since grown stronger and more assertive, Hamas’ leadership nonetheless managed to drag its allies in Iran’s Axis of Resistance into the conflict.
Hezbollah, Iran’s chief surrogate in the Middle East, was the first Hamas ally to intervene. Its intervention led to Israel’s invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon. The Houthis of Yemen were then drawn in, followed by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
The Iranian regime itself was directly sucked into the Mideast conflagration when Israel and the United States went to war with Iran in June of 2025 and again in February 2026. Iran retaliated, closing the vital Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and thereby threatening the shipment of oil and natural gas to international markets.
Iran also struck Arab Gulf States and Jordan, adding a layer of complexity to the war.
In a directly related development, the Houthis, a key Iranian proxy, took aim at Saudi Arabia, their longtime adversary and the world’s largest oil exporter.
The Houthis have been at war with Saudi Arabia since 2014, when they captured Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, from the internationally recognized government, and threw Yemen into a civil war. Shortly afterward, Saudi Arabia initiated an air campaign against the Houthis. This ended with a truce in 2022 that has since crumbled.
Most recently, in a stark illustration of the dissolution of the ceasefire, the Houthis imposed a blockade on Saudi vessels transiting the Red Sea. This offensive was a stunning setback for Saudi Arabia, which began exporting much of its oil through the Red Sea after Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz early in the war with the United States and Israel.
The Houthis also have struck oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia, defeated Saudi-backed government forces along the Red Sea coast, captured the strategic port of Mocha, and seized Perim, an island at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The Houthis have resorted to these measures in a bid for military domination in and around Yemen.
In the estimation of the Institute for the Study of War, the Houthi offensive advances Iranian interests.
“Iran is currently pursuing a regional campaign that aims to degrade the willingness of the United States and its allies to sustain the war and coerce the United States to surrender to Iranian demands. Recent Iranian attacks on US regional assets and civilian shipping indicate that Iranian decision-makers – currently dominated by the hardline faction led by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi – are not satisfied with the current status of the war because Iran has not yet achieved its key objectives in the conflict, such as securing recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz. These decision-makers appear intent on trying to change the current trajectory of the conflict through the use of military force.”
By attacking Saudi shipping and Saudi Arabia itself, the Houthis have effectively “opened a second front in the Iran war, broadening that conflict and placing further pressure on global energy and financial markets,” write April Longley Alley and Allison Minor in Foreign Affairs.
According to The Institute for the Study of War, the Houthis’ campaign against Saudi Arabia seeks to achieve several primary objectives: to end Saudi military operations in Yemen, to lift the Saudi blockade of Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports and airports, and to coerce the Saudis to pay reparations to Yemeni civilians.
Due to these events, Saudi oil exports have plunged to their lowest level in more than a decade. The problem was compounded by a recent drone attack from pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. The bombardment has temporarily shut down the East West pipeline, which carries Saudi oil to its Red Sea ports. From there, it is shipped onward via the Suez Canal in Egypt.
Much to Saudi Arabia’s probable distress, Turkey and Pakistan have not come to its assistance. Last month, in the Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement, the three countries agreed that an attack on any one of them would be considered an attack on all of them. “But Saudi Arabia learned sooner than expected that agreements on paper and declarations of solidarity from its regional partners yielded little more than paperwork and diplomatic statements,” the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commented. “Pakistan promised to act ‘when the time comes.’ Turkey sent warm words …”
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, urged U.S. President Donald Trump to launch an offensive against the Houthis. Much much to the prince’s disappointment, Trump declined, reminding him that Washington’s 2025 ceasefire with the Houthis remains in effect.
Dan Shapiro, a former senior Middle East policy official in the Pentagon during the Biden administration, told The New York Times that Trump’s decision was based on several factors. “Already confronting an open-ended conflict with Iran, with an overstretched Navy and a diminishing munitions stockpile, it’s unsurprising that he does not want to open a new front,” he said.
The United States, however, is reportedly providing Saudi Arabia with air defense systems, targeting data, and intelligence support.
Iran, meanwhile, has been disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, firing on commercial vessels and laying mines to cause havoc and raise oil prices, much to the detriment of the global economy. Iran, too, hopes to end the American blockade of Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf and deter the US Navy from conducting further strikes on Iranian oil tankers.
Consequently, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is far below what it was prior to the Iran war. However, a small number of ships have been getting through with the assistance of the US Navy.
Iran, having rejected Trump’s demands to wind down the war, has stepped up attacks against US warships in the Persian Gulf. Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s top national security official, said that Iran has tested its first anti-ship missile against a US vessel.
Seven months after the US and Israeli joint assault on Iran, the regime in Tehran exerts authority over two major maritime passages: the Strait of Hormuz, which is at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
As a result, Iran now controls two of the most strategic choke points in the Middle East and more than 35 percent of the fuel and oil trade globally, says Farea al-Muslimi, a research fellow at London’s Chatham House think tank.
Foreign Affairs believes that Iran’s long-term aim is to establish a status quo in which it controls the Strait of Hormuz alongside the Houthis’ control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Such a strategy, if sustained, would make Iran and its regional partner de facto gatekeepers for trillions of dollars’ worth of trade each year.
If Iran manages to achieve this daunting objective, there may well be a new hegemon in the Middle East, and the United States and Israel will have been dealt a staggering strategic blow.
