The Morning After: Why Israel’s Next Coalition Will Look Like the Last One

On election night, one side will celebrate, while the other begins calculating what went wrong. Yet by morning, whoever emerges with the strongest claim to power will confront much the same list of problems: an unresolved war in Gaza, a volatile regional security environment, mounting fiscal pressures, disputes over military service, and a society still divided over accountability for October 7, 2023. Israel’s election may change the people at the top. Whether it changes the politics beneath them is another matter.

This is the first national election since Hamas’s October 7 attack plunged Israel into its deepest security crisis in decades. It is also a referendum, in part, on Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, his government’s handling of the war, and the political arrangements that have sustained his return to office. The opposition, led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, has promised a different approach. But a change of leadership, should it occur, will not automatically produce a different system of government.

Israelis vote for parties, not directly for prime minister. The 120-seat Knesset is elected through proportional representation, with a 3.25 percent electoral threshold. No party has ever won an outright parliamentary majority. A government therefore depends on assembling a coalition of at least 61 lawmakers, often across parties with conflicting priorities.

That arithmetic matters because coalition partners do more than provide votes. They negotiate over budgets, military policy, religious exemptions, judicial reform and the distribution of political power. A party with only a handful of seats can wield disproportionate influence when its support determines whether a government survives.

The central question, then, is not simply who wins. It is whether the next coalition can escape the incentives that have repeatedly made Israeli politics vulnerable to deadlock, short-term bargaining and unresolved national disputes. The danger is not that nothing will change, but that change at the top will leave the underlying constraints largely intact.

The Arithmetic of Political Survival

Israel’s electoral system encourages representation, but it also makes governing a permanent exercise in negotiation. The 2022 election gave Netanyahu’s bloc 64 seats, enough for a parliamentary majority. Yet that numerical advantage did not eliminate internal tensions. Instead, the government remained dependent on parties whose demands often extended beyond the priorities of the broader electorate.

The next coalition may have a different composition, but the underlying problem will remain. Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious partners have sought to preserve their influence over issues ranging from judicial reform to exemptions from military service. The opposition, meanwhile, brings together parties whose common opposition to Netanyahu does not necessarily translate into agreement on every major policy question.

This distinction is crucial. An electoral alliance can unite parties around removing a leader without resolving their disagreements over what should follow. A government formed by such an alliance could therefore discover that replacing Netanyahu is easier than establishing a durable governing program.

The same constraint applies to the incumbent camp. Even if Netanyahu retains power, he must accommodate partners whose political survival depends on delivering specific concessions to their constituencies. A coalition can be numerically viable yet strategically inflexible.

The result is a system in which political survival frequently takes precedence over policy resolution. Leaders must calculate not only what the country needs, but also what their coalition partners will tolerate. The more fragile the majority, the greater the leverage of individual factions.

This does not mean that every Israeli government must reproduce its predecessor’s policies. A different parliamentary balance can create opportunities for reform. But unless the incentives governing coalition negotiations change, the next administration will face many of the same pressures, even if its ministers and political slogans differ.

Security, Society and the Price of Governing

Security will remain the most powerful constraint on the next government. The October 7 attack transformed Israel’s political debate, while the subsequent wars have imposed enormous human, military and economic costs. Yet a broad commitment to national security does not settle the harder question of how security should be achieved or what political outcome military operations are supposed to deliver.

Gaza illustrates the dilemma. A government may promise to prevent Hamas from again threatening Israel, but military action alone cannot determine who will govern the territory, how reconstruction will proceed, or what political arrangements might reduce the risk of renewed conflict. These questions require choices that can divide even politicians who agree on the need to protect Israeli citizens.

The dispute over Haredi military service presents a similarly difficult test at home. In 2024, Israel’s Supreme Court ruled that the longstanding blanket exemption for ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students lacked a legal basis. Subsequent legal and political disputes have exposed a deeper conflict over the distribution of national obligations. For families whose members serve in the military, exemptions can appear increasingly difficult to justify. For Haredi parties, protecting religious study and communal autonomy remains a core political commitment.

A government dependent on Haredi support may struggle to reconcile these competing demands. An alternative coalition could pursue broader conscription, but implementing such a policy would require legislation, enforcement and a willingness to absorb political resistance.

The economic consequences make these choices harder still. Israel must finance defense requirements while maintaining public services, supporting households and preserving investor confidence. Higher security expenditure can constrain fiscal flexibility, while prolonged mobilization disrupts employment and business activity. The precise burden will depend on the duration and intensity of conflict, but the trade-offs are unavoidable.

These are not separate crises. They reinforce one another. Coalition bargains influence military-service policy and budget priorities; those decisions affect public trust and economic resilience; and declining trust makes the next round of political compromise more difficult.

Continuity Is Not Destiny

The next government will also inherit a diplomatic problem that cannot be solved through coalition arithmetic alone. Israel’s relationship with Washington remains strategically indispensable, yet differences over military policy and the future of Gaza can complicate that partnership. Meanwhile, the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia remains tied to broader regional calculations, including the Palestinian question and the security interests of both countries.

A government that depends on parties opposed to substantial concessions to the Palestinians may find its diplomatic options constrained. An opposition-led administration might have more room to reconsider some policies, but it would still confront domestic resistance and the security concerns that shape Israeli public opinion. Neither scenario guarantees a diplomatic breakthrough.

This is where the election’s international significance becomes clear. From Jakarta and other parts of the Global South, Israel’s political trajectory is judged not only by the stability of its government, but also by its conduct in conflict and its approach to international law. Economic and technological cooperation can create shared interests, yet it cannot be insulated entirely from questions of legitimacy and regional stability.

For Israel, a more stable political system could widen opportunities for diplomacy, trade and investment. But stability alone is insufficient. Governments must also make choices that allow partners to defend cooperation politically and demonstrate that security objectives can coexist with a credible political horizon for Palestinians.

The first 100 days will offer an early indication of whether the next coalition intends to govern differently. Three tests will matter: whether it can address the unequal distribution of military obligations, establish a credible fiscal course, and articulate a clear political strategy for Gaza and the wider region. These are practical measures of governing capacity, not merely campaign promises.

Israel’s next coalition may indeed look like the last one, even if its composition changes. The deeper continuity lies in the incentives that reward political survival, the compromises that sustain fragile majorities, and the disputes that successive governments have struggled to resolve.

But continuity is not destiny. A different coalition can make different choices if it changes the bargains on which it depends. The morning after the election, therefore, should not be judged solely by who occupies the prime minister’s office. It should be judged by whether the new government can turn electoral authority into decisions that previous governments repeatedly postponed. That is the real test of political change in Israel.